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Spiritual Shakespeares
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are
dreamt of in secular materialism, theology, or contemporary theory.
That at least is what the present collection sets out so suggestively
to show.
John D. Caputo (from the Foreword)
Readers will find here an engagement with both Shakespeare and
spirituality which is intelligent, original, and challengingly optimistic,
one which surely succeeds in its wish to ‘reinvigorate and strengthen
politically progressive materialist criticism’.
Jonathan Dollimore (from the Afterword)
Spiritual Shakespeares is the first book to explore the scope for reading
Shakespeare spiritually in the light of contemporary theory and current
world events. Ewan Fernie has brought together an exciting cast of critics
in order to respond to the ‘religious turn’ in recent thought and to the
spiritualised politics of terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’.
Opening a genuinely new perspective within Shakespeare Studies, this
volume suggests that experiencing the spiritual intensities of the plays
could lead us back to dramatic intensity as such. It tests spirituality from
a political perspective, as well as subjecting politics to an unusual spiritual
critique. Among its controversial and provocative arguments is the idea
that a consideration of spirituality might point the way forward for
materialist criticism.
Spiritual Shakespeares reaches across and beyond literary studies with
challenging, powerful contributions from Philippa Berry, John D. Caputo,
Jonathan Dollimore, Ewan Fernie, Lisa Freinkel, Lowell Gallagher, 
John J. Joughin, Richard Kearney, David Ruiter and Kiernan Ryan.
Ewan Fernie is Senior Lecturer in English at Royal Holloway,












































General Editor: TERENCE HAWKES
It is more than twenty years since the New Accents series helped to
establish ‘theory’ as a fundamental and continuing feature of the study
of literature at the undergraduate level. Since then, the need for short,
powerful ‘cutting edge’ accounts of and comments on new developments
has increased sharply. In the case of Shakespeare, books with this sort
of focus have not been readily available. Accents on Shakespeare
aims to supply them.
Accents on Shakespeare volumes will either ‘apply’ theory, or
broaden and adapt it in order to connect with concrete teaching con-
cerns. In the process, they will also reflect and engage with the major
developments in Shakespeare studies of the last ten years.
The series will lead as well as follow. In pursuit of this goal it will be
a two-tiered series. In addition to affordable, ‘adoptable’ titles aimed at
modular undergraduate courses, it will include a number of research-
based books. Spirited and committed, these second-tier volumes advocate
radical change rather than stolidly reinforcing the status quo.
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And what impossibility would slay
In common sense, sense saves another way.
(All’s Well That Ends Well )
No settled senses of the world can match
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In our time, the field of literary studies has rarely been a settled,
tranquil place. Indeed, for over two decades, the clash of
opposed theories, prejudices and points of view has made 
it more of a battlefield. Echoing across its most beleaguered
terrain, the student’s weary complaint ‘Why can’t I just pick
up Shakespeare’s plays and read them?’ seems to demand a
sympathetic response.
Nevertheless, we know that modern spectacles will always
impose their own particular characteristics on the vision of
those who unthinkingly don them. This must mean, at the very
least, that an apparently simple confrontation with, or pious
contemplation of, the text of a 400-year-old play can scarcely
supply the grounding for an adequate response to its complex
demands. For this reason, a transfer of emphasis from ‘text’
towards ‘context’ has increasingly been the concern of critics
and scholars since the Second World War: a tendency that has
perhaps reached its climax in more recent movements such as
‘New Historicism’ or ‘Cultural Materialism’.
A consideration of the conditions (social, political or
economic) within which the play came to exist, from which it
derives, and to which it speaks, will certainly make legitimate
demands on the attention of any well-prepared student nowa-
days. Of course, the serious pursuit of those interests will also
inevitably start to undermine ancient and inherited prejudices,
such as the supposed distinction between ‘foreground’ and
‘background’ in literary studies. And even the slightest aware-
ness of the pressures of gender or of race, or the most cursory
glance at the role played by that strange creature ‘Shakespeare’










































questions that sometimes appear scandalously ‘non-literary’. 
It seems clear that very different and unsettling notions of 
the ways in which literature might be addressed can hardly be
avoided. The worrying truth is that nobody can just pick up
Shakespeare’s plays and read them. Perhaps (even more
worrying) they never could.
The aim of Accents on Shakespeare is to encourage students and
teachers to explore the implications of this situation by means
of an engagement with the major developments in Shakespeare
studies over recent years. It will offer a continuing and chal-
lenging reflection on those ideas through a series of multi- and
single-author books that will also supply the basis for adapting
or augmenting them in the light of changing concerns.
Accents on Shakespeare also intends to lead as well as follow.
In pursuit of this goal, the series will operate on more than
one level. In addition to titles aimed at modular undergraduate
courses, it will include a number of books embodying polem-
ical, strongly argued cases aimed at expanding the horizons 
of a specific aspect of the subject and at challenging the pre-
conceptions on which it is based. These volumes will not be
learned ‘monographs’ in any traditional sense. They will, it is
hoped, offer a platform for the work of the liveliest younger
scholars and teachers at their most outspoken and provocative.
Committed and contentious, they will be reporting from the
forefront of current critical activity and will have something
new to say. The fact that each book in the series promises a
Shakespeare inflected in terms of a specific urgency should












































xiv General editor’s preface
Acknowledgements
I’m (once again) grateful to Terence Hawkes for help, warmth,
efficiency and wit. I’m also happily indebted to Liz Thompson
and everyone at Routledge and at Florence Production – 
and, of course, to all the contributors. Eleni Pilla supplied an
admirable index. Many have kept the campfire burning.
Foremost among them are Philippa Berry, Mark Thornton
Burnett, Patrick Cheney, John Caputo, Katharine Craik,
Jonathan Dollimore, Deanna Fernie, Lisa Freinkel, Hugh Grady,
Colin Graham, John Joughin, James Knapp, Simon Palfrey,
David Ruiter and Kiernan Ryan. I have to single out Eric Mallin,
whose extraordinary generosity helped kindle the thing. Ken
Jackson’s recent suggestions kept it blazing till the end.
Note
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Shakespeare
are from The Norton Shakespeare, General Editor Stephen
Greenblatt (New York: Norton, 1997); all biblical quotations






















































































The essays that follow are meant to open up links between 
the world of Shakespeare and that surprising twist in post-
modernism sometimes called its “religious turn.” They proceed
from the premise that literature does not illustrate pre-
established philosophical principles but can instruct philosophy
about matters too concrete and singular for philosophy’s
purview. So if, as Peter Brook says, theater is “life in a more
concentrate form,” condensing a lifetime into a few hours on
the stage (cited in Janik 2003), then who better than Shake-
speare can instruct philosophy about the meaning and texture
of concrete experience? Who better than Hamlet, to take a
famous example, can teach us about the dynamics of decisions
made in the midst of life’s uncertainties? To this exciting
venture I wish to add my modest oar. I suggest that these essays
should be read as operating within a uniquely postmodern
horizon that I will call “hyper-reality” (Caputo 2001).
The nineteenth-century prophets assure us God is dead.
According to Marx and Feuerbach, the absolute has renounced
its transcendent foothold in the sky and come down to earth,
annulling the alienation of its absolute alterity for a life of
immanence in the sublunary world. The positivists propose that
mysteries that once were the province of myth and philosophy
have found a demystified resting place in modern science. But
in 1967 Jacques Derrida remarked, “what is dead wields a very
specific power” (Derrida 1972: 6). There are signs of advanced
secularization, like the decline in regular church attendance
among the larger confessions or the virtual collapse of voca-
tions to the Catholic priesthood in Western countries. But










































entire world, west and east, north and south, has been 
swept by surging tides of Christian evangelicalism and Islamic
fundamentalism. These are contemporary realities with which
academic skepticism is totally out of touch.
“Modernity” is more complicated than previously imagined.
The very idea of the death of God in Nietzsche constituted a
denial of Overarching Truth, be it scientific or theological.
There are only as many little pragmatic truths (Nietzsche called
them “fictions”) as are required for the complexities of life.
Secularism’s monopoly is as dead as God’s, allowing many
flowers to bloom. If God is dead, a funny thing happened on
the way to the funeral. A profusion of new gods was born.
The ancients invested a considerable effort trying to convince
us that the supersensible sphere is “really real,” while the nine-
teenth century proclaimed that realm to be an “un-real” fantasy
and asked us to content ourselves with the sensible reality below.
But in this postmodern age it is the “hyper-real” that holds
sway. In a world of interplanetary space probes the very pre-
Copernican distinction between an upper world and a lower
one has lost all sense, even as totalizing omni-explanations have
lost their cachet. Our world is what James Joyce called a
“chaosmos” (see Eco 1989), neither simple cosmos nor simple
chaos, but a complex loosely joined and supple configuration
given to chance and the unexpected, open-ended and recon-
figurable. We no longer live by the simple distinction between
presence and absence. Our lives are suffused and haunted by
shades and spectres, quasi and virtual realities. Within the ultra-
horizon of the “hyper-real” diverse patterns of what this book
calls “spirituality” unfold.
In speaking of the “hyper-real,” I am first of all commending
to the reader Jean Baudrillard’s analysis of an electronic repli-
cation of reality in a “virtual” world so uncanny as to blur the
distinction between the real and the unreal (to what extent was
the “Gulf War” real and to what extent was it a media event?
(see Baudrillard 1995)). Baudrillard’s point, whose importance
cannot be overestimated, goes to the heart of one of the senses
of postmodernism that has been artfully explored in the works
of Mark C. Taylor (see Taylor 2003 and 2004). In such a
world, the insubstantiality of what the materialists call matter
is visited upon us with a fury. We lead lives in which the lines











































plants are so complex that the very meanings of “mother,”
“birth” and “nature” have been made to tremble. In such a
world, materialistic reductionism or “naturalism” is an anachro-
nism, while Elizabethan ghosts and angels have become
interestingly timely.
But I use “hyper-real” in a second and distinctly ethico-
religious sense that bears quite directly on the present volume.
For if it is true that contemporary theorists are critics of realism
and essentialism, as they certainly are, still it brushes against
the grain to call them (simply) “anti-realists,” if that is taken
to connote any kind of vicious subjectivism. For the truth is
that by and large contemporary theory is turned toward the
affirmation of the “Other.” This is the very opposite of self-
ishness or fantasy. Derrida’s discontent with realism arises not
from anti-realist motives but from hyper-realist ones, from a love
and a desire for the real beyond what today passes for real,
which springs from a desire for a justice or a democracy to
come!
And yet the point here, let us recall, is not to fit Shakespeare
into any pre-established theory but to shush the philoso-
phers and make them listen to the play because the play’s 
the thing, die Sache selbst, in which the whole of life has been
concentrated.
Shakespeare knows that our lives are haunted by shades and
shadows of the dead who remind us of what they expect, that
they are uplifted by the voice of a “divinity” who “shapes our
ends”, and that they are disturbed by the demonic distortions
of evil. He knows that we are called to respond in the present
even as we are solicited by the promise of things to come.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than
are dreamt of in secular materialism, theology or contem-
porary theory. That at least is what the present collection sets

























































































Before he is ‘environed’ by ‘a legion of foul fiends’ in a dream
of ‘the kingdom of perpetual night’, Clarence is assailed by his
angry father-in-law.
Then came wandering by
A shadow like an angel, with bright hair,
Dabbled in blood, and he shrieked out aloud,
‘Clarence is come: false, fleeting, perjured Clarence,
That stabbed me in the field by Tewkesbury.’
(Richard III, 1.4.52–6)
Ass-headed Bottom, in a very different dream, enjoys unfath-
omable ecstasies in a fairy bower. His is a comic, synaesthetic
experience that deforms (reforms?) Pauline pieties in the expres-
sion: ‘The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath 
not seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to con-
ceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was’ (A Midsummer
Night’s Dream, 4.1.204–7). Uncomfortably hard on the heels of










































between all things, a ‘sweet harmony’ that ‘creeps’ into the ears
of men and women, tames savage horses and wields a charming
power over ‘trees, stones and floods’, but also reverberates at a
superhuman pitch in the heights:
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still choiring to the young-eyed cherubins.
Such harmony is in immortal souls,
But while this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close us in, we cannot hear it.
(The Merchant of Venice, 5.1.53–90)
Cordelia is a ‘soul in bliss’ to the unhappy father who gazes
up at her while he turns on a wheel of fire that his tears
(mysteriously) ‘scald like molten lead’ (King Lear (conflated text),
4.4.46–8). Othello cries for devils to whip him from the ‘heav-
enly sight’ of Desdemona’s innocent corpse; to blow him about
in winds, roast him in sulphur, wash him in ‘steep-down gulfs
of liquid fire’ (Othello, 52.285–7). Cleopatra elegises a cosmic
Antony whose ‘reared arm crested the world’ and who dropped
‘realms and islands’ like loose change from his pockets (Antony
and Cleopatra, 5.281–91). Hermione is seemingly resurrected.
To a greater or lesser degree, such moments have embar-
rassed the predominantly materialist criticism of the last twenty
years, and they have typically been passed over in silence or
treated as an historical curiosity.1 But, as the current volume
demonstrates, this significantly misrepresents and curtails
Shakespearean drama. Spiritual Shakespeares treats Shakespear-
ean spirituality as a distinctive, inalienable and challenging
dimension of the plays, one that may be illuminated by, but
remains irreducible to, any established theory or theology.
Although it draws liberally from history, the volume offers a
primarily ‘presentist’ engagement with its topic.2 It is a book
that treats Shakespeare as a ‘living thinker’, one whose dramatic
explorations of spirituality can make a real contribution to
contemporary debates and life. Much recent work on Shake-
speare and early modern literature has filtered spirituality
through the variegated light of religious difference.3 Distinc-











































Islam, and so on, will play their part in what follows, but the
collection also has critical and theoretical claims to make 
about spirituality as such. Perhaps most controversially, Spiritual
Shakespeares argues that a fresh consideration of spirituality might
reinvigorate and strengthen politically progressive materialist
criticism.
All the instances I began with are charged to an extra-
ordinary, even astonishing degree with ‘otherness’, which 
(in different forms) has been the defining preoccupation of
contemporary critics. From the more orthodoxly Christian
imaginings of Clarence, Lear and Othello, to Cleopatra’s excep-
tional humanism and the heterodox experiences of Bottom and
Hermione, each example conjures another life – in the theatre
of divine judgement, on a cosmically larger scale, as trans-
cendent sex, as a voice in harmony with the universal choir,
as simply renewed mortality. That the most powerful Shake-
spearean instances of being otherwise are explicitly spiritual
has largely escaped attention. In 1 Henry VI, when the Countess
Auvergne scorns the hero she has trapped in her house, he
answers:
You are deceived; my substance is not here.
For what you see is but the smallest part
And least proportion of humanity.
I tell you, madam, were the whole frame here,
It is of such a spacious lofty pitch
Your roof were not sufficient to contain’t.
(2.3.51–6)4
Talbot’s assertion of a colossally elevated spiritual subjectivity
begs attention in the context of more predictable discussions
of alternative identity in terms of the social varieties of differ-
ence. In spite of the long-standing critical prejudice against
‘essentialism’, specifically spiritual alterity is aesthetically and
theoretically interesting because it is configured not just as
totally different from ordinary life but also as ultimately signifi-
cant and real. Spirituality affords a credible alternative, or rather
a range of such alternatives. It has a special power to break
the illusion of what all-too-often is taken to be ‘this world’s











































world is more desirable as well as somehow more profoundly
real than this one can motivate a hermit-like withdrawal from
the world as it is, but it can also inspire positive revolutionary
change. As Gerard Winstanley said, ‘Why may not we have
our heaven here?’ (quoted in Hill 1968: 60).5
Shakespeare at least once conceived of his art as having the
broadly ‘spiritual’ function of materialising another world.
Theseus famously describes the ‘poet’s eye in a fine frenzy
rolling’ between heaven and earth as he (or she) brings forth
‘the forms of things unknown’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream,
5.1.12ff.). Poetry and spirituality are kin in that both traffic
beyond the known world; they are alike, too, in their disputed
relation to what is real. If both are sometimes thought to reach
through the world of mere appearances into the heart of reality,
they are equally often regarded as empty-headed distractions
from what really is. It depends on whether ‘the forms of things
unknown’ are revelations or illusions. Shakespeare conveys the
epistemological insecurity of poetry and spirituality via Theseus’s
association of poetry’s spiritual reach with the doubtful states
of mind of the lover and lunatic, and by filtering some of the
most profound spiritual experiences in his plays through the
rich but unstable medium of dreams. Poetry and spirituality
both promise no less than another world. But this promise 
may be hollow, which only makes them the more sensation-
ally interesting.6 Shakespeare deliberately mixes the promise
and unlikelihood of poetry and spirituality into something rich
and strange in the last scene of The Winter’s Tale. Even if
Hermione’s revival is a simple trick, it is infused with the aura
of resurrection.
Theseus speaks of poetry, not plays, and some of the
examples I started with could be said to exert only a secondary,
purely verbal pressure within an art-form that at its most
convincing fuses verbal with physical form. But the dreamy
union of Bottom and Titania is acted out in full view of the
audience and the staging of Hermione’s ‘resurrection’ is 
the great coup de théâtre of The Winter’s Tale and perhaps of all
the late plays. Hermione’s reanimation is also a ‘recognition
scene’ for the process of incarnation whereby Shakespearean
drama generally brings its characters to life: everyone on stage
watching the ‘miracle’ is witnessing the strange secret of their











































sprung into life by the magical grace of the playwright and the
theatre company. And if humanity can be recreated on stage,
perhaps it can be renovated off stage as well?
Theseus and The Winter’s Tale encourage us to consider the
plays as a real or fantasised advent of the beyond within reality.
But it is clear from the speeches and experiences of Talbot,
Clarence, Bottom, Cleopatra etc. that Shakespearean drama is
also sufficiently ‘real’ to be haunted by spiritual alterity from
within. Sometimes this fourth dimension seems only obscurely
to inhabit quotidian character or action, but such ‘sightless
substances’ as Lady Macbeth speaks of can exert powerful
spiritual pressure (Macbeth, 1.5.47). Richmond is too obviously
the vehicle of Tudor providence to be convincingly himself,
but when Othello looks down for Iago’s cloven feet, the absol-
ute isn’t so easily identified or ‘earthed’; the infernal energies
that course through the tragedy are frighteningly, uncon-
trollably obscure, as is intimated in the ‘hell’ that gapes in 
the centre of Othello’s name and the ‘demon’ snugly smiling
in Desdemona’s.7 In such cases, we are tempted to feel that
we could scratch the play’s surface to reveal another, perhaps
more terrible drama going on beneath but are doomed to
discover we can’t. As a result, we as much as the protagonists
themselves are stranded between the particular and ultimate,
between an accidental world of misplaced hankies and a terrible
threat of absolute judgement. The sense of simultaneous
spiritual urgency and disorientation is crystallised by Othello’s
trope of the wilderness – ‘antres vast and deserts idle, rough
quarries, rocks and hills’ (1.3.139–40) – where meaninglessness
and the fullness of revelation traditionally contend for human
souls, as in Christ’s temptation in the wilderness or the careers
of the so-called Desert Fathers.8
If the spirituality of the plays has scandalised the materialism
of contemporary thought, it has also often been depreciated or
ignored because the truth-claims it involves are presumed 
to be at odds with Shakespeare’s theatrical polyphony. It is
certainly the case that spiritual utterances or experiences are
often ironised by the plays. Thus Lorenzo’s rhapsody on
harmony is partly wrecked by the sullen resistance, then edgy
silence it elicits from Jessica, reminding us of her relinquished
Jewish faith and father, and highlighting the coercive power











































wild creatures. But the ironic power of spiritual truth itself 
has been underestimated in recent criticism. Although it retains
a glittering Venetian materialism in its heavenly vision of
‘patens of bright gold’, Lorenzo’s verse of universal concord
soars beyond the divisive theologies of the play to expose him,
exclusive Belmont and his complacently corrupt ‘Christian’
community far more than Jessica’s sullen resistance does.
Lorenzo, who can’t even manage a real conversation with his
bride-to-be, has insufficient harmony in his soul. He is damned
out of his own mouth: ‘Let no such man be trusted.’ Nor is it
any wonder that celestial harmonies are inaudible in ‘a naughty
world’ where a fraudulent peace and unity have been secured
by a forced conversion. And yet, the merest echo of them indi-
cates how bitterly far from heaven the happiness of Belmont
is. The touch of spirituality threatens the cruelly provisional
‘realities’ of the plays. In his more tragic idiom, Lear expects
the ‘great gods’ he feels bestirring themselves in the storm on
the heath to break the moulds and forms of things as they are
(King Lear, 3.2.48).
Shakespeare’s protagonists are often ruined by spiritual 
crisis. Stephen Greenblatt’s explanations of Clarence’s dream,
Richard III’s supernatural forebodings before Bosworth Field,
the apparition of Ceasar’s ghost to the doomed Brutus and the
posthumous appearance of ‘blood-baltered Banquo’ to Macbeth
are a touch too mundane (Greenblatt 2001: 180ff.). Conducted
in terms of ‘deep psychic disturbance’, ‘history’s nightmare’, ‘the
poetic or tragic structure of history’ and ‘good theatre’, they
acknowledge but step quickly around the fact that the revenant
murder-victims who appear to Clarence, Richard, Brutus and
Macbeth are accusing figures of guilt disclosing (to the audience
as well as the murderers themselves) what Greenblatt calls ‘an
ineradicable, embodied objective power’ so far pathetically
evaded and ignored (Greenblatt 2001: 180). The alternative
reality of ethics invades the fantasy-lives of megalomaniac
dreamers, thus partly prophesying, partly effecting the ruination
of their tyrannical plans to shape reality to their own desire.
They are left, to paraphrase Richard II, self-affrighted, trembling
at their sin (Richard II, 3.2.49).
But, in order to do justice to Shakespeare’s heterodoxy, it
must quickly be said that Richard III and Macbeth are simul-











































resolve. As the range of contributions to this volume suggests,
Shakespearean spirituality cuts both ways, and more. Unlike
Dante or Milton, Shakespeare isn’t an orthodox or systematic
religious thinker. It is necessary to think in terms not so much
of spiritual truth as truths. For a drama cut loose of its medieval
moorings in an epoch of religious fission and the emergence
of scepticism, spirituality is not a secure given, so much as a
questionable and open structure of being and experience.
Shakespeare’s is the drama of the possibility of spirituality.
Shakespearean pluralism involves competition between possible
absolutes, and resistance to the absolute as well. This leads us
into territory as existentially and ethically treacherous and
exciting as experience itself.9
For example, a sensation of the ultimate seems to release
Hamlet’s trigger-hand, but what is the status of this ‘divine’
transaction? Is it an experience of the opaque, compelling effi-
ciency of ideology at its purest? Or does it access a higher
sphere beyond ideology that motivates or compels action in
the world? Is Hamlet’s subjectivity lost in his last, eschatological
act, or is it there exactly that he finds himself at last? Macbeth
seems to make a selfish choice through which radical evil oper-
ates. Or is his mundane choice of ‘mine own good’ already
demonic (Macbeth, 3.4.134)? What does it mean to ‘jump the
life to come’ (1.7.7)? Is the master-narrative of ‘The Scottish
Play’ simply commitment politics imbued with and refigured
as spirituality? In Measure for Measure, Isabella confronts Angelo’s
secular absolutism with her own religious commitment; or
perhaps two forms of egotism meet under cover of this conflict.
In any case, both are subverted by the Duke’s providential
ideology, while cynics such as Lucio and Barnardine reject all
transcendence. There are puzzling spiritual tensions between
individual plays as well. What is the relationship between
Hamlet’s ‘divinity’ of ‘rashness’ and the ‘supernatural soliciting’
that starts Macbeth on his career of violence (Hamlet, 5.2.11, 7; 
Macbeth, 1.3.129)? How does any of this relate to the spirituality
of specifically brutish sexual congress in Bottom’s dream? Or
to the spirituality of female generativity that emerges when a
mother is ‘resurrected’ by a female Paul and reunited with her
resplendent daughter in The Winter’s Tale?
By playing up the ludic qualities of Shakespeare’s plays,











































and comedies alike are struggles between more or less ‘mighty
opposites’ (Hamlet, 5.2.63). They take up fundamental questions
of human ontology and ethics and offer competing answers.
Liberal relativism is only one of the possibilities that stands a
fighting chance in Shakespeare. The plays are more liberal
than liberalism, which cannot allow for the kind of overriding
commitment that threatens liberal freedoms. They are also
more compellingly involving. Agonistic drama makes liberal
tolerance look more like indifference. Shakespeare’s is not post-
modern shadow play avant la lettre but serious, sometimes bloody
play for real stakes that has more in common with dialectical
politics. Dramatic tension and interest depends crucially on 
two factors: that one or more characters (Shylock, Falstaff,
Cleopatra, Timon, etc.) might be right; and that out of the
struggle new values and social formations might evolve. This,
as much as delight in disorder, keeps us reading or watching
the plays. Re-experiencing their spiritual intensities may lead
us back to dramatic intensity itself.
II
Time for a definition: spirituality is (or purports to be) the
experience or knowledge of what is other and is ultimate, and
the sense of identity and ‘mission’ that may arise from or be
vested in that experience.10 Recent Shakespeare studies have
tended to miss spirituality’s investment in otherness and have,
therefore, typically dismissed it as a form of essentialism that
operates, at best, as a distraction from history and, at worst,
as justification for pernicious hierarchies of race, gender and
class. But, as I have suggested already, such scepticism has
resulted in serious neglect not only of important metaphysical
dimensions of Shakespeare’s text, but also of ideas of emanci-
pation and an alternative world that have real political
potential.11
Precisely because it isn’t just ideology by a prettier name,
spirituality can function as an effective cover for ideology.
Henry V uses religion as wartime propaganda. But the exces-
sive otherness of spirituality subverts such ideological uses, and
spirituality comes back to haunt King Henry in the speech











































[I]f the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy
reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads
chopped off in a battle shall join together at the latter day
and cry all ‘We died at such a place’ – some swearing,
some crying for a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor
behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon
their children rawly left. I am afeard there are few die well
that die in a battle, for how can they charitably dispose of
anything when blood is their argument? Now, if these men
do not die well, it will be a black matter for the King, that
led them to it – who to disobey were against all proportion
of subjection.
(Henry V, 4.1.128–38)
This powerfully material evocation of spiritual judgement is a
useful reminder that spirituality and materialism should not be
simply opposed. It hardly needs saying that after the Iraq war
and the tragic farce of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, the
values of the speech have been powerfully renewed.
Because it is committed to an extraordinary world of value
beyond particular political interests, spirituality never coincides
perfectly with ideology. As Queen Katherine says to her royal
husband’s spin-doctors, ‘Heaven is above all yet – there sits 
a judge/That no king can corrupt’ (Henry VIII, 3.1.99–100).
Where there’s no tension between ideology and the spirituality
through which it operates – as, for example, with the descent
of Jupiter in Cymbeline – only the form or mechanism of spiritu-
ality is involved. This is frustratingly the case in Measure for
Measure, where the Duke goes undercover as a friar and brings
Angelo to judgement. The spiritualised exposure of power, and
Angelo’s painful liberation from it, are immediately absorbed
into the consolidation of Vincentio’s original regime. Had the
Duke submitted to the spirituality he wields, it would have
made an opening for real change.
Nor is spirituality just the same as religion. Though it is
religion’s heart and inspiration, spirituality precedes religion
and may well take place outside it. Spirituality is an experi-
ence of truth, and of living in accordance with truth, but it is
concerned with the truth not of this world but of a world that
has not yet and perhaps never will come to be. Spirituality is











































opposed to the body and the material world – and what could
be more oppositional than that? But there are forms of spiritual
materialism (for example, in ‘new-age religion’) where physical
life is seen as ultimately valuable and real by comparison with
the conventions of social life.12
Indeed, as a structure of thought and possibility, spirituality
may be a necessary supplement for radical materialism, which,
after all, has its roots in Hegelian spiritual ‘dialectic’. A salient
terminological shift in recent criticism begs attention here: as
a result of admittedly complex intellectual upheavals, ‘dialec-
tical materialism’ became ‘cultural materialism’, which has
recently become the study of ‘material culture’, implying a
degenerative tendency whereby the world-transforming ambi-
tion of Marxist materialism is progressively lost.13 After new
historicism and cultural materialism, history is now the far
horizon and sole explanatory hypothesis in contemporary criti-
cism to the extent that conceiving of and accounting for
resistance to history has become a familiar problem. Subversion
is notoriously always contained for the Greenblatt of Shake-
spearean Negotiations (1988). Cultural materialists have managed
to evade this hopeless position by emphasising that history is
always fractured and divided. Alan Sinfield, for instance, finds
a way of combining a commitment to historical determinism
with the possibility of resistance to the dominant culture in the
notion of ‘subcultures’ (see Sinfield 1992: 35–48). But while 
the efforts of radical critics to find counter-histories within the
history that prevailed are instructive, they are not very inspira-
tional. Spirituality holds out the hope of a more positive leap
into a revolutionary alternative.
This book asks whether radical materialism might not be
regenerated by rethinking spirituality, if not by returning to its
own spiritual source in Hegel? According to Jürgen Habermas,
spirituality remains ‘indispensable’ in enabling ‘discourse with
the extraordinary’ (Habermas 1992: 51, 145). One premise of
Spiritual Shakespeares is that the speculative freedom and phenom-
enological appeal of imaginative literature offer special oppor-
tunities for the study of spirituality before it has hardened into
institutional religious forms.
Two things in particular opened the way for Spiritual
Shakespeares. First, the celebrated Shakespeare critic, Stephen











































the late Jacques Derrida, broke ranks with materialism narrowly
conceived to publish surprising accounts of the spirituality of
Hamlet. Both thinkers were captivated by the powerful alterity
of Shakespeare’s ghost. At the beginning of Hamlet in Purgatory,
Greenblatt remarks:
The ghost in Hamlet is like none other. . . . It does not have
very many lines – it appears in three scenes and speaks only
in two – but it is amazingly disturbing and vivid. I wanted
to let the feeling of this vividness wash over me . . .
(Greenblatt 2001: 4)
None of Greenblatt’s subsequent rationalisation explains away
the origins of Hamlet in Purgatory in what seems to be some-
thing like a spiritual encounter.14 Before Greenblatt, Derrida
derived a novel form of spirituality from his own, similarly
intense encounter with the ghost in Specters of Marx. This 
made Shakespeare a surprisingly pivotal figure in the spiritual
or religious ‘turn’ in contemporary thought (Derrida 1994).
Spiritual Shakespeares is the first book to ask what the Bard really
has to say in this context.
Derrida presents the spirituality he finds in Hamlet as nothing
less than ‘another concept of the political’ (Derrida 1994: 44).
The second opening for Spiritual Shakespeares within contempor-
ary culture is the increasing association of religion and politics.
‘The end of history’ and the triumph of the Western liberal
democratic system were proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama in
1992 and, in the same year, Zygmunt Bauman lamented ‘living
without an alternative’ in a global situation where, with com-
munism vanquished, the West seemed free to do as it liked
(Fukuyama 1992; Bauman 1992: 175). But, by 2002, Tariq 
Ali was in no doubt that what he calls American ‘imperialist
fundamentalism’ had inspired the insurgency of an opposing
Islamic fundamentalism. That a central component of Ameri-
can ‘imperialist fundamentalism’ is Christian fundamentalism
is clear after the re-election of President Bush in 2004. In The
Clash of Fundamentalisms, Ali recommends ‘an Islamic Reforma-
tion’ as the way beyond the ‘fundamentalist’ double-bind (Ali
2002).15 In their groundbreaking post-Marxist manifesto, Hege-
mony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal











































movements that were emerging around the globe, even though
they didn’t conform to classical Marxist ideas of what revolu-
tionary movements should be. Partly in response to Specters of
Marx but also as a way of adapting to a new political world,
other prominent post-Marxist thinkers have extended this
strategy to embrace religious dissidence. Slavoj Žižek endorses
Hegel’s dictum, ‘It is a modern folly to alter a corrupt ethical
system, its constitution and legislation, without changing the
religion, to have a revolution without a reformation’ (Hegel
1959: 436; quoted in Žižek 2003: 5). Žižek also startlingly
proclaims that ‘to become a true dialectical materialist, one
must go through the Christian experience’ (Žižek 2003: 6). 
This is because, as Alain Badiou says, ‘Christ’s death sets up an
immanentization of the spirit’ (Badiou 2003: 69), empowering what
Žižek calls ‘a fighting collective’ to make an absolute difference
to the material status quo (Žižek 2003: 130).
We live in a world much changed from that of Jean-François
Lyotard’s ‘postmodern condition’ (Lyotard 1984). For Žižek,
the return to religion has renewed political commitment within
the post-ideological world of a capitalist monoculture. The
Christian Right has essentially brokered a deal with culturally
aggressive capitalism in the United States. But it is also true
that, after the collapse of Soviet communism and the terrible
events of 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bali and Madrid, the domin-
ant and representative form of political resistance to Western
capitalism is religious. For Bush and Blair and Al Qaeda, a
transcendent cause matters more than ethics and the lives of
innocent people. ‘It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul’ (Othello,
5.2.1ff.): Shakespeare conveys the seduction of such thinking
through the driving rhythm and grand vocabulary; but he
suggests its potential for insane idiocy through the bitter irony
that Othello is on his way to kill his innocent wife.
At this historical juncture, any intellectual engagement 
with militant spirituality risks being misinterpreted as an
endorsement of terrorism. But it’s a danger that Žižek, for one,
is prepared to risk:
The proper politically correct attitude is to emphasise, with
symptomatic insistence, how the terrorist attacks have
nothing to do with the real Islam, that great and sublime











































Islam’s resistance to modernization? And, rather than
bemoaning the fact that Islam, of all the great religions, is
the most resistant to modernization, we should, rather, con-
ceive of this resistance as an open chance, as ‘undecidable’:
this resistance does not necessarily lead to ‘Islamo-Facism’,
it could also be articulated into a socialist project. Precisely
because Islam harbours the ‘worst’ potentials of the Facist
answer to our present predicament, it could also turn out
to be the site for the ‘best’.
(Žižek 2002: 133–4)
In spite of the Christian Right, Žižek celebrates the political
potential of Christian advent. In spite of Islamist terrorism, he
insists on the positive possibilities of Islamic resistance.
In the context of such religious, political and intellectual
ructions, the Shakespearean spirituality that is one of Derrida’s
most surprising legacies is a genuinely hot topic. According to
some, spirituality should be reformed; according to others, it
should be stamped out. But it can no longer be dismissed as
irrelevant.
III
In Specters of Marx (first published in French in 1993), Derrida
presents Shakespearean spirituality as powerfully threatening
to the material status quo. For Derrida, Shakespeare’s ghost is
an uncanny revelation of Karl Marx and his arresting 
demand that we meet our historical responsibilities. It is also
a manifestation of the figure of ‘the Other’, who has long
haunted Derrida’s thought. Derrida regards Hamlet as ethically
exemplary because he recognises (he cannot but recognise) the
otherness of the ghost. In light of this, Derrida recasts all ethics
as essentially spiritual, because in any ethical encounter the
Other must remain other – respected, not conquered, possessed
or known; spectrally out of reach. Following the Prince of
Denmark’s example, Derrida extends political responsibility to
‘spirits’ – not just of the deceased, but also of those who are
not yet born. The spirituality he derives from Shakespeare
involves conversion from a narrow investment in the self 











































Emmanuel Levinas called ‘the spirituality of the soul, ceaselessly
aroused from its state of soul’ (Levinas 1989: 170). Derrida
describes this as a ‘messianic’ expectation of what is always ‘to
come’ and, elsewhere, as ‘the experience of what we are unable
to experience’ (Derrida 2002: 244). Thus, Žižek points out,
‘Derrida can indulge in all kinds of paradoxes, claiming, among
other things, that it is only atheists who truly pray – precisely
by refusing to address God as a positive entity, they silently
address the pure Messianic Otherness’ (Žižek 2003: 139).
According to Derrida, democracy falls within this messianic,
spiritual ‘structure of experience’ (Derrida 1994: 168). For
democracy is still ‘to come’. It can never be perfectly realised.
Instead, it exercises a magnetic force from beyond to keep us
striving towards it.
Shakespeare’s Ghost has played John the Baptist to Derrida’s
hooded Messiah. It’s a remarkable development that exemplifies
the theoretical potency and richness of literature itself. But is
Shakespearean spirituality really Derridean? Lowell Gallagher,
Julia Reinhard Lupton and Ken Jackson have improvised a
fruitful spiritual conversation between the late great philoso-
pher and Shakespeare.16 Many of the chapters that follow are
cued by or resonate with Derrida’s work. And there is scope for
more Derridean interpretation of Shakespearean spirituality.
For instance, the spirituality of deconstruction is anticipated in
the famous ‘Our revels now are ended’ speech (The Tempest,
4.1.146–58). Dissolution is given a specifically spiritual twist
when Prospero says, ‘These our actors,/As I foretold you, were
all spirits and/Are melted into air, into thin air’. Presumably
Prospero tells Ferdinand to be ‘cheerful’, not downcast, because
the comparable evanescence of the material world will make
way for something else to occur. As Howard Felperin proposes:
Before identifying overhastily that ‘something else’, let us
consider its characteristics. All that is clear is that it will not
be more of the same, history as usual and as we have come
to know it, the recurrent nightmare. Prospero’s invocation
of last things, of an ultimate collective destiny, effectively
brackets human history within a containing structure of













































This suggests that what Derrida calls ‘the messianic’ may be
working as a positive political force through the apparent
nihilism of Shakespeare’s plays, just as it operates through the
seeming pessimism of deconstruction itself. An approach
informed by Specters of Marx could also delineate Shakespear-
ean fantasies of the afterlife (Claudio’s, Hamlet’s) as intense
experiences of the foreignness of the self: of its simultaneously
thrilling and frightening non-coincidence with itself. It has
become a cliché of modern criticism to interpret the happy
endings of the comedies as bitterly ironic, but Derrida could
help us to recognise that they also raise the hope of a ‘messianic’
promesse de bonheur.17 Which begs the question: is spirituality 
an unrealisable ‘divine comedy’ dialectically related to the
tragedies of life?
After Specters of Marx, poststructuralist spirituality seemed 
for a while to be the only theoretically credible option. But
Badiou and Žižek have now challenged Derrida in a series of
books that has given spirituality a sharper political edge in an
epoch of ‘terror’.18 Contra Derrida’s spirituality of deferral,
these thinkers declare, after Jacques Lacan, that ‘the impos-
sible happens’: that is, it really is possible to bring the beyond
absolutely into the world now.19 As part of the ‘widespread
search for a new militant figure’ after communism, Badiou
scandalously prefers St Paul (Badiou 2003: 17). Žižek glosses
his choice as follows:
[A]lthough St Paul’s particular message is no longer
operative for us, the very terms in which he formulates 
the operative mode of the Christian religion do possess a
universal scope as relevant for every Truth-Event; every
Truth-Event leads to a kind of ‘Resurrection’, through
fidelity to it and a labour of Love on its behalf, one enters
another dimension.
(Žižek 2000a: 143)
A new self is secured here in a new relation to the absolute.
One of the most Pauline moments in Shakespeare is in As You
Like It when Oliver repents his jealous attempt on his brother












































’Twas I, but ’tis not I. I do not shame
To tell you what I was, since my conversion
So sweetly tastes, being the thing I am.
(4.3.134–6)
His old self is completely alien to him. He has been reborn.
For Badiou, real subjectivity as opposed to ‘mere being’ is
attained when the human agent becomes the militant bearer
of a truth (see Badiou 2001). But whereas poststructuralism
displaces spiritual realisation into an impossible future, Badiou
and Žižek advocate the spirituality of a real advent: a flash of
lightning that may, at any point, strike and transfigure the
world of history. In the midst of terrorist attacks and what
Søren Kierkegaard calls ‘the teleological suspension of the
ethical’ (Kierkegaard 1983), the controversial and provocative
nature of this will be readily apparent. Badiou and Žižek also
compare Paul with Lenin.20
For these thinkers as for Derrida, spirituality is a structure
of experience and possibility, rather than a revelation of the
one true dogma. But Badiou and Žižek are opposed to the
ultimately undetermined spirituality of otherness that Derrida
advocates. As we have seen, Žižek’s revolutionary desire to
bring the beyond into the world expresses itself as enthusiasm
for both Islamic resistance and Christian advent. This more
committed and manifest spirituality is relevant to Shakespeare.
Drama happens: only exceptionally is the action of a play
deferred, and the power of withholding the action, as in Love’s
Labour’s Lost and Hamlet, derives from the seemingly unstoppable
imminence of the dramatic event or advent. The impossible
assumes specific form and invades the reality of the poems and
plays time and again. Oliver’s spirituality is not deferred but
achieved absolutely. For Theseus, poetry brings ‘the forms of
things unknown’ into the world from a specifically metaphys-
ical region, and T. G. Bishop calls Shakespeare’s ‘a poetics 
of incarnation’ (Bishop 1996: 15). Of all Shakespeare’s works,
potentially most scandalous to Derrideans is ‘The Phoenix 
and Turtle’, which celebrates an actual (if admittedly short-
lived) dissolution of difference in a flamingly intense spiritual
union.
The impossible happens, too, when France throws his lot in











































Fairest Cordelia, that art most rich, being poor;
Most choice, forsaken; and most loved, despised:
Thee and thy virtues here I seize upon.
Be it lawful, I take up what’s cast away.
(King Lear, 1.1.251–4)
Of course, it would be touchingly romantic if France had fallen
in love with his bride in spite of her disgrace, but he actually
falls for her because of it – her disgrace makes her beautiful to him.
And clearly this isn’t a perverse sentiment that cynically respects
the values it transgresses. As Žižek asserts, the ‘true interven-
tion of Eternity in Time’ occurs when such moments don’t
‘stand just for a passing carnivalesque suspension of Order . . . 
but start to function as a founding figure of a New Order’
(Žižek 2003: 91). Cordelia’s disgrace is a revelation to France.
His plunge into love for his abject bride discovers different
values. That this new model of love is required by the ‘cold’st
neglect’ of the ‘gods’ (1.1.242) underlines that it specifically
offers a spirituality beyond conventional religion.21
Lear later says to his daughter, ‘You are a spirit, I know’
(4.7.49), and spirituality is linked with worldly shame and
dispossession in this extraordinary exchange when a frightened
fool runs out of a hovel:
Fool: Come not in here, nuncle, here’s a spirit.
Help me, help me!
Kent: Give me thy hand. Who’s there?
Fool: A spirit, a spirit! He says his name’s poor Tom.
(King Lear, 3.4.40–4)
Poor Tom is the spirit of utter poverty but as Edgar he will
ascend the throne. If there’s a spiritual injunction in this, it’s a
political lesson as well. In the words of Terry Eagleton, ‘cling
to your faith that the deathly emptiness of the dispossessed is
the only source from which a more jubilant, self-delighting
existence can ultimately spring’ (Eagleton 2003: 296).22 As we
shall see by the end of this volume, spirituality gleams with a
worrying political edge when Hamlet’s mystical experience per-
suades him that ‘The readiness is all’ (Hamlet, 5.2.169).23
Of course much of the above chimes with Derrida’s inter-











































something like heaven on earth – something to see in a theatre!
– it contravenes the French thinker’s fastidious deferral of the
absolute into a region beyond the real world of history.
Shakespeare resonates with Derrida’s esoteric political spiritu-
ality of hope and with Badiou’s and Žižek’s more ‘adventist’
political spirituality. Even though each spiritual moment in
Shakespeare involves a specific determination of the ultimate,
Shakespearean spirituality should not be reified as any one
thing. In this it accords with what Derrida calls ‘religion without
religion’: an openness to spiritual possibility that stops short of
exclusive dogma. But insofar as the plays involve spiritual struggle
they equally accord with Badiou’s and Žižek’s emphasis on
ultimate commitment. A postmodern reading of Shakespeare
frees up the Badiou and Žižek vs. Derrida debate, restaging it
more creatively by putting opposed positions into play.
IV
From the perspective of this volume, Shakespearean spirituality
promiscuously, irresistibly breeds with the spiritual possibilities
of our own time. Of course the spiritual range of the plays is
broader than the controversies surrounding Derrida’s ‘religious
turn’. For instance, the kind of stance which ‘[f ]inds tongues
in trees, books in the running brooks,/Sermons in stones, and
good in every thing’ (As You Like It, 2.1.16–17) corresponds
more closely with ‘new-age’ approaches to religion than to the
‘religious turn’ in theory. The simultaneously fey and full-
blooded spirituality of sex and nature in A Midsummer Night’s
Dream is begging for a full-scale new-age treatment.24 And there
is no single contemporary reference point for much of what
Shakespeare does: that’s why he has something else to bring to
contemporary debates. In their effort to lay hold of Shake-
spearean spirituality in the present, the chapters that follow
avail themselves of a full complement of critical equipment 
and techniques. In retrieving some of the spiritual possibilities
of the plays, they simultaneously discover much that is of
theoretical interest and bring back some of the force of experi-
ence that Shakespearean drama conveys. Kiernan Ryan dives











































the promise and the violence of spirituality that Spiritual
Shakespeares explores. In Ryan’s reading, the dream of salvation
trumps cynical materialism. But All’s Well is a ‘materialist miracle
play’ (my emphasis), where hope disrobes at the dead-end of
despair as utopian political vision. And yet, as Ryan acknow-
ledges, ‘a miracle is also a form of terrorism, an arbitrary
manifestation of omnipotence, before which mere mortals are
helpless’. Ryan contends that the play nonetheless reserves and
calls for an as-yet-unrealised spirituality of hope, which
resonates with a larger critical project that significantly antic-
ipated Specters of Marx.25
In ‘Harry’s (in)human face’, David Ruiter sets his compass
by Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. Patiently tracking
Hal through the second Henriad, Ruiter discovers that the
future Henry V’s heroic destiny is simultaneously a process of
abject spiritual shrivelling. ‘The strange truth of spirituality’,
Ruiter discovers, ‘is that when we look in the mirror we should
see someone else.’ Thus ‘Hal is in the end all-too-human and, as
a result, not really human at all, because bereft of that extra,
precious, spiritual element which defines humanity and yet is
engendered in a vital response to ordinary life.’ Ordinary life
is an insistent theme of this volume. Ryan calls that ‘poor
fellow’ Lavatch the ‘spiritus rector’ of All’s Well That Ends Well;
and it is a casual conversation in a bar that particularly illu-
minates the spirituality of the second Henriad for Ruiter.
In ‘Waiting for Gobbo’, Lowell Gallagher demonstrates 
how the comical double-act of The Merchant of Venice manage
haplessly to anticipate, and magically act out, the vexed twenty-
first-century debates on the scope of spiritual possibility. In
Gallagher’s reading, Shakespeare’s clowns – Gobbo père et fils
– beckon in an incarnate spirituality that would transcend the
exclusionary religious politics of the early modern period and
our own.
The incarnational, paradoxically materialist temper of
Spiritual Shakespeares is further intensified by Philippa Berry’s
chapter. Berry discerns in the baroque language-games of Love’s
Labour’s Lost a ‘heterodox meditation upon the grace and
salvation that may – or may not – follow man’s mortal end’.
The distinctly feminine version of salvation she teases out of 











































Joan’ in the play’s final song of Hiems. Its medium is palpably
erotic, its effect to expose the men of the play to the awful
alterity of the phenomenal world, which especially confounds
narrowly rational, ‘academic’ attempts to discipline and make
sense of it.
Spirit materialises once more in Lisa Freinkel’s essay.
Drawing on a range of classic and contemporary treatments
of the fetish, Freinkel tells how the critique of fetishism as
benighted idolatry was informed by Reformation iconoclasm,
facilitated Western cultural imperialism, and was powerfully
appropriated by Freud. But after Shakespeare and, to a lesser
extent, Luther, Freinkel reclaims the fetish in spite of the
Freudian critique. Her reading of the remarkable reversals of
Sonnet 20 reveals that the young man, within the poet’s very
fantasy of his creation, is castrated only to be re-endowed. His
penis therefore is a fetish already, and is no more ‘his’ than it
belongs to the feminised figure of Nature who dotingly supplies
it. The trauma of deprivation and lack is incorporated into a
positive efflorescence of human creativity. Freinkel concludes
that ‘the Shakespearean fetish’ is not an idol to vanish in the
cold, humiliating dawn of reason, but a position where ‘spirit
finally matters’.
In the context of contemporary critical thought, Spiritual
Shakespeares proffers a striking spiritual materialism, where
spirituality is not so much an escape from material reality as
an immanent chance for something better. John J. Joughin’s
chapter establishes the interplay between the material and
spiritual as the inherent dialectic of dramatic form. Joughin
points to the director Peter Brook’s conception of ‘Holy
Theatre’ or ‘The Theatre of the Invisible-Made-Visible’, which
makes its metaphysics out of ‘common sense’. Like Theodor
Adorno, Joughin insists on the political implications of the fact
that a play necessarily brings another world to bear on this
one by crudely physical means and effects: a stage, a curtain,
the materiality of generic conventions and language. He holds
up Bottom’s dream as a singular epitome of Shakespeare’s rest-
less traffic between the human and divine. But Shakespeare
doesn’t domesticate the spirit so much as he makes the everyday
mysterious, as Stephen Greenblatt also avows.26 What Joughin
terms ‘Bottom’s secret’ reminds us of the comical, unfathom-











































scene in The Winter’s Tale, Joughin argues for Shakespeare’s
rhapsodic power to transport us beyond the losses and narrow
identifications of history to a new place where we must ‘begin
again’.
Spiritual Shakespeares concludes with two new essays on Hamlet.
The philosopher Richard Kearney begins with the disarmingly
simple recognition that ‘Hamlet is a play about spirits’. He
considers psychoanalytic explanations of Jacques Lacan and
others, the existential account of Søren Kierkegaard, the decon-
structive descant of Derrida and the theologically inclined
reading of René Girard. Although his philosophical purview
doesn’t take in Hamlet in Purgatory (2001), Kearney’s conclusion
that Shakespeare’s tragedy is not a monument to the ‘majesty
of melancholy’ but ‘a miracle of mourning’ chimes with
Greenblatt’s view. However, Kearney’s irreducible ‘miracle’
separates him from Greenblatt. The philosopher leaves us with
a vision of universal political significance: ‘an eschatological
end to the bitter cycle of repetition and revenge’ that is all the
more appealing amid the turbulence of contemporary global
politics.
My own chapter on Hamlet takes a different line, arguing
that any overriding preoccupation with mourning and the ghost
fails to see that the play transcends them in favour of an
ambiguous metaphysics of ‘rashness’. In an exact reversal of
what we might expect, Hamlet’s mystical experience turns him
from a kind of conscientious objector into the activist who says,
‘The readiness is all’. In our present, Hamlet’s supposed trans-
cendence of ethics has a sinister flavour of terrorism and the
‘War on Terror’. But I argue that Shakespeare’s play suggests
nonetheless that the present is the place where all time – the
legacy of the past and the hopes of the future – can 
and perhaps must be consummated in action. Perhaps such a
metaphysics of rashness is the natural spirituality of drama?
V
Preoccupied with death and the oppressive nightmares of
history, recent Shakespeare scholarship has typically sounded
a melancholy and depressing note.27 Spiritual Shakespeares is











































overbrimming fullness, as the transcendence of given material
conditions. Consider the following passage from The Tempest:
Miranda: What is’t? A spirit?
Lord, how it looks about! Believe me, sir,
It carries a brave form. But ’tis a spirit.
Prospero: No, wench, it eats and sleeps, and hath such senses
As we have – such. The gallant which thou seest
Was in the wreck, and but he’s something stained
With grief, that’s beauty’s canker, thou might’st call him
A goodly person. He hath lost his fellows,
And strays about to find ’em.
Miranda: I might call him
A thing divine, for nothing natural
I ever saw so noble.
Prospero: [aside] It goes on, I see,
As my soul prompts it. [To ARIEL] Spirit, fine spirit, I’ll
free thee
Within two days for this.
Ferdinand: Most sure, the goddess
On whom these airs attend. [To MIRANDA] Vouchsafe
my prayer
May know if you remain upon this island,
And that you will some good instruction give
How I may bear me here. My prime request,
Which I do last pronounce is – O you wonder –
If you be maid or no?
(1.2.410–29)
There is an extraordinary existential intensity in a scene 
that dramatically isolates human being and says, ‘What is’t?’
Miranda suggests Ferdinand is ‘a spirit’. Then she affirms that
guess: ‘Believe me . . . ’tis a spirit’. Undeterred by her father’s
demystifying explanations – ‘it eats and sleeps, and has such
senses as we have’ – she insists he is ‘divine’, ‘nothing natural’.
Prospero’s scepticism seems misleading at first. After all, the
instant flourishing of love between Miranda and Ferdinand is
instigated by his ‘soul’ and by Ariel, whom the magus calls ‘Spirit,
fine spirit’. But ideology is involved in Prospero’s ambivalence.











































together for personal and political reasons, but they exceed these
purposes by activating the amorous and spiritual content that are
the means of Prospero’s self-interested promptings. Perhaps it is
this as much as paternal anxiety that wrong-foots Prospero into
opposing the very spirituality he says he inspired.
In fact, Prospero is not really directing the scene, though
no doubt he’d like to be. He is pushed aside by the spiritual
conjunction of Ferdinand and Miranda. Even as Miranda is
captured by his aura, Ferdinand sees her as a ‘goddess’. Having
blundered into her realm, he prays she may teach him how
to comport himself there. He is beside himself, ecstatic: ‘O you
wonder’. Filtered though it is through a worldly patriarchal
expectation of female chastity, his concluding question intimates
desire to be one with her. And Miranda isn’t some Marlovian
conjuration of Helen but a real, substantial woman who wants
Ferdinand back. An instructive pun is at work in Ferdinand’s
question: Miranda may be ‘a maid’, but she is also ‘made’ 
in the sense of being physically in existence, incarnate. We 
are dealing with neither the deferral (Derrida) nor the advent
(Žižek) of the beyond, nor with its recovery at a more pro-
foundly natural level (new-age religion). The distance between
the spirituality that Miranda and Ferdinand perceive and
normal life is nil, nothing like the magical superiority Prospero
enjoys. The beyond is here already, spirituality an indwelling
excess inalienable from being (and that this holds for Caliban
as much as any other character is plain from his exquisite
dreams and visions earlier in the play).28
Ferdinand is both the thing that eats and sleeps and the spirit
Miranda recognises. Such double-vision isn’t a trick of love’s
drunkenness, as is confirmed at the end when the ideal alterity
of human society as such is revealed to Prospero’s daughter:
O, wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
That has such people in’t!
(5.1.184–7)
Of course, this meets a sceptical paternal put-down, but it is











































words. The alternative world of spiritual ultimacy shimmers in
her eyes as the other, potential face of our real world. Like
Shakespeare, Prospero knows spirituality is just a possibility.
But surely the possibility that human beings may thrillingly
surpass what we have taken for reality is aesthetically, intel-
lectually and politically irresistible? As Leontes says in The
Winter’s Tale,
No settled senses of the world can match
The pleasures of that madness.
(The Winter’s Tale, 5.3.72–3)
Notes
1 For a comprehensive account of how new historicism and cultural
materialism have avoided considerations of religion and spirituality
or silently converted them into terms more amenable to materialist
thought, see Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti (2004). The new
‘turn’ towards religion in criticism described by Jackson and Marotti
is predominantly historicist. A large number of critical works – to
give just a few examples: Shuger 1990, 1994 and 2001, Diehl 1997,
Shell 1999, Dolan 1999 and 2002, Knapp 2002, Lake 2002 and
McCoy 2002 – have treated religion as a complex reality of the early
modern period and an important dimension of its historical alterity
in relation to our own times.
2 For more on ‘presentism’, see Grady 1991, 1996 and 2002, Hawkes
2002 and Fernie 2005. A few pioneers, including Jackson and a
number of contributors to this volume, have begun a theoretical
recovery of spirituality as an existential, ethical or epistemological
experience pertinent, in several ways, to the present: see especially Berry
1999 and 2004, Freinkel 2002, Gallagher 1991, Girard 1991, Jackson
2001, Lupton 1997, 2000a and 2000b, Taylor 2001 and Wilson 2004.
As well as surveying the field, Jackson and Marotti attempt to further
and consolidate this initiative ( Jackson and Marotti 2004). Out 
of a fastidious respect for the otherness of the past, they fight shy of
presentism, but the connections they perceive between early modern
religion and postmodern theory belie this – and Jackson is acutely
sensitive to the extraordinary resonance between early modern belief
and postmodern theory in other work ( Jackson 2001). Jackson and
Marotti are right to be wary of glibly translating early modern religion
into ‘acceptable modern forms conformable to our own cultural
assumptions’ but they don’t consider the positive possibility that a
presentist criticism might deliberately seek out, and dialectically profit
from, the alterity of the past and of literature (see Grady 2002 and











































tions between the spiritual vitality of the plays and our contemporary
moment, but it also enjoys the recalcitrant challenges that Shake-
spearean spirituality offers the present. For more on the ‘religious
turn’ in postmodern culture, see, for instance, Berry and Wernick
1992, de Vries 2002 and Caputo 2001 and 2002. See also Badiou
2001 and 2003, Derrida 2002, Irigaray 1993, Joy et al. 2002 and
Žižek 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002 and 2003.
3 On Catholicism see, for instance, Lake 1989, Finlayson 1983, Shell
1999, Marotti 1999, Dolan 1999 and 2002 as well as Dutton et al.
2004a and 2004b and Wilson 2004. For a consideration of religious
difference with real purchase on the present, see Lupton 1997.
4 See also Newell 2003: 1. It’s instructive that a non-academic book
picks up on the existential intensity of Talbot’s speech.
5 Speaking for the political Left, Fredric Jameson has written of such
radical religious figures, ‘These dead belong to us’ ( Jameson 1981b:
319).
6 This connection between literature and spirituality isn’t just a
Shakespearean archaism. It has been asserted by notable thinkers
and writers throughout the modern era. For instance, Martin
Heidegger writes, ‘Poetic thinking is being in the presence of . . . 
and for the god’ (see Caputo 2002: 66). Echoing Theseus, Salman
Rushdie has written more recently that art ‘is the third principle that
mediates between the material and spiritual worlds’ (Rushdie 1991:
415ff.). Richard Rorty has called for ‘a religion of literature in which
works of the secular imagination replace Scripture as the prin-
ciple source of inspiration and hope for the new generation’ (Rorty
1996: 15).
7 Similarly in Macbeth, according to Stephen Greenblatt, ‘Shakespeare
achieves the remarkable effect of a nebulous infection, a bleeding of
the spectral into the secular and the secular into the spectral’
(Greenblatt 2001: 194).
8 I am indebted here to Tom Bishop’s excellent unpublished essay,
‘Othello in the Wilderness’, part of his current monograph-in-
progress: Shakespeare’s Scriptures.
9 Knapp 2002 has stressed the spiritual openness of Shakespearean
drama. But reading Shakespearean drama ‘in conformity with the
Erasmian spirit of the English religious settlement – a spirit of uncon-
tentiousness and impartiality, according to its defenders, of apathy
and evasiveness, to its enemies’ neglects the agonistic intensity and
spiritual struggle of the plays that I want to bring out (169).
10 For a more theological definition, see Sheldrake 1992. My definition
is meant to be general and inclusive in order to facilitate the broadest
possible consideration of spirituality in Shakespeare.
11 Fredric Jameson stressed such potential some years ago, attempting
to ‘rewrite certain religious concepts – most notably Christian histori-
cism and the “concept” of providence – as anticipatory fore-











































12 A good description of the new-age movement is provided by Heelas
1996.
13 Dympna Callaghan puts her finger on the way in which this shift
has disabled traditional Marxist materialism in Callaghan 2001. See
also Bruster 2001 and Stallybrass 2002.
14 For a fuller consideration of Greenblatt’s Hamlet in Purgatory, see
Chapter 8.
15 Muslim intellectuals like Ziauddin Sardar have long advocated Islamic
resistance to globalisation and corporate culture (see Sardar 1979:
230).
16 Gallagher 1991, Lupton 2000b and Jackson 2001.
17 This point has already been well made by Kiernan Ryan:
The culminating moments of concord, ‘When earthly things made
even/Atone together’ (As You Like It, 5.4.109–10), also bristle with
estrangement effects. These demand that the denouement be
grasped as a symbolic fiction, whose mood is subjunctive rather
than indicative, and whose satisfactions therefore lie beyond the
reach of contemporary society.
(Ryan 2002: 118)
18 See Badiou 2001 and 2003 and Žižek 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002 and
2003.
19 Derrida says:
He is coming now; the messianic does not wait. This is a way of
waiting for the future, right now. The responsibilities that are
assigned to us by this messianic structure are responsibilities for
here and now. The Messiah is not some future present; it is
imminent and it is this imminence that I am describing under
the name of messianic structure.
(Derrida 1997: 24)
But to the extent that the Messiah is always ‘to come’, by contrast
with Žižek’s and Badiou’s, Derrida’s remains a spirituality of the
beyond.
20 Badiou admits that Žižek made the comparison first (Badiou 2003: 2).
21 I am grateful to Patrick Cheney for stressing this point.
22 In a typically elegant and suggestive treatment, Greenblatt rationalises
these moments of spiritual pressure in King Lear so much that he
drains them of their aesthetically and intellectually compelling power
to intimate another, more ultimate world that overlaps with the more
familiar world of the play (Greenblatt 2001: 185ff.).
23 Wilson argues that the historical Shakespeare was ‘a member of one
of the most militant recusant families in a town which was a bastion
of Elizabethan papist resistance’ (Wilson 2004: 1). He brings this into











































And the return of fundamentalism has taught us never again to
conflate spirituality with humanism, or to euphemise Protestant-
ism, in the old Left tradition, as ‘hardly religion at all, but a kind
of Christian anarchy’. We know so much more about religious
violence than critics before 11 September 2001. For as I write
this, on the site of Shakespeare’s Gatehouse, the ‘Ring of Steel’
around Blackfriars and the City, first erected to counter the
Catholic IRA, is being reinforced, to seal the precinct even more
securely from a world elsewhere.
(Wilson 2004: 7)
24 See Heelas 1996.
25 Ryan 2002 originally appeared in 1989. The political philosophy of
hope that Ryan develops out of Shakespeare bears comparison with
Derrida’s conception of ‘the messianic’ as well as with the work 
of Ernst Bloch.
26 See Greenblatt 2001.
27 Terry Eagleton writes in The Ideology of the Aesthetic: ‘[F]ew literary
texts are likely to make it nowadays into the new historicist canon
unless they contain at least one mutilated body’ (1990: 7).
28 Žižek is interested in the possibility of such immanence. In Žižek
2003, he quotes Christ in St Thomas’s Gospel, ‘That (resurrection)
which you are awaiting has (already) come, but you do not recognize
it’, and comments, ‘This is the key “Hegelian” point of Christianity:
the resurrection of the dead is not a “real event” which will take
place sometime in the future, but something that is already here –
we merely have to shift our subject position’ (86–7). Yet even this
depends on the paradigmatic advent that is the incarnation; spiritu-
ality always is more violently eruptive in Žižek than at this point in
The Tempest. Better theoretical bearings here could be taken from
French feminist theoreticians of spirituality, especially Luce Irigaray’s
notions of a ‘sensible transcendental’ and ‘becoming divine’ (see












































‘Where hope is coldest’
All’s Well That Ends Well
Kiernan Ryan
I
In the opening scene of Act II of All’s Well That Ends Well the
heroine, Helen, steps into the timeless, archetypal realm of folk-
lore and fairy tale, and turns into the Clever Wench who stakes
her life on curing the King. His scepticism quelled by the force
of her conviction, the King wonders whether Helen is possessed
by a higher power:
Methinks in thee some blessèd spirit doth speak,
His powerful sound within an organ weak;
And what impossibility would slay
In common sense, sense saves another way.
(2.1.174–7)
Things that common sense would dismiss as impossible may
be perfectly plausible in another sense, which owes nothing to
realism or rationality. So flagrantly do such phenomena break
the laws of likelihood that they bespeak the intervention in our










































Impalpable powers are repeatedly invoked in All’s Well to
accomplish or account for the incredible. The first striking
instance occurs in the speech with which Helen, determined
to bridge the chasm of class that divides her from her beloved
Bertram, concludes the opening scene of the play:
Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie
Which we ascribe to heaven. The fated sky
Gives us free scope, only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
What power is it which mounts my love so high,
That makes me see and cannot feed mine eye?
The mightiest space in fortune nature brings
To join like likes and kiss like native things.
Impossible be strange attempts to those
That weigh their pains in sense and do suppose
What hath been cannot be.
(1.1.199–209)
Helen begins by refusing to shift the responsibility for our
destiny to divine providence or astrological influence. But her
assertion of autonomy is swiftly eclipsed by her sense that 
she is nonetheless in the grip of a power she cannot name or
comprehend. This thought prompts the reflection that nature
finds ways of dissolving huge disparities of wealth and rank.
And that reflection triggers the contention, echoed in the 
next act by the King, that extraordinary endeavours (‘strange
attempts’) seem futile only to those who try them in the court
of common sense and judge them to be not worth the ‘pains’
they would cost.
All’s Well That Ends Well stacks the deck from the start against
its characters and the dictates of comedy. The play begins in
the shadow of the death of old Count Roussillon, with the
Countess, Bertram, Helen and Lafeu dressed in black, and the
gloom is deepened by the impending death of the King:
Countess: What hope is there of his majesty’s amendment?
Lafeu: He hath abandoned his physicians, madam, under
whose practices he hath persecuted time with hope,
and finds no other advantage in the process but only











































‘Where hope is coldest’ 29
The hopelessness of the King’s plight is underlined by the fact
that the only doctor who could have healed him – Helen’s
father, Gérard de Narbonne – has recently died as well, despite
possessing skills almost great enough to vanquish death itself.
His daughter regards her secret love for the dead Count’s son
as equally hopeless:
’Twere all one
That I should love a bright particular star
And think to wed it, he is so above me.
In his bright radiance and collateral light
Must I be comforted, not in his sphere.
Th’ambition in my love thus plagues itself.
The hind that would be mated by the lion
Must die for love.
(1.1.80–7)
When the Countess presses her to confess her feelings for
Bertram, however, Helen finds sublime solace in the futility 
of her desire, which she transmutes into a state of spiritual
exaltation:
I know I love in vain, strive against hope;
Yet in this captious and intenable sieve
I still pour in the waters of my love
And lack not to lose still. Thus, Indian-like,
Religious in mine error, I adore
The sun that looks upon his worshipper
But knows of him no more. . . .
. . . then give pity
To her whose state is such that cannot choose
But lend and give where she is sure to lose,
That seeks to find not that her search implies,
But riddle-like lives sweetly where she dies.
(1.3.185–91, 197–201)
The very act of striving against hope releases intimations of
plenitude and ecstasy that turn lack and loss into fulfilment
and death into exquisite life. The last four lines of the speech
slip into couplets that charge them with the vatic resonance











































the first person to the third, is to make Helen sound as though
a remote, impersonal voice, whose origin is as obscure as its
import, is indeed speaking through her, as the King later
suspects. Beneath the surface of the speech, which revels in its
thraldom to despair, deeper tides are stirring.
The strange fecundity of that despair, its power to summon
salvation from the void into which it stares, is borne out at
once by Helen’s revelation that her father has bequeathed 
her ‘a remedy, approved, set down,/To cure the desperate
languishings whereof/The King is rendered lost’ (1.3.214–16).
The means to cure the King, which will provide in turn the
means to win Bertram’s hand, does not derive its potency,
however, from its deviser’s genius or its medicinal properties
alone, as Helen explains to the Countess:
There’s something in’t
More than my father’s skill, which was the great’st
Of his profession, that his good receipt
Shall for my legacy be sanctified
By th’ luckiest stars in heaven . . .
(1.3.228–32)
What that something more is, and whether the celestial realm
that sanctifies the ‘receipt’ is Christian or pagan, Shakespeare
declines to divulge. Of its startling supernatural virtues, how-
ever, Lafeu stands in no doubt when he sets about cajoling the
King into trying the elixir on himself:
I have seen a medicine
That’s able to breathe life into a stone,
Quicken a rock, and make you dance canary
With sprightly fire and motion; whose simple touch
Is powerful to araise King Pépin, nay,
To give great Charlemagne a pen in’s hand,
And write to her a love-line.
(2.1.70–6)
But before ‘Doctor She’ (2.1.78) can raise her own sovereign
from the dead and revive his virility, she must persuade him
to place his trust in the cure he spurns as ‘A senseless help,










































‘Where hope is coldest’ 31
adduces divine precedents furnished by the Bible, conscripting
couplets again to lift her reasoning to another plane:
He that of greatest works is finisher
Oft does them by the weakest minister.
So holy writ in babes hath judgement shown
When judges have been babes; great floods have flow’n
From simple sources, and great seas have dried
When miracles have by th’ great’st been denied.
Oft expectation fails, and most oft there
Where most it promises, and oft it hits
Where hope is coldest and despair most fits.
(2.1.134–43)
Helen’s allusions to the precocious wisdom of Daniel and Jesus
as children, and to the miracles wrought by Moses when he
struck water from the rock and caused the Red Sea to part, are
veiled, but the inference they invite the King to draw is clear:
Helen is the instrument of ‘him that all things knows’ and can
count on ‘The help of heaven’ to effect what lies beyond ‘the
act of men’ (2.1.148, 151). Such miracles materialize, however,
Helen is at pains to stress, not when we expect them to, but
precisely at the point of utter despair, ‘Where hope is coldest’
and thus, inexplicably, at its most powerful.
Up to this point, Helen’s plea to heal the lethal fistula 
that afflicts his highness has been couched in Christian terms,
but the incantation into which she glides to predict the cure’s
duration springs from another place altogether:
Ere twice the horses of the sun shall bring
Their fiery coacher his diurnal ring,
Ere twice in murk and occidental damp
Moist Hesperus hath quenched her sleepy lamp,
Or four-and-twenty times the pilot’s glass
Hath told the thievish minutes how they pass,
What is infirm from your sound parts shall fly,
Health shall live free, and sickness freely die.
(2.1.160–7)
The universe this spell conjures up with no sense of incongruity











































repetitions would not sound amiss on the lips of Oberon or
Prospero. Helen metamorphoses from ‘the weakest minister’ 
of the Almighty into a formidable sorceress, and her readiness
to lose her own life should she fail clinches the King’s consent.
The curing of the King is displaced from the stage by a
bout of parodic badinage between the Countess and her fool,
Lavatch. The masking of the act magnifies its mystery. What
takes place between the sovereign and the ‘Sweet practiser’
(2.1.184) to cure his ‘past-cure malady’ (2.1.119), and whether
the potion, Christian prayer, pagan rite or Helen’s sexual allure
is responsible for his restoration, is left open to surmise. Indeed,
the desire to explain things that defy explanation is made the
object of Lafeu’s scorn immediately after the King’s recovery:
‘They say miracles are past, and we have our philosophical
persons to make modern and familiar things supernatural 
and causeless’ (2.3.1–3). Lafeu is adamant that, far from 
being commonplace (‘modern’), what has transpired is unprece-
dented, ‘a novelty to the world’ (2.3.19), which reveals the
‘Very hand of heaven’ (2.3.30). That Lafeu’s view of the matter
is already enshrined in the title of the ballad he reads out –
‘A showing of a heavenly effect in an earthly actor’ (2.3.22–3)
– qualifies it as a cliché, as does its parroting by Paroles in 
his eagerness to ingratiate himself: ‘Why,’ opines the shallow
braggart, ‘’tis the rarest argument of wonder that hath shot
out in our latter times’, manifesting in a ‘debile minister great
power, great transcendence’ (2.3.6–7, 33). But this whiff of
irony at the expense of the miraculous is not enough to dispel
the atmosphere of awe that fills the stage as the resurrected
King enters with his redeemer, who states with simple certainty,
‘Heaven hath through me restored the King to health’ (2.3.61).
For a time, of course, the miracle seems to have misfired as
far as Helen’s ulterior ‘project’ (1.1.211) is concerned. Her
reward for summoning ‘great power, great transcendence’ to
slay impossibility is to find herself not the fairy-tale bride of
the young lord she adores, but publicly reviled by an aristo-
crat so appalled at being forced to wed ‘A poor physician’s
daughter’, who ‘had her breeding at [his] father’s charge’
(2.3.110–11), that he abandons her for the Tuscan wars rather
than consummate the marriage.
But the doctor’s child is not long deterred by Bertram’s










































‘Where hope is coldest’ 33
misprizing of a maid too virtuous/For the contempt of 
empire’ (3.2.30–1). The ‘dreadful sentence’ (3.2.59) Bertram
sends her seems to set the seal on the futility of her love and
the hopelessness of her plight all over again:
When thou canst get the ring upon my finger, which never
shall come off, and show me a child begotten of thy body
that I am father to, then call me husband; but in such a
‘then’ I write a ‘never’.
(3.2.55–8)
Yet as before, by some occult logic that remains opaque,
impossibility and the abjection it breeds engender their anti-
thesis. In the grip of a Griselda-like swoon of self-sacrifice, Helen
steals away in the dark like a ‘poor thief ’ (3.2.129), so that
Bertram will feel free to return safe from the wars. But no
sooner has she exiled herself than a brighter note is discreetly
struck by the speech of the Duke of Florence to Bertram that
opens the next scene, the mathematical centre and turning
point of the play: ‘we,/Great in our hope, lay our best love
and credence/Upon thy promising fortune’ (3.3.1–3). Without
rational warrant, hope rears up again out of hopelessness and,
moments later in stage time, the Countess receives a poetic
epistle from ‘Saint Jaques’ pilgrim’ (3.4.4). Helen’s penitential
sonnet adopts the same posture of self-abnegation as the speech
in which she portrayed herself as one who ‘riddle-like lives
sweetly where she dies’. But this time the obtrusive artifice of
the verse, read to the Countess by Reynaldo, renders its author
even more remote and rarefied; its piety is pronounced and
unquestionably Christian (‘barefoot plod I the cold ground
upon/With sainted vow my faults to have amended’ (3.4.6–7));
and the final couplet succumbs less ambiguously to extinction,
though with the same paradoxical rush of delight: ‘He is too
good and fair for death and me;/Whom I myself embrace 
to set him free’ (3.4.16–17).
The death Helen embraces, however, is equally figurative
this time, unlike the real death from which she rescued the
King. In fact, in this case it is astutely feigned, a subterfuge
cooked up with the help of Diana, Diana’s mother and ‘the
rector of the place’ (4.3.57) in Saint Jaques le Grand, where











































virtual does not make what ensues less uncanny than it 
would have been if Helen had died for real. Helen’s fabricated
death to the world empowers her to devise the means of 
her deliverance from its adversities, the bed-trick that dupes
Bertram into completing their union and making her pregnant.
The tenor of that trick, which belongs entirely to the enchanted
realm of folk tale, demands a Delphic conundrum to contain
its glaring contradictions:
Let us essay our plot, which if it speed
Is wicked meaning in a lawful deed
And lawful meaning in a wicked act,
Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact.
(3.7.44–7)
The bed-trick is further mystified, like the curing of the King,
by the creation of a smokescreen, in this case the entrapment
of Paroles, which harbours obvious parallels with his master’s
fate in Diana’s bedroom. Diana keeps Helen’s fictitious corpse
subliminally in focus by her demeanour and diction. ‘You are
no maiden but a monument’, Bertram complains at their first
tryst, ‘When you are dead you should be such a one/As you
are now’ (4.2.6–8). After he departs, Diana even pushes the
charade so far as to flirt with the idea of necrophilia: ‘He had
sworn to marry me/When his wife’s dead; therefore I’ll lie with
him/When I am buried’ (4.2.72–4).
Helen’s absence from most of the last two acts reinforces
the delusion that she is indeed dead. So do the recurrent
laments for her demise and the subtextual echoes of it, such
as ‘When you have spoken it ’tis dead, and I am the grave of
it’ (4.3.12–13). Their concerted effect is so strong that it takes
a conscious effort in the last scene to remind oneself that the
King, the Countess, Bertram and Lafeu are deceived, and their
indecent haste to hitch Bertram to Lafeu’s daughter, ‘fair
Maudlin’ (5.3.69) – ‘Be this sweet Helen’s knell, and now forget
her’ (5.3.68) – is misbegotten. Shakespeare’s purpose is plain:
to amplify the impact on the characters and the audience when
‘Helen that’s dead’ (5.3.78) rises from her grave and material-
izes in the court at the eleventh hour to solve Diana’s riddle.
The last scene pulls out all the stops to make us feel as though
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contradictions with which Diana assaults common sense baffles
us into consorting with another sort of sense and surrendering
to a transcendent theatrical wonder:
He knows himself my bed he hath defiled,
And at that time he got his wife with child.
Dead though she be she feels her young one kick.
So there’s my riddle; one that’s dead is quick.
And now behold the meaning.
Enter HELEN and WIDOW
King: Is there no exorcist
Beguiles the truer office of mine eyes?
Is’t real that I see?
Helen: No, my good lord,
’Tis but the shadow of a wife you see,
The name and not the thing.
Bertram: Both, both. O, pardon!
(5.3.297–305)
Unlike the King, we witness Helen’s resurrection in full posses-
sion of the truth. Yet the existence of a rational explanation
does not dispel our impression that something ‘supernatural
and causeless’ has taken place that cannot be reasoned away.
The King’s suspicion that Helen’s spirit has been raised by
sorcery, and that what he beholds is unreal, is not contradicted
by Helen’s reply, ‘ ’Tis but the shadow of a wife you see,/The
name and not the thing’, and Bertram’s ‘Both, both’ is not
enough to exorcise the ghost of the tragic heroine Helen might
have been.
II
From this account of All’s Well That Ends Well it might be
tempting to conclude that the comedy is an early modern
miracle play. At every turn it begs to be read as a parable of
self-mortification and blind faith rewarded by grace, redemp-
tion and the promised conquest of death itself. And nothing
would seem to endorse that reading more than the store the
play sets by the power of hope, which rises time and again











































to turn All’s Well back into the dramatic act of piety early
twentieth-century Christian critics believed it to be. But the
comedy is too complex to tolerate such simplifications. It is
equally impervious, however, to profane approaches that repress
its recourse to the discourse of spirituality in order to shackle
it to some new historicist precept or poststructuralist creed.
All’s Well is clearly not a religious play in the sense that 
it demonstrates and demands belief in Christian doctrine. It
deploys the narrative templates, affective lexicon and master
tropes of Christianity, but it does so neither consistently nor
exclusively. The ease with which Helen can slip from citing
the Old and New Testaments as God’s ‘weakest minister’ to
fusing the pagan lore of pre-Christian Britain with the exotic
rites of the ancient world is ample evidence of that. Moreover,
All’s Well has plenty of room alongside these metaphysical
models of reality for more earthbound conjectures about the
mainsprings of human destiny. If we return to the speech in
the opening scene where Helen muses on these matters, it is
arresting, after all the marvels confidently credited to higher
powers, to hear her aver with equal confidence: ‘Our remedies
oft in ourselves do lie/Which we ascribe to heaven.’ She revises
that proposition in favour of the notion that what makes us
tick is a double act, a tug of war between celestial constraint
and individual volition: ‘The fated sky/Gives us free scope,
only doth backward pull/Our slow designs when we ourselves
are dull.’ In the process, the ambiguously Christian ‘heaven’
turns into an unambiguously pagan ‘fated sky’, which mutates
in the next sentence into a nameless ‘power’, neither Christian
nor pagan, whose imperatives Helen must obey.
The provision with which Helen prefaces her healing charm
– ‘The great’st grace lending grace’ (2.1.159) – is no less vague
about the source of that grace, notwithstanding the Christian
tint of the word. A similar evasiveness marks the King’s ascrip-
tion of Helen’s assurance to ‘some blessèd spirit’. When we
add to these considerations the light burlesque of the miraculous
in Paroles’s echoes of Lafeu, the play’s detachment from its
eclectic spiritual discourse can scarcely be overlooked. The
strongest proof of that detachment is Shakespeare’s concern to
keep everything that confounds ‘common sense’ intelligible 
in sublunary terms. Unlike the romances for which it paves










































‘Where hope is coldest’ 37
of Jupiter in Cymbeline to confirm its protagonists’ faith in divine
intercession. Whatever the characters say, the miracles worked
by Helen can also be attributed to material, mortal causes: to
the pharmaceutical skill of her father in the first case, and 
to her own ingenuity in the second.
This is not to undermine or understate the spiritual
dimension of All’s Well That Ends Well, but rather to redefine
its role in the comedy as revolutionary rather than religious,
as a means to the end of a play obsessed with means and ends.
By framing the play’s religious discourse as figurative rather
than factual, Shakespeare declutches it from dogma, releasing
its resources to serve the secular agenda that religion secretes.
The dream of salvation, of the self and the world redeemed,
doubles as a metaphor for forms of emancipation that as yet
can find expression in no other way. The Christian’s hope for
grace and resurrection houses the indomitable human hope 
for freedom from misery, injustice and oppression – a hope
anchored in realism rather than revelation, a hope that thrives
on disappointment and defeat. And the play fosters faith in
miracles, not as the props of revealed religion, but as testaments
to the poverty of rationality and realism, as mockeries of the
empirical mind that sustains the status quo and kills trans-
formation in the cradle. The cynical materialism of those who
claim ‘miracles are past’ is doomed to remain in thrall to the
past, from which it draws its conclusions about the limits of
possibility. Whereas the spiritual idealism of those who believe
that ‘what impossibility would slay/In common sense, sense
saves another way’ is incorrigibly prospective, propelled toward
the transcendence of the present by the radical difference 
of the future it foresees.
For proof that the revolutionary spirit of utopian hope
governs All’s Well, we need look no further than its scandalous
central premise. In no other play by Shakespeare does such a
wide social gulf yawn between heroine and hero, a gulf that
early modern men and women would have found formidably
difficult to cross. The breadth and depth of that class divide
are brought painfully home to Helen in Bertram’s response to
her choice of him as her prize for curing the King: ‘But follows
it, my lord, to bring me down/Must answer for your raising?’
(2.3.108–9). However, not only does the penniless doctor’s











































but she does so by taking the sexual initiative from start to
finish, in a reversal of patriarchal roles that has no parallel in
Shakespearean comedy. So unseemly did Helen’s frank desire
and forwardness appear to the Victorians that they doctored
her part in the play’s upending of The Taming of the Shrew to
make her more demure.
Nor is this inversion of gender roles, which makes a man
the helpless object of a woman’s choice, the only generic heresy
of which All’s Well is guilty. The parental elders of the play,
the Countess, the King and Lafeu, whom convention should
have cast as obstacles to such an irregular union, shatter the
stereotype epitomized by Egeus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
Far from being stony pillars of conformity, this truly sage trio
backs Helen and her cause to the hilt. Indeed, so incensed is
the Countess by her son’s snubbing of his bride that she disowns
him and adopts Helen in his stead: ‘He was my son,/But I do
wash his name out of my blood,/And thou art all my child’
(3.2.64–6).
Blood is also the theme of an astounding speech placed in
the mouth of the King, whose advocacy of Helen’s cause
subverts the foundations of his own sovereignty. When Bertram
rebuffs his bride-to-be, the King rebukes him:
’Tis only title thou disdain’st in her, the which
I can build up. Strange is it that our bloods,
Of colour, weight, and heat, poured all together,
Would quite confound distinction, yet stands off
In differences so mighty. If she be
All that is virtuous, save what thou dislik’st –
‘A poor physician’s daughter’– thou dislik’st
Of virtue for the name. But do not so.
From lowest place when virtuous things proceed,
The place is dignified by th’ doer’s deed.
Where great additions swell’s, and virtue none,
It is a dropsied honour. Good alone
Is good without a name, vileness is so:
The property by what it is should go,
Not by the title. She is young, wise, fair.
In these to nature she’s immediate heir,
And these breed honour. That is honour’s scorn
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And is not like the sire; honours thrive
When rather from our acts we them derive
Than our foregoers. The mere word’s a slave,
Debauched on every tomb, on every grave
A lying trophy, and as oft is dumb
Where dust and dammed oblivion is the tomb
Of honoured bones indeed.
(2.3.113–37)
To hear such Falstaffian contempt for honour and titles as
mere ornaments of rank voiced by royalty is disarming enough.
But this commendable attitude is dwarfed by the King’s admis-
sion that the ‘differences so mighty’ over which he presides as
a monarch have no basis in human physiology, which ‘Would
quite confound distinction’ were we to found society on the
facts of nature rather than the fictions of culture. The fragility
of those fictions is underscored by the Epilogue, when the actor
who has played the King steps forward and declares, ‘The
King’s a beggar now the play is done.’
Furthermore, by endowing his heroine with the power not
only to leap the barriers of class and gender, but also to bridle
mortality itself, Shakespeare suggests something far more dis-
concerting: that deliverance from our subjection to death may
depend on our deliverance from structures of social subjection
that feed on the fear of extinction. Certainly the faculty Helen
inherits from her father is described as one which, ‘had it
stretched so far, would have made nature immortal, and death
should have play for lack of work’ (1.1.18–19). The full signifi-
cance of that dream of natural immortality, of death robbed
of its terror and made redundant by human art, must be left
to readers and spectators of the distant future to decipher.
The surest guide to the play’s seditious vision is its spiritus
rector, Lavatch. In his first line he reminds his mistress that he
is but ‘a poor fellow’, and, when the Countess responds with
an innocuous ‘Well, sir?’, he pounces on the word worked so
hard by the title of the play: ‘No, madam, ’tis not so well that
I am poor, though many of the rich are damned. But if I may
have your ladyship’s good will to go to the world, Isbel the
woman and I will do as we may’ (1.3.11–16). Lavatch’s pre-
emptive mimicry of Helen’s marital ambition weds it to the











































rationale. His confession that his connubial desire is ‘driven on
by the flesh’ and ‘the devil’ (1.3.24–5), to whom his ‘other holy
reasons’ (1.3.27) play second fiddle, discloses the carnal core
of Helen’s motives, first glimpsed in her ribald quibbling with
Paroles about the best way a woman might lose her virginity
‘to her own liking’ (1.1.140). One of Lavatch’s chief tasks as
the play’s irreverent raisonneur is to flesh out its ethereal energies.
At the end of her round of repartee with Paroles, Helen laments
‘That wishing well had not a body in’t/Which might be felt’
to aid ‘the poorer born,/Whose baser stars do shut us up in
wishes’ (1.1.168–70). Lavatch supplies that body to ensure that
the longings of ‘the poorer born’ in this play are viewed as
incarnate rather than incorporeal.
Lavatch’s mock-religious iteration of the phrase ‘flesh and
blood’ (1.3.31, 41–3) in praise of cuckoldry is crowned by a
quip that seeks common ground between the rival tribes of
Christianity while debunking the divisiveness of both: ‘For
young Chairbonne the puritan and old Poisson the papist,
howsome’er their hearts are severed in religion, their heads 
are both one: they may jowl horns together like any deer i’th’
herd’ (1.3.45–8). Shortly afterwards, Lavatch tacks another
poke at the Puritans onto an ironic exclamation that spotlights
the anti-patriarchal thrust of the plot: ‘That man should be at
woman’s command, and yet no hurt done! Though honesty
be no puritan, yet it will do no hurt; it will wear the surplice
of humility over the black gown of a big heart’ (1.3.81–4).
When the Countess upbraids her fool for being ‘a foul-mouthed
and calumnious knave’, he protests that he is ‘A prophet’,
adding ‘and I speak the truth the next way’ (1.3.51–2). In one
sense he speaks the truth anything but ‘the next way’, prefer-
ring the byways of obliquity to the highway of blunt statement.
But in another sense he does deal directly with issues of which
the play he glosses fights shy. He is thus like a prophet in his
role as revealer of concealed truths, but he also has the vatic
task of foreshadowing the ultimate objective of the play.
Consider, for example, the next encounter between the
Countess and the Clown, which supplants the miraculous
curing of the King. While Helen rejuvenates her monarch off-
stage, the Countess puts Lavatch to the proof of his boast that
he has ‘an answer will serve all men’ (2.2.11–12). The basic
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courtier, anxious to deflect questions with his catch-all cry, 
‘O Lord, sir!’ (2.2.36). But the torrent of gross analogies the
Clown unleashes to commend this reply – ‘as the nun’s lip to
the friar’s mouth, nay as the pudding to his skin’ (2.2.22–3) –
insinuates that the sovereign’s virility is what is really at stake
in the occluded scene. Moreover, these lewd shafts of plebeian
derision are fired at the court from a standpoint that collapses
class distinctions in the name of universal community. The
answer that will serve all men ‘is like a barber’s chair that fits
all buttocks’ (2.2.14), says Lavatch. ‘From beyond your duke to
beneath your constable, it will fit any question’ (2.2.26–7). The
whole scene synchronizes, and thus conflates, the miracle that
empowers the poor doctor’s girl with the utopian materialism
of Lavatch’s comic fantasy.
Two scenes later, the misprized maid and the lugubrious
fool are overtly allied, when it is Helen’s turn to prompt Lavatch
to worry the word ‘well’ to death, this time by inquiring of the
Countess, ‘Is she well?’ The two reasons why ‘she’s not very
well’ despite being ‘very well indeed’ are, Lavatch explains:
‘One that she’s not in heaven, whither God send her quickly.
The other, that she’s in earth, from whence God send her
quickly’ (2.4.1, 9–11). The Clown’s equivocation warns us again
to treat the term ‘well’ in the titular proverb, and in Helen’s
repeated appeals to it, with the utmost circumspection. But it
also adapts a routine piety to vent an aggressive contemptus mundi
on the Countess. This subterranean strain of class animosity
camouflaged as Christianity becomes more salient as the play
proceeds. It peaks in Lavatch’s sermon joyeux to his betters on
‘the prince of darkness, alias the devil’ (4.5.36–7), who is, the
fool informs Lafeu, ‘as great a prince as you are’ (30–1):
I am a woodland fellow, sir, that always loved a great fire,
and the master I speak of ever keeps a good fire. But since
he is the prince of the world, let the nobility remain in’s
court; I am for the house with the narrow gate, which I
take to be too little for pomp to enter. Some that humble
themselves may, but the many will be too chill and tender,
and they’ll be for the flow’ry way that leads to the broad












































It is no coincidence that Helen’s comic counterpart enlists
Matthew 7:13–14 – ‘Enter ye in at the strait gate: for wide is
the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction’ –
to launch his final attack on ‘pomp’ and ‘nobility’ in the name
of the ‘humble’ just as the ‘poor unlearnèd virgin’ (1.3.226)
and her female companions are converging on Roussillon to
rout the noble lord who abhors her.
III
Lavatch binds the numinous vision of All’s Well That Ends Well
to the materialist critique of rank and patriarchy that shadows
it. He embodies the points at which the transcendental and
the terrestrial, the yearnings of the soul and the claims of the
body, fuse in a perspective that incorporates both. All’s Well
understands that the miraculous is meaningless unless it is made
flesh through the transmutation of human lives in the material
world of history. It is equally adamant, however, that sheer
materialism, bereft of the spiritual and the prospect of trans-
cendence, immures men and women in a retrospective present,
from which all hope of transfiguration has been banished.
But if Lavatch highlights the alliance of radical humanism
and religion that turns All’s Well into a materialist miracle play,
he also bears witness to the anger and hostility that animate
that alliance, to the dark side of the dream of Shakespearean
comedy. Like its predecessors and successors in the canon, All’s
Well whets our hunger for a new dispensation and excites our
hope that it can be created, that what we have been told is
unattainable is within our reach. It does so through a theatrical
parable in which a poor, despised woman overcomes social
and sexual prejudice and fulfils her heart’s desire with the help
of other women. At the same time, All’s Well is acutely aware
that the spirit of utopia that possesses it and procures its 
radiant denouement must also be as ruthless as the hope that
spurs it on.
Helen hints as much when she tells the King, ‘Oft
expectation fails, and most oft there/Where most it promises,
and oft it hits/Where hope is coldest and despair most fits’,
which suggests that hope is strongest not only at its lowest ebb,
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in this regard is made by Lafeu. Immediately after the curing
of the King, as we have seen, Lafeu decries those ‘philosoph-
ical persons’ who ‘say miracles are past’ and attempt to explain
away ‘things supernatural and causeless’. But his next sentence
makes clear that by miracles Lafeu means something quite
different from comforting proof of divine providence: ‘Hence
is it that we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into
seeming knowledge when we should submit ourselves to an
unknown fear’ (2.3.3–5). With these words an abyss opens
beneath the comedy that Lafeu’s resort to pious platitudes
cannot close. Lafeu’s reflection invites us to wonder whether
our true response to miracles should be terrified submission to
a nameless fear of the unknown. However benign its effects may
be, a miracle is also a form of terrorism, an arbitrary manifesta-
tion of omnipotence, before which mere mortals are helpless.
The miraculous is autocratic and coercive: it brooks neither
doubt nor discussion, but imposes its will by pure force.
The ‘sweet practiser’ who performs the miracles of healing
and reunion in All’s Well achieves her goal, after all, through
blind obsession and the inflexible exertion of her will. That
much she makes plain in the lines that close the first scene of
the play: ‘The King’s disease – my project may deceive me,/
But my intents are fixed and will not leave me’ (1.1.211–12).
She saves the King, whose doctors could not save him, not for
the King’s sake, but as a means to secure the power to make
Bertram marry her. The suppressed ferocity of the heroine
beatified by Coleridge as Shakespeare’s ‘loveliest character’
(Coleridge 1930: 113) and praised by Hazlitt for her ‘great
sweetness and delicacy’ (Hazlitt 1930: 329) suffuses the speech
in which she stakes her life:
Tax of impudence,
A strumpet’s boldness, a divulgèd shame;
Traduced by odious ballads, my maiden’s name
Seared otherwise, nay – worse of worst – extended
With vilest torture let my life be ended.
(2.1.169–73)
Bertram’s public and private revulsion from his wife – he cannot
even stoop to kiss her goodbye – leaves Helen wounded but











































guile what Bertram refuses to give freely. That her gratuitous
passion for Bertram remains unreciprocated does not restrain
her from duping him into cementing their marriage by means
of what she admits is ‘a wicked act’ and ‘a sinful fact’ 
(3.7.46, 47).
Helen comforts herself and her accomplices by quoting the
play’s title, inflating it by rephrasing it until it fills a couplet:
‘All’s well that ends well; still the fine’s the crown./Whate’er
the course, the end is the renown’ (4.4.35–6). But, however
often she recites her mantra, it cannot disguise the fact that
her ‘course’ has been to fake her own death and practise a
grotesque deceit on a man constrained to wed her. When she
next invokes the adage, she glances directly at the dubiousness
of her methods: ‘All’s well that ends well yet,/Though time
seem so adverse, and means unfit’ (5.1.27–8). And she returns
a few lines later to pick compulsively at the word that troubles
her as much as ‘well’ nettles Lavatch: ‘I will come after you
with what good speed/Our means will make us means’
(5.1.36–7). For once, Hazlitt could not have been wider of the
mark when he insisted: ‘There is not one thought or action
that ought to bring a blush to her cheeks, or that for a moment
lessens her in our esteem’ (Hazlitt 1930: 329).
Even after she has brought Bertram to heel and the comedy
to a close, Helen’s repressed rage still resonates in her final
speech: ‘If it appear not plain and prove untrue,/Deadly
divorce step between me and you’ (5.3.314–15). The unpalat-
able truth of the matter is that the miracle play of All’s Well
cradles a revenge comedy fuelled by ressentiment. If Helen is 
an angel of redemption, she is also an avenging angel, an
implacable base-born fury unleashed on Bertram, the arrogant
ruling-class rake, to pursue him the way men pursue women,
and to make him pay for refusing to love her by lashing him
to her forever. Alongside its more uplifting satisfactions, All’s
Well offers us the unsavoury pleasure of seeing Bertram
bamboozled and brought to his knees by a woman who had
her breeding at his father’s charge.
In his commentary on the play, Dr Johnson wrote:
I cannot reconcile my heart to Bertram, a man noble without
generosity, and young without truth; who marries Helen as
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by his unkindness, sneaks home to a second marriage, 
is accused by a woman whom he has wronged, defends
himself by falsehood, and is dismissed to happiness.
( Johnson 1968: 404)
But part of the point of Bertram’s undesirability is to expose
the callous indifference of Helen’s desire as she hunts down
and corners her aristocratic quarry. As Johnson’s superb phrase
‘dismissed to happiness’ suggests, Bertram’s feelings are of no
consequence to his persecutor or the playwright. Bertram 
is not there, as sentimental moralists suppose, to be redeemed
by love, but to be unmanned and unmasked as a despicable
object of undeserved love. The trapping and humiliation of
Bertram’s partner in crime, Paroles, are cross-cut with Bertram’s
seduction by Diana and the bed-trick to hammer the point
home. The prolonging of Bertram’s torment in the final scene,
where he is arrested on suspicion of murdering Helen and
publicly shamed as a lewd, spineless liar, puts the punitive
aspect of Helen’s plot beyond doubt.
Thinking of All’s Well as a social and sexual revenge 
comedy, in which the epitome of patrician misogyny gets his
comeuppance, throws light on the Countess’s cryptic remark
about Helen early on in the play, a remark that proves as
prophetic as the gnomic wisecracks of her fool: ‘she herself
without other advantage may lawfully make title to as much
love as she finds. There is more owing her than is paid, and
more shall be paid her than she’ll demand’ (1.3.90–2). How
deeply or consciously Shakespeare identified with Helen must
remain speculative. But it does not seem too far-fetched to
surmise that the glove-maker’s lad from the sticks who con-
quered the London stage, won the patronage of the Crown,
acquired a coat of arms, and – as the Sonnets attest – knew 
the pain of loving ‘a bright particular star’ out of his orbit, had
good grounds for empathizing with his heroine’s plight and
her nailing of Bertram through her own native wit. This surmise
is strengthened by the care the dramatist takes to insulate 
Helen from the slur of vulgar opportunism and vindictiveness
her actions threaten to attract. She is partly immunized by her
portrayal as a seraphic alien from the parallel universe of folk
myth. But she is doubly indemnified by the presence in the











































a character wholly of Shakespeare’s invention. A brazen arriviste
parasitically attached to Bertram, Paroles is coupled with Helen
from their saucy banter about virginity in the first scene to his
vital betrayal of Bertram in the final moments of the play.
The animus Helen’s transgressive triumph might arouse, 
and whatever guilt Shakespeare felt for letting her flout rank
and female decorum, are deflected onto the fawning upstart,
Paroles. Hence the King’s scolding of Bertram for snobbery
and demand that he marry Helen are followed by Lafeu’s
vitriolic abuse of the bogus gallant, on whom the play can
discharge its covert aversion to its heroine. And when Paroles
is baited and crushed by his fellow soldiers, his affliction serves
not only as a mirror of Bertram’s fate at Diana’s hands, but
also as a punishment of Helen by proxy for what she achieves
with impunity. If Lavatch unlocks the utopian import of Helen’s
apotheosis, then Paroles is the lightning rod for the loathing
the parvenu inspires in any hierarchical culture. That Paroles,
as his name proclaims, is also the personification of the words
the play is forged from makes clear, moreover, the complicity
of the wordsmith himself in the coercive wiles of All’s Well. In
so far as Shakespeare perceives in Helen and Paroles caricatures
of his own ambition and the art by which he achieved it, 
his portrayal of ‘the manifold linguist’ (4.3.224) and ‘double-
meaning prophesier’ (4.3.96) as ‘A very tainted fellow, and full
of wickedness’ (3.2.87) speaks volumes about what comedy has
obliged his language to connive in.
In the end, in spite of his collusion with her, Shakespeare’s
thaumaturgic heroine cannot remain unsoiled by the world in
which she works her miracles. Nor can the utopian spirit and
the principle of hope she embodies escape contamination 
by the culture of division, subjection and injustice they seek to
destroy. On the contrary, as the creatures of that culture they
leave the imprint of its violence and malice on every scene 
of All’s Well That Ends Well, as it broods on the means and
ends of human happiness. Even the perfunctory formalities 
of farewell are infected: ‘I grow to you,’ Bertram assures his
comrades, ‘And our parting is a tortured body’ (2.1.36–7). The
play whose title acknowledges the devil’s deal struck by comedy
knows the cost of the providential closure it contrives, and
incriminates itself by virtue of the language it commands. If
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sound within an organ weak’ is Shakespeare, so is the demonic
dramatist who stalks All’s Well, making it a thing of darkness
as well as a child of light.
That dramatist ensures that disavowal is not an option for
the play’s spectators either, by hooking them into its utopian
realism. Helen herself reminds us not only that the fulfilment
of her fantasy is double-edged, but also that it hangs by a
syllable, by a single thread of the language disparaged in the
figure of Paroles:
Yet, I pray you –
But with that word the time will bring on summer,
When briers shall have leaves as well as thorns,
And be as sweet as sharp.
(4.4.30–3)
‘Yet’ is made to bear enormous weight here, as both adverb
and conjunction, for it stresses the play’s unresolved openness
to the future in which it places its faith, and asks us to place
ours. The fragility of the resolution is accentuated by an equally
potent slip of a word, ‘if ’, which fronts its conditional clauses,
as in Bertram’s last lines: ‘If she, my liege, can make me know
this clearly/I’ll love her dearly, ever ever dearly’ (5.3.312–13).
Indeed, ‘yet’ and ‘if ’ team up in the final couplet of the comedy,
spoken by the King, to strand the ending in the subjunctive
mood, at the mercy of reversal:
All yet seems well; and if it end so meet,
The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet.
(5.3.329–30)
The axiomatic truth maintained by the title is betrayed by
deferral and exposed as a hypothesis, whose validity only the
future beyond the play can verify.
That future belongs to the world the audience inhabits, as
the Epilogue, addressed to us by the actor who has played the
King, compels us to recognize:
The King’s a beggar now the play is done.
All is well ended if this suit be won:











































With strife to please you, day exceeding day.
Ours be your patience then, and yours our parts:
Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts.
(Epil., 1–6)
The first line dissolves the difference between beggar and king
in the democratic spirit by which the King of this comedy has
been possessed. Then the second line recycles the penultimate
line of the play, but this time to snare the spectators in its
circumspect syntax and the dilemmas it has dramatized. The
Epilogue makes the audience – and all the audiences that will
succeed it – accountable for the satisfactory resolution of what
it has witnessed. It redefines ending well as an unending
endeavour, stretching off into an indefinite future: ‘which we
will pay/With strife to please you, day exceeding day’. And
the closing couplet leaves us in command of that endeavour
by reversing the roles of actors and audience. It puts us on the
stage in their place with their hearts, and turns them into














































Harry, Prince Hal, Henry V: he’s quite a character. And in
the end – whereas many of Shakespeare’s principals trespass
strangely into the sphere of the human – a character is all Hal
becomes. This chapter examines him through two philosoph-
ical lenses: the first provided by Martin Buber’s paradigm 
of the “I-You, I-It” duality of human, relational existence, and
the second taken from Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of “face”
and “character.” Both of these theories, Levinas’ knowingly
following Buber’s, understand humanity and the possible
creation of authentic human existence in terms of relational
opportunity and responsibility. My main aim is simply to see
how Hal/Henry V relates to others – even to “the Other.” I
start with his easily overlooked dealings with Francis, the
apprentice drawer at the tavern, whose limited but repeated
appearance in the Henry IV plays provides a template upon
which to begin mapping the Prince’s relational life, which is
what life essentially – yes, essentially – is according to Buber
and Levinas. Ethics for these thinkers has a numinous coloring.
As what is other to habitually selfish life and what is ultimately
significant and valuable, it is, to use the terms of this volume,










































Most critics who examine Hal ultimately determine whether
he treats Falstaff ethically, especially when the newly crowned
Henry V chooses a very public rejection for the fat knight. We
learn later that this rejection “kills” Falstaff (Henry V, 2.1.110ff.,
4.7.37ff.), but the same act seems to open the door for the
new, improved Hal to become “the mirror of all Christian
kings” (Henry V, 2.0.6). Of course, the rejection of Falstaff, no
matter how one views it, is just one moment in Hal’s dramatic
life, but that it is traditionally taken to be the moment is a
reminder that we are compellingly confronted with the ethics
of Shakespeare’s plays and with the ethical choices of Prince
Hal in particular.2
Paul Dean writes:
Shakespeare seems to show, in the Histories, and above all
in the figure of Prince Hal in Henry IV and Henry V, some-
thing contrary to the determinism of contemporary theory:
that it is what we do and wish to be which shapes the
universe we live in.
(1997: 35)
Individual identity is more complex than simply the “is” and
“was” of existence. It entails the hope of what “could be” and
even the wish to live up to what “should be.” These aspira-
tions are achieved or fail in action – with, as Dean emphasizes,
real consequences for the world. Criticism should pay heed to
Hugh Grady’s recommendation of a more “Machiavellian”
understanding of character, which begins with what characters
are rather than what they should be.3 But Shakespeare drama-
tizes Hal’s potential for becoming something else, for finding
the ethical mode which is, as Levinas would say, “otherwise
than being” (Levinas 1981). I will describe Hal’s relational exist-
ence as it is before going on to what should be, but “could”
and “should” do become inevitable because seeing Hal’s ethical
potentiality creates a reasonable curiosity as to whether and
how that potential will be realized, which contributes richly
and involvingly to the drama.
As mentioned, I use the Hal–Francis relationship as a
foundation for my argument. The ordinariness of Hal’s contact
with a barman seems to me especially revealing of his ethical
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chapter is – God is or isn’t in the details, as it were. There
has been a relative abundance of criticism on the basic (ir)rele-
vance of the short scenes with Hal and Francis. For example,
several critics, including Fredson Bowers (1975–6: 18–20),
Joseph Porter (1979: 69–70), J. McLaverty (1981: 107), and Lois
Potter (1999: 289–90) see Francis as relevant in the sense that
he is a representation, in miniature, of Hotspur, because of the
linguistic monotony each demonstrates – Francis shouting,
“Anon, anon,” and Hotspur equally committed to repeating
the name “Mortimer”; thus both appear to be single- and
simple-minded in comparison to Hal. J. D. Shuchter offers a
more elaborate comparison, one that shows Francis as a puny
Hal in his paralysis created by “conflicting obligations,” and
as a tiny Hotspur in terms of his potential rebellion against a
master (1968: 130). In each of these cases, Francis is inter-
preted as a figure for someone else. G. L. Kittredge sees the
relationship between the waiter and the Prince as essentially
pointless, except in terms of fun (in Bowers 1975–6: 139).
Eugene Wright, similarly, sees the Francis scenes as aesthetic-
ally useless, except for filling time until Falstaff arrives (1975–6:
65–7). More pertinently to my emphasis on relationship and
responsibility, Stephen Greenblatt sees significance in the histor-
ical politics of the interaction, writing, “the prince is implicated
in the production of this oppressive order [and] in the impulse
to abrogate it” in his conversation with Francis (1985: 44). Also
speaking historically, Charles Whitney asks, “what does the
truant Prince Hal have in common with the many apprentices
who in the 1590’s were regularly committed to Bridewell for
tavern-haunting?” (1999: 455). But Greenblatt and Whitney
take it for granted that Francis has no interest in himself, which
is ethically and politically questionable and which, I argue, is
precisely what is at stake in Hal’s reactions to him.
When we first encounter Prince Hal in the Boar’s Head 
Tavern, he is aglow with enthusiasm for his newly established
relationship with the “drawers,” the tavern’s apprentice tapsters
and waiters (1 Henry IV, 2.5). It is a complex moment dramatic-
ally, partly because the Prince is discussing his relationship to
his supposed social and political inferiors, the drawers, with
another of his supposed inferiors, Poins. Moreover, the discus-











































will awhile uphold/The unyoked humour of your idleness”
speech, in which he promises to use the Boar’s Head com-
munity – including Poins and Falstaff – for political advantage
(1.2.173–95). These factors complicate what can be gathered
about Hal’s relationships from the following lines. He says that
he’s been:
With three or four loggerheads amongst three or fourscore
hogsheads. I have sounded the very bass-string of humility.
Sirrah, I am sworn brother to a leash of drawers, and can
call them all by their christen names, as “Tom”, “Dick”,
and “Francis”. They take it already, upon their salvation,
that though I be but Prince of Wales yet I am the king of
courtesy, and tell me flatly I am no proud jack like Falstaff,
but a Corinthian, a lad of mettle, a good boy – by the
Lord, so they call me; and when I am King of England 
I shall command all the good lads in Eastcheap. They 
call drinking deep “dyeing scarlet”, and when you breathe
in your watering they cry “Hem!” and bid you “Play it
off!” To conclude, I am so good a proficient in one quarter
of an hour that I can drink with any tinker in his own
language during my life. I tell thee, Ned, thou hast lost
much honour that thou wert not with me in this action.
But, sweet Ned – to sweeten which name of Ned I give
thee this pennyworth of sugar, clapped even now into my
hand by an underskinker, one that never spake other
English in his life than “Eight shillings and sixpence”, and
“You are welcome”, with this shrill addition, “Anon, 
anon, sir! Score a pint of bastard in the Half-Moon!” or
so. But, Ned, to drive away the time till Falstaff come, I
prithee do thou stand in some by-room, while I question
my puny drawer to what end he gave me the sugar, and
do thou never leave calling “Francis!”, that his tale to me
may be nothing but “Anon!” Step aside, and I’ll show thee
a precedent.
(2.5.4–29)
The Prince speaks first of some “loggerheads”, but he then
potentially gives the members of that group personal identi-
ties, calling them by their supposed “christen names of ‘Tom’,
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to whether “Tom” and “Dick” are the actual names of the
other apprentices, or whether the Prince is jocularly using an
identity-denying cliché – every “Tom, Dick, and Harry” – but
substituting the name of the actual “Francis” for his own, as
Kiernan Ryan suggests (1995: 108).4 On the other hand, at
least one of the trio, Francis – the very one who breaks the
“Tom, Dick, and Harry” cliché – is in the tavern and will
shortly appear. Hal’s throwaway line seems casually to credit
the possibility of Francis’ singularity at the same time as it
undermines it.
In his complicated attempts to establish his own identity in
relation to Francis and the drawers, Hal fluctuates between
two relational positions that exemplify precisely the dialectical
condition that Martin Buber describes as inherent to human,
relational existence. Hal is demonstrably “human” in Buber’s
terms; however, despite the Prince’s seeming desire to relate
in the mode of what Buber calls the “I-You,” he fails really to
acknowledge Francis. And his bluff contempt for supposed
inferiors surely rebounds on Poins; in fact, in calling Poins
“Ned,” Hal again signals the particular and generic identity 
of one of his Boar’s Head associates, as “Ned” is both an abbre-
viation of “Edward” and a general label for a petty criminal.5
Recognition of and responsibility for the Other is what Levinas
posits as necessary for the achievement of ethical subjectivity.
While Hal manages to demonstrate his human potential
through his dual attitude to others throughout the Second
Henriad, his being human is frustratingly impeded by his failure
to fulfill the ethical life he can imagine and has opportunity to
attain. The pathos of this is not blunted but sharpened by the
humdrum quality of a barroom encounter, which suggests that
the most important issues of human ethics and ontology are
dramatized and decided in the infinite series of forgettable
moments that comprise the everyday.
After naming the drawers, Hal sways again towards the
conglomerate perspective of apprenticeship, repeatedly refer-
ring to the drawers as “they” – “so they call me,” “They call
drinking deep ‘dying scarlet’,” etc. But even while speaking of
the apprentices en bloc, Hal seems genuinely excited by the
sense that the experiences he shares with them prove his ability
to relate: “To conclude, I am so good a proficient in one











































language during my life.”6 But this enthusiasm is complicated,
most notably when Hal says:
They take it already, upon their salvation, that though I
be but Prince of Wales yet I am the king of courtesy, and
tell me flatly I am no proud jack like Falstaff, but a
Corinthian, a lad of mettle, a good boy – by the Lord, so
they call me; and when I am King of England I shall
command all the good lads in Eastcheap.
The apprentices’ appraisal of Hal as being “a lad of mettle, a
good boy” might be authentic praise or simple flattery; either
way, Hal appears to take it as an extended hand, an invita-
tion to join their group. But if it is such an invitation – rather
than just a means of enjoying an evening on the Prince’s tab,
utilization of others not being exclusively available to the power-
ful, as Nina Levine makes clear (Levine 2000: 414–15) – Hal
nonetheless sees the apprentices’ utility to him. The serious-
ness of his apparent casualness is always explicitly an issue after
“I know you all” (1.2.173–95) and here it emerges powerfully,
even brutally. Says Hal in effect, “I am Prince of Wales; while
I drink with them, they think that I am a good boy and a peer
of sorts: all the better to rule them with – when I am King I
will command such ‘good lads’ as these”. As Jeffrey Knapp
demonstrates, this political method contrasts starkly with that
of Henry IV:
While Hal’s father Henry IV ineffectually struggles to
resolve “intestine” conflict by reminding his people of the
Crusades and their lapsed duty to Christendom, Hal finds
companionship in an alehouse, and then finds a way
through the alehouse to rid England of civil war, recover
its empire, and strike a “Christian-like accord” with France
– all as the “king of good fellows.”
(Knapp 2002: 57)
Here, Hal’s method is only beginning to take shape, but it does
appear to be working: the “good lads” name him a “good
boy”; he places them as affectionate future subjects.7
However, as soon as we realize the political benefits of 
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of its individual members. Only at this moment do we realize
for sure that “Tom-Dick-and-Francis” is not simply a mocking
cliché for the apprentices, but that there is an actual “Francis”
at work in the Boar’s Head; this same Francis will also be the
butt of Hal’s attempted joke. Shortly, the Prince calls Francis
to his table and seems to take an interest in him – asking how
much time remains to serve out the terms of his apprentice-
ship, suggesting that Francis might be interested in breaking
this bond and running away, inquiring after the waiter’s age
(2.5.37–49). Hal even promises extraordinarily generous reci-
procation for the gift of the sugar, saying, “but hark you,
Francis. For the sugar thou gavest me, ’twas a pennyworth,
was’t not? [. . .] I will give thee for it a thousand pound. Ask
me when thou wilt, and thou shalt have it” (2.5.53–7).
This promise is fraught with difficulties of the kind that 
Ken Jackson, building on the work of Marcel Mauss (1990)
and Coppélia Kahn (1987), discusses in his thoughtful essay
on Timon of Athens (2001). The reader might be willing to see
Hal’s apparently absurd generosity as matching that which
Francis has shown; that is, given their economic difference, a
pennyworth of sugar to Francis may be similar to a thousand
pounds to the Prince. Or perhaps Hal’s generosity should be
seen as ethically and impressively excessive. But the economic
difference between prince and waiter is nonetheless highlighted,
and maybe even aggressively, as Hal not only makes the offer,
but also suggests the ease with which he can produce such a
handsome sum by encouraging the waiter to come and ask for
the thousand pounds at any time. Jackson would likely see this
gesture as an example of Mauss’s concept of “potlatching,”
whereby a chief would provide a huge gift in order to “prevent
any reciprocation and establish his superiority [. . .] by demon-
strating his different social position in the exchange network”
(2001: 38). In this case, the fact that Hal (Big-Chief-in-Waiting)
doesn’t even produce the actual gift but only the offer of the
gift (a sort of rain check) turns Francis from a free gift-giving
agent into a supplicant; and it potentially subjects the waiter
to scorn and humiliation for believing a joke to be an honest
offer. This is not to suggest that Francis’ “gift” is entirely free
of “economy” – a situation Jacques Derrida argues is logically
impossible (in Caputo 1997b: 140–51) and Ivo Kamps, relying











































would seem that we are encouraged to see Hal’s gift as
significantly poorer than the tapster’s.8
Still, Francis appears to take the Prince’s questions and offer
at face value, which only makes him all the more confused
when Hal begins speaking his “leathern-jerkin, crystal-button,
knot-pated” nonsense (2.5.64–6). When the bewildered waiter
asks what Hal means, the Prince roughly reminds him of his
subordinate position, saying, “Away, you rogue! Dost thou not
hear them call?” (2.5.73). Hal here treats Francis with the
contempt of a royal customer towards an apprentice waiter.
When he next calls the waiter, Hal receives the customary,
waiterly response of, “Anon, anon, sir!” (2.5.90). This comment
concludes the Hal–Francis interaction in 1 Henry IV with the
relational positions of each apparently clarified: Francis is the
waiter, Hal the master.
To summarize, in fewer than a hundred lines of text, Hal
happily describes his relationship with the drawers, makes clear
their political utility, enters into personal conversation with
Francis, then treats him in a manner that clarifies the difference
between royal customer and apprentice waiter. The dramatic
situation is brief, involves four speakers (Hal, Poins, Francis,
and the vintner), is all prose, and is certainly not sentimental
moralizing; instead, it has both the tone and the significance
of real speech, of everyday language, right down to the barroom
specifics of drink orders and seating arrangements. Yet the lines
also repeatedly evoke the difference between treating others as
subjective individuals or as objects to be used for one’s own
advantage. I am arguing that the passage is, perhaps para-
doxically, more ethically compelling because it doesn’t involve
any extraordinary “fear and trembling.” We can recognize
ourselves in this exchange, and in the ethics of casualness, of
relaxation, of contingent rather than ultimate situations that
define our lives. I also suggest that if any spiritual issues can
be shown to hang on Hal’s failed barroom joke, then spiritu-
ality may be more of an issue in ordinary life than we might
think.
At the end of these lines, it seems that Hal withdraws into
a view of Francis as a bought man rather than an individual.
But such a view will not hold entirely because Francis appears
again in 2 Henry IV (2.4), and again he alone receives special
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Though Hal this time does not exchange words with Francis,
he does borrow the waiter’s uniform and attempts to fill 
Francis’ position. That is, Hal attempts in some way to be Francis
– though less than successfully. In this second situation, in which
Francis again appears as individual and as member of the
apprenticeship conglomerate, the text explicitly replays Hal’s
dual attitude as if to underline that Hal’s relationship with 
the apprentices, and with Francis in particular, is not reducible
to a single orientation.
Prince Hal and Buber’s “I-You” paradigm
Martin Buber’s I and Thou provides a helpful basic construct
by which to understand the natures of Hal’s relationships with
Francis and others.9 In his opening line – “The world is two-
fold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude” (Buber
1970: 53) – Buber suggests that humans live, essentially, in two
relational positions – the position of “experience/utility,” which
he characterizes as the “I-It,” and that of true relationship,
which he calls the “I-You.” These positions are distinct but
are also simultaneously at work. The “I-It” position, says Buber,
is realized when a person
perceives the being that surrounds him, plain things and
beings as things; he perceives what happens around him,
plain processes and actions as processes, things that consist
of qualities and processes that consist of moments, things
recorded in terms of spatial coordinates and processes
recorded in terms of temporal coordinates, things and pro-
cesses that are bounded by other things and processes and
capable of being measured against and compared with
those others – an ordered world, a detached world. This
world is somewhat reliable; it has density and duration; its
articulation can be surveyed; one can get it out again and
again; one recounts it with one’s eyes closed and then
checks with one’s eyes open.
(82)
This “I-It” position, I suggest, is the one from which Hal
formulates his prodigal-prince-to-powerful-king prognostica-











































position that Hal understands the political value of his
association with the apprentices as a group. The world is an
objective reality outside himself that Hal is going to refashion
for his own purposes. But that is not quite the whole story of
the way he relates to the apprentices, as we have seen.
The “I-You” position is much different. Buber says that in
this attitude a person
encounters being and becoming as what confronts him –
always only one being and every thing only as a being.
What is there reveals itself to him in the occurrence, and
what occurs there happens to him as being. [. . .] The
encounters do not order themselves to become a world,
but each is for you a sign of the world order. They have
no association with each other, but every one guarantees
your association with the world. The world that appears to
you in this way is unreliable, for it appears always new 
to you, and you cannot take it by its word. [. . .] It cannot
be surveyed: if you try to make it surveyable, you lose it.
[. . .] It does not stand outside you, it touches your ground;
[. . .] you can make it into an object for you and experi-
ence and use it – you must do that again and again – and
then you have no present any more. Between you and it
there is reciprocity of giving.
(83–4, Buber’s italics)
The shift from “him” to “you” exemplifies the interplay between
the two positions Buber describes. The “I-You” position is
evident in Hal’s questions regarding Francis’ apprenticeship
and in his promised reciprocation for Francis’ gift of the sugar;
as seen in the quotation earlier, reciprocity of giving is, in fact,
the central ethical component of Buber’s “I-You” construction.
I suggested that Francis’ confusion results largely from his belief
in the authenticity of this aspect of his relationship with the
Prince. We may categorize this belief, and Francis himself, as
simple or even “mindless,” as does Bowers (Bowers 1975–6:
20). From one point of view, no doubt it is, but if we follow
Buber’s thought then the drawer’s belief is also indicative of
an ethically and existentially superior mode of being, one which
stunningly reverses the positions of the prince and the pauper.
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being ego or alcohol induced, the “I-You” position also comes
into view in Hal’s delight at being “sworn brothers” to the
drawers. Ultimately, through the seeming casualness and
insignificance of this dramatic moment in a pub, another
dimension shows through. Our first real glimpse in this chapter,
perhaps, of spirit.
Still, it seems easy to decide that Hal’s “I-You” relationships
turn out to be phony or hypocritical. The shifting back and
forth from the personally engaged to the instrumentally polit-
ical is really only symptomatic of Hal’s relationships with
everyone, and especially with Falstaff. But if Hal does reject
his “I-You” relationship with Falstaff, the Boar’s Head gang,
Francis, and the drawers, then the “I-You” relationship does,
or at least did – or at least could – exist. I suggest that the
oscillation in Hal between “I-You” and “I-It,” between under-
standing and perhaps desiring true relationship with Francis
or Falstaff and utilizing them, creates a dramatic environment
that is less than completely, less than theoretically stable or
straightforward, but is convincingly, ambiguously human, in a
way that would satisfy Buber.10
On relationship Buber writes in terms that take on a strong
spiritual and essentialist coloring:
[. . .] the longing for relation is primary, the cupped hand
into which the being that confronts us nestles; and the rela-
tion to that, which is a wordless anticipation of saying You,
comes second. [. . .] In the beginning is the relation – as
the category of being, as readiness, as a form that reaches
out to be filled, as a model of the soul, the a priori of
relation; the innate You.
(1970: 78)
Such a desire imbues the speech I have focused on earlier.
Consider not only Hal’s warm exuberance, but also his value-
laden, sometimes explicitly spiritual diction: “humility,” “sworn
brother,” “christen,” “salvation,” “Corinthian,” “by the Lord,”
“drink with any tinker in his own language.” All of these 
words and phrases are suggestive of relationship. For example,
brotherhood is a form of, often a synecdoche for, relationship,
whereas drinking with a tinker in his native tongue suggests











































all this, let us recall, is the Boar’s Head. In a sense, the episode
is absurd, as it’s doubtless meant to be. But it also suggestively
plants what otherwise would only be mock-pious irrelevancies
in the soil of real existence. Here, as I have suggested, spirituality
is another dimension of ordinary life itself.
Significantly, Hal’s personal conversation with Francis 
and later borrowing of Francis’ outfit occur in the context 
of attempted jokes, indicating that the Prince is trivializing 
his knowledge of the “I-You” relationship and clarifying his
superior position by temporarily drawing close to the drawer.
Nonetheless, in order to be effective, each joke involves a certain
emptying out of that very superiority. That is, Hal has to step
down from his princely position and into the place of Francis
and the other drawers. In the first instance, he does this by
attempting to learn the loggerheads’ “language.” In Part Two,
Poins indicates that all that is required to change from prince
to apprentice is costume – “leather jerkins and aprons” – and
professional behavior – “wait upon [Falstaff] at his table like
drawers” (2.2.149–50). Hal takes note of his stepping out of
position, saying, “From a God to a bull – a heavy declension
– it was Jove’s case. From a prince to a prentice – a low trans-
formation – that shall be mine; for in everything the purpose
must weigh with the folly” (151–4). When the Prince mentions
the “purpose” of the joke, he once more highlights his tendency
toward utilization. But Jove descended into the form of a bull
from desire: the comparison keeps the possibility of relation-
ship in play.11 And the disguise offers an image of identification
and solidarity. In his transformations into a sort of everyman/
drawer, Hal’s attempt to utilize is mixed up with an effort and
a desire to relate that lean toward ethical/spiritual possibility
even in the midst of self-orchestrated political history.
On several other occasions, Hal demonstrates this desire 
for true relationship. We might consider three of the most
memorable:
• Hal’s desire for small beer (2 Henry IV, 2.2.1–23). Is the
draw for the Prince really toward Falstaff and the old gang
(and beer), or away from his troubled relationship with his
father and the pressing politics of the kingdom? Most likely,
both are the case. Hal utilizes Falstaff and his father, but
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moments later he wishes to show concern regarding his
father’s illness (2.2.29–54) – a desire which Poins might
not see as hypocritical if only the Prince had spent time
administering to his relationship with his father prior to
this moment when the King’s death is so fully equated with
Hal’s rise to power. Once again it is in the complexity, the
detail, the “undecidability” of this moment that its ethical
credibility is felt.
• Henry V’s pain as the result of Scroop’s betrayal (Henry V,
2.2.90–141). This moment is almost shocking in its 
re-humanization of Hal/Henry V. After the rejection of
Falstaff, one senses that Hal has become the “Great User,”
a perspective strengthened by his spurious spiritual sanc-
tion for a war with France – the battle abroad that his
father had suggested would end the British civil war. And
yet, Henry V asks us to believe that he is both stunned
and sorrowed by the fact that Scroop attempted to “ha’
practiced on [the King]” (2.2.96). He even says that
Scroop’s treason “is like/Another fall of man” (2.2.138–9).
If the first fall of man ended the perfect relationship
between humans, their environment, and God, this second
fall perhaps indicates the King’s near despair of authentic
relationship even on a limited basis. But has he not himself
created this twice-fallen world of the Second Henriad?
• Still, Henry continues to try to relate, as is evinced by his
desire to move among the soldiers on the night before
Agincourt (4.1.24–211). This effort fails but merits consid-
eration. Henry again disguises himself and attempts to
communicate with the common people, as he did in don-
ning Francis’ apron at the tavern, but Bates and Williams
remind him that the King’s politics are inextricably bound
up with his and their personal and spiritual relationships:
if they die, they will leave wives and children behind, and
the King will be responsible. Henry strains to deny this
responsibility, but the burden of their words stays with him.
He cannot reach them, cannot authentically relate to them,
because he’s already using them for his kingly advantage.
As Hal moves through his politically successful kingship, he
moves deeper and deeper into the more surveyable but inert











































the history of the individual and that of the human race may
diverge in other respects, they agree in this at least: both signify
a progressive increase of the It-world” (1970: 87); furthermore,
“the improvement of the capacity for experience and use
generally involves a decrease in man’s power to relate” (89). 
As we witness in Hal’s dismissal of Francis, his “crown-theft”
while supposedly attending to his dying father (2 Henry IV,
4.3.150–311), the chilly deaths of Falstaff and Bardolph (Henry V,
2.1.73–116, 2.3.1–37; 3.6.89–103), and the ultimate disappear-
ance of Francis and Poins, Henry’s increased “capacity for
experience and use” and decreased ability in the “power to
relate” is painfully evident. According to Buber, this makes 
him a paradigmatic figure of modernity.12 However, even so 
late as in Henry’s late-night chat with Bates and Williams,
designed by the King as an “I-It” experience preparatory to the
battle, there remains a flicker of the urge to relate, uncomfort-
able now for Harry as Williams essentially forces the issue of
being understood as a “You,” rather than as one more soldierly
“It.” Though this urge is left unfulfilled in Henry, elsewhere in
Shakespeare – for example, in Lear’s relationships, especially
with the Fool, and in Richard II with his last “friend” the 
groom – it is possible for the “I-You” between king and subject
to be discovered or rediscovered after a period of latency.
Therefore, we see that Shakespeare’s texts tend to maintain 
both relational integers, the “I-It” and the “I-You,” even in
obviously hierarchical contexts, although as Buber suggests, 
“it is not as if these states took turns so neatly; often it is an
intricately entangled series of events that is tortuously dual” (69).
Hal and Buber’s being-in-relationship
In Buber’s terms, Hal demonstrates the dual attitude indicative
of the divided human condition, as well as the requisite longing
for relationship, and these characteristics do much to vitalize
the drama. But we also remember how excited Hal was to be
viewed as a “good boy” and a “sworn brother” to the drawers,
terms that establish the desirability of sustained ethical rela-
tionships to others. There is more than just a desire simply to
experience ethical life here. We seem instead to glimpse, even
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into what Buber calls the “lived actuality” of the concept of
being-in-relationship (136).
Buber’s “I-You, I-It” structure concedes the necessity of the
“I-It” world, largely because this is the world in which events
and experiences can be psychologically, politically, and historic-
ally organized, and made generally reliable through a certain
detachment (82). There must be an accommodation of the “I-
It,” because it is simply not possible to live exclusively in the
“I-You” (83–4). However, Buber states of the two positions:
“The It is the chrysalis, the You the butterfly” (69) and “without
It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that
is not human” (85) and is “buried in nothingness” (83). While
Hal’s desire for true relationship appears time and again
throughout the tetralogy, there is the question of whether or
not the move towards true relationship is actualized at any
time, whether Hal unfurls into a fully human being, an example
to us all such as a “mirror of all Christian kings” might be.
If a moment of actualization does occur, it perhaps is found
in the Prince’s relationship with Falstaff. From the moment 
we first see these two in 1 Henry IV (1.2), there is a sense of at
least a verbal fraternity between them. Initially, their discussion
is mostly made up of light banter concerning whoring, thieving,
drinking, and eating: again, not a very promising starting-point
for a spiritualized ethics, we might think. But this banter, as is
the case in Shakespeare’s texts elsewhere (perhaps most notably
with Benedick and Beatrice in Much Ado), does indicate a certain
closeness of feeling, a camaraderie, a desire for and pleasure
in the Other. The lines quoted below continue this significant
tone and begin to absorb more explicitly if ambiguously spiritual
content:
Falstaff Thou hast the most unsavory similes, and art indeed
the most comparative, rascalliest sweet young Prince. But
Hal, I prithee trouble me no more with vanity. I would to
God thou and I knew where a commodity of good names
were to be bought. An old lord of the Council rated me
the other day in the street about you, sir, but I marked
him not; and yet he talked very wisely, but I regarded him
not; and yet he talked wisely, and in the street too.
Prince Harry Thou didst well, for wisdom cries out in streets,











































Falstaff O, thou hast damnable iteration, and art indeed able
to corrupt a saint. Thou hast done much harm upon me,
Hal, God forgive thee for it. Before I knew thee, Hal, I
knew nothing; and now am I, if a man should speak truly,
little better than one of the wicked. I must give over this
life, and I will give it over. By the Lord, an I do not, I am
a villain. I’ll be damned for never a king’s son in
Christendom.
Prince Harry Where shall we take a purse tomorrow, Jack?
Falstaff Zounds, where thou wilt, lad! I’ll make one; an I do
not, call me villain and baffle me.
Prince Harry I see a good amendment of life in thee, from
praying to purse-taking.
Falstaff Why, Hal, ’tis my vocation, Hal. ’Tis no sin for a
man to labour in his vocation.
(1.2.70–93)
The familiar nicknames suggest a sort of easy “I-You” mode.
In addition, there is a relishing affection in Falstaff calling Hal
the “rascalliest sweet young Prince” and “lad.” And, as with
Hal’s speech regarding the drawers, there are strange, even
overwhelming spiritual connotations: “God,” “wisdom cries out
in the streets,”13 “corrupt a saint,” “God forgive thee,” “By the
Lord,” “I’ll be damned for never a king’s son in Christendom,”
“Zounds,” “good amendment of life,” “praying,” and “sin.”
Though it dances in complex, not easily decipherable measures
with his humor and general audacity, Falstaff ’s skewed, weird
but persistent spirituality appears from these first moments in
1 Henry IV to the last we hear of him in Henry V, and it often
occurs in conversation with, or concerning his relationship 
with, Hal.
Opportunity for the “I-You” again surrounds Hal here, 
this time in the person of Falstaff, and in a performative and
improvised manner the Prince participates; shortly later, this
participation will be even more fully realized in their play-acting
scene (2.5). The earlier passage associates Falstaff with suffering
virtue and Hal with sin and temptation until they both join in
an enthusiastic spiritual “vocation” of thieving!  What I am
hinting at – what I am suggesting that the play hints at – is that
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Hal is a revelation of a strangely ethically and spiritually creative
mode of being that is not carried into Henry’s kingship and is
beyond conventional piety.
In their initial scene, Hal concludes their interaction with
the “I know you all” speech; similarly, the play-acting ends
with Hal’s ominous “I do; I will” promise to banish Falstaff
(2.5.439). And what’s really unnerving is that Hal knows that
in banishing plump Jack he’s banishing all the world. And yet,
the fact that Hal is using Falstaff does not rule out the contin-
uing chance for authentic relationship. Although Falstaff ’s (like
Francis’) optimism for developing true relationship with Hal is
ultimately unrealized and even misplaced, his understanding
of Hal’s human, relational being is nonetheless far from stupid:
in its unworldliness and reckless independence from the selfish
desire usually associated with Falstaff, it is even rather heroic.
As for Hal, the fact that he utilizes Falstaff and Francis and
others does not cancel the Prince’s potential to realize honest
relationship.
This potential is later enacted as the worried Henry V
attempts to turn toward God. On the night before the battle
of Agincourt, immediately following his conversation with 
Bates and Williams, Henry decides to pray, to (in Buber’s terms)
enter into the ultimate “I-You” relationship. In this attempt,
the King asks that God give his soldiers courage and that his
familial guilt for the death of Richard II not be considered at
this historical moment, for after all, Henry points out, he has
demonstrated great penitence for that death. But he ends the
prayer with the realization that his good works are worthless
because he retains the kingship, the lasting benefit of Richard’s
murder (4.1.271–87). This allows us to see that Hal/Henry V,
who to some resembles Hamlet,14 is also related to the prayerful
Claudius. Like Henry, Claudius guiltily frets that his desire for
forgiveness and atonement with God will remain unrealized
because he retains the benefits of his murder of Old Hamlet.
And while Claudius suffers from “the primal eldest curse”
(3.3.37) – that is, Cain’s curse for having murdered Abel –
Hal’s inherited responsibility for the death of his cousin Richard
has a similar result. To gain a crown, Claudius killed a brother
and thereby stifled his possible relationship to God. As heir 











































kinsman, Henry finds himself frustrated in his efforts to realize
true relationship with his “sworn brothers,” his brothers-in-
arms, and God.
Hal’s attempt at prayer is also interesting when read more
explicitly through Buber’s comments. Buber states:
One cannot divide one’s life between an actual relationship
to God and an inactual I-It relationship to the world –
praying to God in truth and utilizing the world. Whoever
knows the world as something to be utilized knows God
in the same way. His prayers are a way of unburdening
himself – and fall into the ears of the void.
(156)
Buber’s concept of God is at least partly comprised in the idea
of “absolute relationship” or the “true You [. . .] that cannot
be restricted by any other and to whom [one] stands in rela-
tionship that includes all others” (127, 124). The philosopher
understands God as a kind of quintessence of personality. A
relationship with God is implied and realized in ordinary ethical
life, and vice versa (172–82).15 This clearly has a bearing 
on my “spiritual” reading of seemingly mundane moments 
in the Second Henriad. If, as Hal does, one utilizes one’s 
fellow humans and puts aside the actualization of the “I-You,”
then one does the same with God, both in the moment of
utility and when attempting to relate to God in prayer. And
this process of utilization is draining to one’s humanity; in 
that respect, and considering Henry’s prayer as merely one
more attempted “piece of shrewd diplomacy,” Una Ellis-
Fermor says:
Neither we the readers nor Henry himself nor his God
ever meets the individual that had once underlain the outer
crust that covers a Tudor monarch, for there is nothing
beneath the crust; all has been converted into it; all desires,
all impulses, all selfhood, all spirit.
(1946: 46)
This idea is precisely realized as Henry finishes the prayer,
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transforming from chrysalis to butterfly, but instead is coming
to recognize the It-world as the world that presently matters to
him. It is an existentially fraught moment. To Buber, it would
signify a mere departure from the pole of ethics, but the
dramatic spotlight shines so powerfully on Hal’s inwardness
here as to suggest that lasting damage has been done. In other
words, Henry’s distancing of relationship has corrupted and
degraded his being, his “I,” and reduced him to his utilitarian
value, his “It.” Disrespect for others manifests and results in a
harmful disrespect for the nature of his own being, his being-
in-relationship. It is a failure by Henry V to achieve his own
inherent potentiality, to realize the fullness of the “I-You.”
Hal and Emmanuel Levinas
Through the lens of Levinas, Hal’s failure is seen somewhat
differently – not simply as failure in self-actualization (a failure
of the “I”), but as failure for the Other (for the “You”). For
Buber, the “infinite” exists as personal potentiality (1970: 136,
167), but for Levinas it exists as responsibility.
Before moving on briefly to consider Hal/Henry V in
relation to the ethics of Levinas, it is important to point out
that Levinas is acutely aware of Buber’s “I-You” paradigm,16
and in significant ways values this model even while changing
both the terms and the ethical ideal it enshrines. As to the terms,
what Buber refers to as the “I-You, I-It” duality of humanity,
Levinas compasses under his theory of the Other. The Other
is experienced as either the “face” or as a “character,” which
Levinas defines as follows:
The face is signification, and signification without context.
I mean that the Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a
character within a context. Ordinarily, one is a “character”:
a professor at the Sorbonne, a Supreme Court justice, a
son of so-and-so, everything that is in one’s passport, the
manner of dressing, of presenting oneself. And all signifi-
cation in the usual sense of the term is relative to such a
context: the meaning of something is in its relations to
another thing. Here, to the contrary, the face is meaning











































face is not “seen”. It is what cannot become a content,
which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable, it
leads you beyond.
(Levinas 1985: 86–7)
In Buber, the “I-You” is what is uncontainable, what leads
one beyond, while the “I-It” is very much a content within a
context. But despite the similarity of their foundational terms,
it is apparent even at this cursory level that Levinas’ ethics are
differently focused, not so much oriented toward the develop-
ment of the “I” as to the responsibility for the Other. In this
respect, while Buber focuses on the issue of reciprocation in
relationship for full development of the “I,” Levinas focuses on
response to and responsibility for what is outside the self.
Although Levinas makes clear that the desire for what he
also calls the “Infinite,” for authentic relationship (1985: 82),
is as crucial as Buber claims it to be, Levinas also believes that
this desire “nourishes itself on its own hungers and is augmented
by its satisfaction” (92). This may explain how relational desire
appears to decline in Hal over the course of the tetralogy. That
is, as Hal turns away from authentic relationship with his father,
Falstaff, Francis, Poins, Scroop, and others, his desire for actual-
izing authentic relationship begins to wane, and while he may
have the impulse towards the “Infinite,” his longing for true
relationship is consistently smothered by his commitment to
utilizing others as “characters” within his ultimately socio-
symbolic network, rather than responding to them as “faces,”
as what immediately confronts his subjectivity in and even as
the Other below or above any social description.
Levinas believes that in taking note of the existence of the
“face,” one immediately becomes responsible “for him, without
even having taken on responsibilities in his regard; his respons-
ibility is incumbent on me” (96, his italics). The reason for this,
in Levinas’ view, is that “subjectivity is not for itself; it is [. . .] 
initially for another” (96). In fact, says Levinas, “[f ]or every
man, assuming responsibility for the Other is a way of testifying
to the glory of the Infinite, and of being inspired” (113). In
this regard, Hal’s dismissal of opportunities for authentic rela-
tionship is not just a matter of failing to achieve his potentiality.
Rather, this pattern of turning away is grossly irresponsible.
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while living in the “I-It” – Hal demonstrates that he has the
dual attitude inherent to humans, but by refusing responsibility
for the Other, by not responding to the “face,” he becomes
buried in nothingness and fails to achieve a subjective, ethical
agency.
Nowhere is this lack of humanity more pronounced than in
Henry V’s last moments in the tetralogy, the scene of his
“wooing” of Catherine (5.2). Here, Henry’s instrumentaliza-
tion of others manifests itself once again, and he has now
become so brazen in this relational mode as to refer to his
future wife – in front of both herself and her parents – as “our
capital demand” (5.2.95–7). In addition, he decides to act the
part of a plain soldier with Catherine (5.2.145–62) even though
this role does not square with our experience of Hal/Henry V
throughout the larger part of the tetralogy. When Catherine
leaves the room after Henry’s most flagrant failure to relate,
the King attempts to keep up his bluff soldierly role when he
speaks with Burgundy, but this “character” quickly fades to be
replaced by something akin to the Boar’s Head Hal, who
roughly banters about the similarity between women and 
flies (5.2.262–94). Here, at the closing of the Second Henriad,
having reduced everyone else to the function of “character” in
his personal political drama, and having played a vast array
of roles himself, Hal confirms that he has ultimately buried his
own ability to respond to the “face,” buried the responsibility
for the Other, and therefore his own humanity, lost his own
face and become a mere “character.”
Maybe this loss is in some ways inevitable for Hal/Henry V,
as kingship in Shakespeare appears generally to result in 
greater utilization of others and a reduced ability to relate and
respond; in that regard, along the way I have mentioned
Richard II, Lear, and Claudius, and other ready examples might
include Henry IV and Macbeth. But Hal is a special case, partly
because his opportunities to relate occur so frequently and
under a dramatic spotlight, and his turnings away, especially
from Falstaff, create a more devastating sense of what is lost in
the process of achieving abundant political gains. Despite his
many maneuverings as prince and king, Harry somehow always
seems on the verge of becoming, of entering or rediscovering
a new mode of being-in-relationship. Although my emphasis











































wish to oppose private ethics to public politics. A politics 
of ethical responsibility toward all others is the “undecon-
structible” inspiration for deconstruction that many of the
chapters in this volume explore. God’s love for everything in
creation may be the most concrete image of such politics.17
Henry V’s kingdom cannot compare. In the Second Henriad,
Hal does demonstrate that he is a man, even has the necessary
“stuff” – potential, desire, and opportunity – to become an
ethical human being and ruler. But the roles that he chooses
to play, those many “characters” – prince, thief, drinking
buddy, benefactor, son, brother, king, soldier, suitor, etc. –
while allowing for position and power, cost him his shot at the
“Infinite.” Harry is in the end all-too-human and, as a result,
not really human at all, because bereft of that extra, precious,
spiritual element that defines humanity and yet is engendered
in a vital responsiveness to ordinary life. The strange truth of
spirituality is that when we look in the mirror we should see
someone else. Were this “Christian king” to look in the mirror,
he might well see one of his gratifyingly successful “characters”
smiling smugly back at him, but he wouldn’t see a Levinasian
“face,” the face of the Other that is also his own, the mean-
ingful authentication of the “could be” and “should be” of 
his life.
Notes
1 There has been no lack of interest in the religious issues of the 
Second Henriad, especially in regard to the Catholic, Protestant, and
Reformation ideologies found within the plays. For interesting reading
on these issues, see, among many others, Poole 1995, Hunt 1998,
and Hamilton 2003. But I would distinguish this work from the sorts
of spiritual/ethical matters I am discussing here.
2 For a sampling of the variety of impressions concerning the ethics,
politics, and propriety of Hal’s rejection of Falstaff, see Bradley 1909,
Newman 1966, McGee 1984, Bloom 1998, and Amirthanayagam
1999.
3 See Grady 2000.
4 The OED notes the common use of the names “Tom”, “Dick”, and
“Harry” both as nicknames for the Christian names of “Thomas”,
“Richard”, and “Henry” and as the generic naming “for any male
representative of the common people.” Shakespeare also uses the
names of “Tom” and “Dick” in this generic way in Winter’s song at
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5 The OED includes other possibilities for “Ned,” as well, among them
“a general term of disapprobation.”
6 Steven Mullaney 1983 writes thoughtfully on the nature and utility
of Hal’s language lessons in the tavern.
7 Harry Levin states, the Boar’s Head event demonstrates the politically
useful idea that the “dissolute playboy seems at heart to be a fun-
loving boy-scout. [. . .] Harry’s youthful fraternization with Tom,
Dick, and Francis will have made him more humane as head of state
than his aloof and crafty father has been” (1981: 6–7). Eugene Wright
more bluntly asserts, “Hal is, and this scene proves it, a man who
acts according to his present political needs [. . .]” (1975–6: 67).
8 Though outside of my parameters here, it is tempting to discuss
Derrida’s concept of the gift much further, especially as it is addressed
by both Jackson 2001 and Caputo 1997b. Desire for the gift is 
relevant to Hal’s interaction with Francis, and possibly with many
others in the Second Henriad. Derrida’s idea that gift (at least as an
impossibility) and economy are always with us, and therefore demand
that decisions and choices are made in regard to both, has several
interesting parallels and intersections with Buber’s “I-You/I-It”
paradigm, and also, as Caputo suggests (150), with Levinas’ concept
of responsibility for the Other.
9 For more on the spiritual and sociological implications of 
Buber’s work, see Friedman 1955, Kohanski 1982, Murphy 1983,
and Silberstein 1989. I wish to thank Alfonso Morales for many
productive discussions on the sociological application of Buber.
10 See Buber 1970: 82.
11 I am indebted to Bruce Louden for discussion of Jove/Europa. See
Books Two, Six, and Eight of the Metamorphoses (Ovid 1965).
12 For much more on the instrumentalization of others in Shakespeare
as part of the onset of modernity, see Grady’s Shakespeare’s Universal
Wolf, especially Chapter Three, “Othello and the Dialectic of
Enlightenment: Instrumental Reason, Will, and Subjectivity” (1996:
95–136).
13 This phrase comes from Proverbs 1:20: “Wisdom crieth without; she
uttereth her voice in the streets.”
14 For some thoughtful comparisons between Hal and Hamlet, see 
H. D. Janowitz 2000, H. MacLean 1987, and D. R. C. Marsh 1983.
15 These ideas are made especially clear in the referenced pages, which
were added by Buber in 1957 in his Afterword to the second edition.
16 For more on Levinas’ understanding of Buber, see Sean Hand’s The
Levinas Reader, especially Chapter Three, “Time and the Other,” and
Chapter Four, “Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge” (1989:
37–74). Correspondence between Buber and Levinas can be seen in
Levinas 1976: 51–5.














































The cascade of revelations at the close of The Merchant of Venice
achieves the effect of a cinematic close-up, calling attention,
one last time before morning dawns in Belmont, to the unsettled
semantic range and ideological mooring of gifts and gift-
exchange in the play-world at large. Three gifts appear, brought
forth from as many origins: happy coincidence (unexpected
news of the return of Antonio’s argosies); civil law (safe
conveyance of Shylock’s deed of gift to Lorenzo and Jessica);
and providential care (Lorenzo’s grateful invocation of biblical
manna). However one judges the worth, and the cost, of these
gifts, there is more than meets the eye in the ensemble. There
is an absence: the Gobbo family, Old Gobbo and his son,
Launcelot. The absence is easy to overlook, for several reasons.
The Gobbos belong to the periphery of the play’s social world,
and what we know of the story of their lives dissolves into white
noise when pitched against the dominant key of the pre-marital
banter in the final act. Yet their absence discloses something
that anthropologically driven notions of the logic of the gift,
which have dominated the subject of gift exchange in Merchant










































For the Gobbos have their own forgotten gift to give. 
Its vanishing tacitly proclaims the essential component of the
gift to be nothing – literally, no thing. In gift-giving, it’s the
thought that counts, the excessive, gratuitous spirit of the gift,
not the thing itself. The gift soundlessly but persistently mocks
materialism’s investment in empirical and quantifiable meas-
ures of the real. By no coincidence, the most telling indicators
of this provocation surface in the Gobbos’ forays into the main
action. Their comic wordplay generates intuitions of the gift
that challenge the play’s dominant religious, ethnic, and social
partitions (Christian/Jewish enclaves, landed vs. mercantile
economies, and the shifting choreography of friends, lovers,
neighbors, rivals, and enemies).
Taking its cue from the Gobbos’ accidental insights and
suggestions, this chapter examines the radical nature of Merchant’s
rendering of the spirit of the gift. To this end, it follows the ques-
tion of the gift’s intangible essence into the contested peninsula
of twentieth-century philosophical thought on the gift – outside
the play’s local frames of reference – where contemporary
phenomenologies of religion and incarnational theologies con-
verge. The Gobbos’ wayward exchanges, I argue, find illumin-
ating counterparts in the philosophical debates between Jacques
Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Alain
Badiou over the defining terms of the gift and its conditions of
possibility.
Beyond gift exchange
Where mainstream Shakespeare scholarship is concerned, the
four thinkers just named occupy a place strangely reminiscent
of the Gobbos’ in the final tableau of Merchant. Though
acknowledged as significant participants in the community of
discourse on the gift, their speculative labors have by and large
gone unrecognized in Merchant criticism. This is so, in part,
because of the visceral immediacy of the play’s depiction of an
urban, and urbane, social world and the raw urgency of its
antagonisms. No wonder the play has lent itself with such ease
to materialist inquiry and to sociological and anthropological
theories of gift exchange: these are the prevailing critical idioms
for addressing the immanence of the real. However, the quarry











































speak to the arguments of Continental philosophers of the gift
– does not lie as far afield as one might think.
The route opens from an established crossroads in Merchant
criticism. The play’s reiterated oscillations between a concocted
memory of feudal usury and a waking dream of mercantile
capitalism evince prescient intuitions of one of Marcel Mauss’s
foundational contributions to anthropological discourse on the
gift: the distinction between gift and commodity. For Mauss
the distinction turned on a surplus element he found to be
characteristic of the gift rather than the commodity (unlike
Karl Marx, who famously discovered “the secret of surplus
value” in the capitalist system of commodity exchange (Yan
1996: 5)). On Mauss’s account, the surplus element – the 
spirit (hau) of the gift – generates relations of exchange and
reciprocity, without being reducible to them. By and large,
subsequent anthropological writing rejected Mauss’s intuition
of the spirit of the gift, erecting in its place a logic of immanent
reciprocity, as in Bronislaw Malinowski’s “principle of give and
take” (Yan 1996: 6), and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s gift economy,
in which the exchange of women constitutes both origin and
paradigm of sociality. In a well-known essay on the dynamics
of gift exchange in Merchant, Karen Newman accounts for the
legibility of the Lévi-Straussian “traffic in women” paradigm
model in the play, even as she contests its viability.1 What is
striking about the critique, from the standpoint of Mauss’s
legacy of thought on the gift, is what it passes over in silence:
notably, the vexed relation between legible structures of
reciprocity or exchange and the gift’s “spirit” or unquantifiable
surplus.
Discerning excess
Mauss’s thought is strategically important to my argument
because it gives rise to two basic questions on the gift: does
the gift appear only in acts of reciprocity (however diffused
these might be over space and time), and does the component
of reciprocity nullify any conceivable surplus to the gift?2
Merchant raises these questions, too. Their impact can be felt
not only in the eye-catching spectacles of the casket scenes and
the pound of flesh but also, more tellingly, in the suburbs 










































Waiting for Gobbo 75
little consequence nonetheless appear charged with implication.
Consider, for example, the strange career of the gift Old Gobbo
produces in Act II, the “dish of doves” (2.2.134). We will return
to this scene later, but for the moment I want to indicate 
how some of the subliminal provocations produced by Gobbo’s
gift help redirect the basic questions arising from Mauss’s
anthropological horizon.
Carried in a basket, the dish of doves hardly seems an
ostentatious gift, though in view of the likelihood that Gobbo
is not a wealthy man it seems fair to say that the gift is not
nothing, either. Materialist inquiry would first seek to ground
the reference in a relevant historical context by assembling 
data from Renaissance cookbooks and food practices, but such
information alone does not account for what happens to the
dish of doves in the scene: its drift into the elusive domain of
“no thing.” We should recall here that Old Gobbo’s first
mention of the gift identifies it as a “present” (2.2.89) for
Shylock and that Launcelot, appalled at the thought of giving
any present to “a very Jew” (2.2.93), orders his father to give
the dish of doves to Bassanio instead. Given Launcelot’s earlier
decision to change masters, trading Shylock for Bassanio, it is
easy enough to assume that the gift has tactical value from
Launcelot’s standpoint. He says as much, voicing the hope that
Bassanio will reciprocate by hiring him as a servant (giving
him one of his “rare new liveries” (2.2.97)). Launcelot’s candor
(or naked ambition) raises more questions than it answers,
however. Does the integrity of the gift – its freely given
character – depend on the extent to which the gift’s conformity
to a rule of reciprocity is not known – that is, not given to
consciousness? If so, whose knowledge is at issue: the giver’s,
the recipient’s, the onlooker’s? Is the gift Old Gobbo prepares
to give Bassanio the same gift he intended to give Shylock?
The material substance – the cooked dish – is unchanged at
the end of the scene, but it is far from clear how many – or
whether any – gifts have actually transpired.
The questions raised by Gobbo’s gift are not confined 
to anthropology’s investment in mapping patterns of social
behavior. They also speak to phenomenology’s project to
describe the “given” character of the world and to discern the
range of perceptual frames or horizons through which specific,











































come to be recognized as such.3 In addition, these questions
are susceptible to theological inflection, insofar as theology is
expressly concerned with the gifts of creation and divine pres-
ence and involvement in human affairs. The fact that Gobbo’s
dish is made of doves is not without interest here, given that
doves figure conspicuously as covenantal signs of divine care
in both Jewish and Christian traditions. Gobbo’s dish of doves,
then, provides a suggestive index of what we can expect to
find at large in the world of the Gobbos. Not only do we find
an interrogation of the nature of the gift and of its ties to 
“no thing.” We find this by observing how the manner of the
interrogation – the Gobbos’ farcical misadventures and mis-
communications – exposes the fault line, the shifting and
uncertain boundary, between phenomenological and theological
concerns with givenness.4
To better grasp the shape of this concern in the Gobbos’
world, I turn to a crucial parting of ways between Jacques
Derrida’s and Jean-Luc Marion’s respective thoughts on the
essential character of the gift.5 Both thinkers are inclined to
discount the role of reciprocity and to rekindle interest in the
speculative question of the gift’s surplus element. But their 
ways of framing the question diverge significantly. For Derrida,
the gift crucially transcends its material conditions. From this
follows Derrida’s controversial aporia of the gift: the “con-
ditions of possibility of the gift . . . designate simultaneously the
conditions of impossibility of the gift . . . For there to be gift,
it is necessary that the gift not even appear, that it not be
perceived or received as gift” (Derrida 1992: 12, 16). If the 
gift were to appear as such, this would only generate indebt-
edness, raising the expectation of repayment and nullifying 
its character as gift. In the 1997 Villanova roundtable discus-
sion on the gift, Derrida tries to quell the confusion apt to 
arise from such logical sleight-of-hand by insisting that the state-
ment “the gift as such is impossible” does not mean that there
is no gift (Caputo and Scanlon 1999: 60). Rather, it attributes
to the word “gift” a spirit, a “no thing,” that transpires in
excess of knowledge, “beyond” the “economic circle” of gift
exchange and beyond what can be seen or put into words 
(ibid.: 60).
As we have already seen, this is the basic problem posed by










































Waiting for Gobbo 77
both Derrida’s concerns and those of his main interlocutor at
the Villanova roundtable, Jean-Luc Marion. For Derrida, the
gift’s spirit is a subtraction or withdrawal from our everyday
phenomenal world.6 Yet precisely because it is not an appre-
hendable thing – because it is, strictly speaking, impossible –
it creates a space from which new things or events may emerge.
The transcendent trajectory of the gift pulls towards a different
and better future. For Marion, the gift’s impossible excess works
otherwise: not by withdrawing from the world, but by exposing
it to a “new horizon,” one of unconditioned, superabundant
givenness (Caputo and Scanlon 1999: 61). Through this gesture,
the gift enters the domain of what Marion calls the “saturated
phenomenon.” Such a phenomenon can be seen, heard, tasted,
touched, or smelled, and it can be thought or made present
to consciousness. But it cannot be comprehended by any of
these horizons, because its essential trait is nothing other than
its capacity to give “more, indeed immeasurably more” than either
mind or body can grasp (Marion 2002: 197). By definition,
then, the saturated phenomenon is irreducible to description
either as object or thing or as being. Nonetheless, saturated
phenomena surround us, Marion explains, in the inexhaustible
character of historical events and works of art, in the profound
intimacy of the human sensorium with its environment, in the
elusive constitution of interpersonal relations, in the giving of
time, of one’s attention, one’s word, one’s life, and, crucially,
in the possibility of divine revelation.
Both Derrida’s and Marion’s accounts of the gift’s im-
possibility see beyond the habitual determinism of cultural
history, whether by imagining a deferred or a manifest excess
in lived experience. To judge from their standoff at Villanova,
however, the difference between the deferred and the mani-
fest appears irreconcilable, not least because Derrida’s “no
thing” lies outside sociality and representation, to the point of
abstraction, whereas Marion’s not only saturates the world 
of appearances but also appears ultimately to do so on behalf
of a particular religious tradition.7 The standoff warrants
mention because Merchant, too, aligns the question of the gift
with the logic of a zero-sum game. Think again of the conun-
drum posed by the dish of doves, which seems to mutate into











































also sees beyond such divisive maneuvers – that is, it asks
whether the gift’s essential trait resides precisely in its capacity
to incarnate, within the social lineaments of gift exchange, the
profound intimacy between opposing dimensions of the gift’s
“no thing” – between what remains categorically out of sight
and mind, and what is so immediately present as to confound
comprehension. Such insight, as the Gobbos’ misadventures
suggest, seeks to reawaken wonder at the strangeness and
vulnerability of what is given in the world.
To indicate more precisely what is at stake in this line of
inquiry, I turn to two thinkers who were not present at the
Villanova roundtable, Emmanuel Levinas and Alain Badiou.
Ethics, rather than the question of the gift per se, is their prin-
cipal concern, and their respective accounts of the ethical
relation could not be more different, if you consider Badiou’s
well-known objections to Levinas’s ethics of alterity, which on
Badiou’s account mistakenly privileges the transcendence of the
Other and underestimates the ethical solvency of conditions of
likeness and solidarity – the sphere of the Same (Badiou 2001:
18–19). Nevertheless, these thinkers’ respective meditations 
on eschatology and universalism fruitfully expose a common
intuition – which the Gobbos share – of the profound connec-
tion between the gift’s impossibility and the possibility of a
radical ethics: an ethics not content with dutiful observance of
given norms but mindful, instead, of the “no thing” that subsists
in social relations and challenges all settled forms of knowledge
and behavior.
For Levinas, eschatology refers not to a stage in history (a
messianic “End-time,” for example) but to the sudden breach
made in totality by the “infinity” of desire and responsibility
for the Other (Levinas 1969: 23). As Richard Kearney reminds
us, Levinas “confronts us with the paradox of the infinite which
is inscribed within our historical experience of totality,” within
the warp and woof of the everyday (Kearney 2001: 63). Hence
the ambiguity of one of Levinas’s key terms for the event that
gives eschatological desire its ethical charge: the “face” of the
other. Rather than simply denoting physical features, “face”
calls attention to what is singular in the face-to-face encounter
and thus irreducible to the horizons of objectivity and being.
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a call to compassion and care which is both inexhaustible and
fragile: impossibly present, one could say, yet easily ignored
(Levinas 1969: 50). In sum, to encounter the “face” of the other
is to discover that the social other – whether neighbor, stranger,
or kin – compels attention because it eludes cognitive mastery,
though it may be mastered in other ways. Shylock, for example,
is mastered by the Venetian court: he is brought into a deter-
minate civic identity whose prerequisite is religious conversion.
Yet Launcelot’s astonishment at the dish of doves Old Gobbo
intends, without explanation, for Shylock – an impossible gift
– suggests that Gobbo’s gesture acknowledges, however fleet-
ingly, the “face” of Shylock, an aspect that does not coincide
with any of the names used to define him ( Jew, usurer, father,
alien, etc.) but rather belongs to and indicates his singular,
irreducible personality.
Badiou mounts a comparable provocation by drawing out
the ethical and political challenge of the visionary thinker whose
writings constitute a significant proof text for Merchant: St Paul.
It should be said that the Paul at issue here is not the Paul
known as the font of Christian orthodoxy and tacitly presented
as such in the confessional antagonisms informing the main 
plot of Shakespeare’s play. Instead, Badiou’s Paul is a non-
denominational thinker of the gift. We might call this Paul 
the patron saint of the Gobbos, in the sense that the Gobbos’
antics, performed on the margins of Christian, Jewish, and
mercantile Venice, express a core insight remarkably similar 
to what Badiou finds in Paul. At the heart of Paul’s thought,
Badiou discovers a radical intuition: that universality is “organic-
ally bound to the contingency of what happens to us, which is
the senseless superabundance of grace” (Badiou 2003: 81).
Badiou’s reading of a key passage from Romans develops the
implications of this intuition: “ ‘for you are not under law, but
under grace’ (Rom. 6:14)” (Badiou 2003: 63). The statement
indicates that grace is “neither a bequest, nor a tradition, nor
a teaching,” because these belong to the domain of law, which
is “always predicative, particular, and partial,” whereas grace
is “supernumerary relative to all this and presents itself as pure
givenness” (Badiou 2003: 76, 63). In consequence, the division
indicated by the “not . . . but” turn of phrase occurs not between











































contemporary thought has been so preoccupied, and which the
trial scene in Merchant famously broods over), but within the
subject of grace. Indeed, this division constitutes the subject.
Badiou and Levinas share with Paul (as do Derrida and
Marion) the conviction that subjectivity is not, as it is for cultural
historicism, socially determined: it is exactly what exceeds social
determination. In other words, the subject is “no thing” other
than the process through which the sheer excessiveness of grace
disrupts and alters the entire field of the given – the received
horizons of everyday experience, the realm of the possible. 
And it is this very process, born of the “suddenly emerging
singularity” of grace, which founds the universal – that is, the
categorical possibility for everyone of unmooring from social
conditions (Badiou 2003: 36). On this account, the event of
grace is necessarily unrelated both to the historical Jesus (whom
Paul did not know) and to the Christ of ecclesiological and
doctrinal history (who postdates Paul). As Badiou puts it, Jesus
is “the name for what happens to us universally,” and what
happens is not induction into a new way of marking sectarian
differences, but fidelity to what Badiou calls the “strong, simple
idea that every existence can one day be seized by what happens
to it and subsequently devote itself to that which is valid for
all” (Badiou 2003: 60, 66).
Fidelity to the truth of a “pure event,” to its charisma, may
be a strong, simple idea with heroic associations beyond a
couple of Shakespearean antics, but it is also a precarious one.
In fact, Paul’s discourse on grace insists on the contradiction:
“whenever I am weak, then I am strong” (2 Cor. 12:11).8
Strength resides in the “completely precarious having-taken-
place” of the event of grace, detached from the “logic of signs
and proofs,” so that its “real content,” its truth, will be “nothing
but what each can see and hear” (Badiou 2003: 54, 53). But
what can this “real content” be, since it clearly has nothing to
do with empirically or logically verifiable knowledge or received
opinion? The gist of Paul’s argument is that what can be seen
and heard is nothing – no thing – but the excess, or “charism,”
of the received gift, which interrupts the horizons of object-
ivity, being, and constituted knowledge. As Paul says, this is
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Kenosis
One of the running jokes in Merchant has the Gobbos repeatedly
stumbling across the “no thing” to which Paul’s image of the
treasure held in “clay jars” alludes. To get the joke, however,
we must recognize that Merchant harbors a memory of another
Pauline word for the gift’s impossibility, and that the play’s
most challenging insights on the gift turn on the ways in which
varied implications of this word are deployed. The word, from
Paul’s epistle to the Philippians, is kenosis.
Look not every man on his own things, but every man also
on the things of other men. Let the same mind be in you
that was even in Christ Jesus, Who being in the form of
God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God: But he
made himself of no reputation [heauton ekenosen, “emptied
himself ”], and took on him the form of a servant, and was
made like unto men, and was found in shape as a man.
He humbled himself, and became obedient unto the death,
even the death of the Cross. Wherefore God hath also
highly exalted him, and given him a Name above every
name.
(Phil. 2:4–9)9
For Paul, kenosis, the gesture of self-emptying, describes the
ultimate theological gift: the descent of God into human form.
It also constitutes a radically selfless new ethics. The depiction
of Christ’s person as exalted in self-emptying discloses an altered
concept of personhood, where personhood refers not to a
historically determinate set of properties, but instead to an
ongoing process of separation from familiar contours of iden-
tity, and consequent exposure to further, unexpected vistas of
responsiveness and responsibility.10 The Merchant of Venice offers
its own fraught comedy of kenosis when Launcelot outrageously
tells his blind father his son Launcelot has died, and then has
to struggle to persuade him that he is Launcelot himself. In
between, Launcelot is deprived of all the social specifics of his
accustomed identity. He plummets into a condition of bare or
pure personhood, from which he must renegotiate his position
in the world. It is a theme Shakespeare will take up again 
in King Lear, when Edgar loses his identity as his father’s son











































In both cases, tragic and comic, I am arguing that the shocking
appearance of the destitute human being is also a positive mani-
festation of human being as such, as it is given before and
beyond socialization.
It is no accident that Derrida, Marion, Levinas, and Badiou
should all invoke the word kenosis in their ruminations on the
gift, for the event it describes – the enigmatic crossing of desti-
tution and plenitude – speaks to their common ambition to
describe the challenge to thought (whether in social, political,
aesthetic, or spiritual domains) generated by the gift’s impos-
sible “no thing.” With the possible exception of Marion, none
of these thinkers writes from Paul’s presumed Christological
perspective, yet collectively they maintain the arc of Paul’s
thought on kenosis by testifying to the word’s continuing power
to evoke a generosity of vision and action, which is given body
– made operative – through a counterintuitive grasp of the
real.11 Kenosis strips the social specifics of identity, to reveal
that which is essentially unexplainable, unwarranted, a gift.
Merchant’s investment in the thought of kenosis is closer 
in spirit to these thinkers than it is to the word’s early modern
reception. While the incarnational mystery suggested by the
Philippians passage text was much rehearsed and debated in
sixteenth-century Christology, contemporary English devotional
cultures retained only something of the ethical intuition couched
in Philippians, partly because most vernacular translations (like
the text from the Geneva Bible cited earlier) deflected the theo-
logical conundrum of the emptying deity by emphasizing the
more legible act of humility.12 To claim that such emphasis
did no more than endorse ostensibly Christ-like acquiescence
to social hierarchies would be reductive, yet even modern
discussions of humility – to say nothing of their early modern
antecedents – are marked by a normalizing ethos that does
little to indicate how the spirit of kenosis might actually undo
existing social hierarchies in the service of a broader vision of
sociality.13 This, however, is the very question posed by the
four philosophers we have considered. And by the Gobbos.
What’s in a name?
In a classic essay on Merchant, Walter Cohen observes the
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malapropisms: “On the one hand, his nonsense parodically
demystifies; on the other, it uniquely combines archaic memories
and utopian vistas” (Coyle (ed.) 1998: 60). With only slight
adjustment, Cohen’s assessment points up Launcelot’s unique
contribution to the question of the gift. Parodic demystification,
archaic memories, and utopian vistas name mutually interpen-
etrating parts of a single constellation of wit, but the whole
makes of Launcelot the unwitting vessel of a searching inquiry
into the very limits of what the thought of kenosis can bear.
Consider, for starters, his two names. In “Launcelot Gobbo”
the ineffable and the commonplace converge, which is to say
that the name alone spells out the essential grammar of the
incarnational theology housed in the Philippians passage.
“Launcelot” harbors a memory of the Grail legends woven
into Arthurian romance, certain strands of which read incar-
national and, more pointedly, Eucharistic significance into the
Grail.14 The Arthurian Launcelot is arguably more closely
linked with Guinevere than with theological speculation, but
the patronymic of Merchant’s Launcelot brings the latter ques-
tion into focus. If the colloquial word “gob,” conjuring a
mouthful of food or stash of money, points up the ambiguity
of Launcelot’s social reality – is he ravenous from hunger or
greed, or both? – the cognate “gobbet” raises the stakes.
“Gobbet,” which means “raw flesh,” belongs to the reformist
lexicon of slurs on the Eucharistic doctrine of transubstantia-
tion.15 Launcelot’s name, in other words, is provocatively
invested with a specifically Eucharistic variant of the incarna-
tional question: Where is the body of Christ? As the semantics
of “gob”/“gobbet” suggest, contemporary answers to the ques-
tion favored the partisan logic of “either/or,” claiming Christic
presence to be manifested either in the sacramental bread or
in the believing community.16
Launcelot’s first malapropism, in his comically tormented
effort to find moral sanction for running away from Shylock
(2.2.1–25), discovers an answer literally unthinkable to religious
orthodoxy, which is to say thinkable only as nonsense. He
names “the Jew . . . the very devil incarnation” (2.2.21–2)
instead of the devil incarnate. Principally, the conjunction 
of “incarnation,” “devil,” and “the Jew” confects a garbled
memory of the equation of Jews with devils in the vice tradi-











































mangled attempt to assert the self-evidence or sheer givenness
of the equation – that which is incarnate being for all eyes to
see. But Launcelot’s accidental foray into incarnational theology
also expresses further nuances to the questions already lodged
in his name: How does the person of Christ manifest itself?
What are the attributes of Christic identity?17 By suggesting a
secret proximity between Christ’s kenosis and regions associ-
ated paradigmatically in Christian orthodoxy with the refusal
of grace (“the fiend,” “the Jew”), Launcelot’s tongue, fabricator
of perverse affinities, briefly – and daringly – suspends the
historical and theological justifications for confessional antagon-
ism and communitarian partisanship which are axiomatic in
the play-world and in Shakespeare’s culture at large. Astonish-
ingly, Launcelot’s nonsense revives or reinvents the gift of grace
as that which extends universally, even to an identification with
“the very devil.”18
Fathers and sons
For all that, Launcelot’s tongue is also barbed in obvious ways.
The most flagrant, perhaps, appear in his several rehearsals 
of the play’s sedimented anti-Judaism, beginning with the
intended attack on Shylock just described and ending with 
the sobering advice he gives Jessica concerning her prospects
as a viable Christian (3.5.1–21). These incidents document
Launcelot’s function as casual witness to the play’s regnant
Same/Other dichotomy. But Launcelot’s nonsense consistently
works to undo this structure of thought. In Launcelot’s world,
otherness is not simply synonymous with social or religious
difference; it is what animates and sustains sameness, beyond
all considerations of difference. It is the excess of the given.
Consider the joke Launcelot plays on Old Gobbo. After he
sees that his “sand-blind” father has failed to recognize him,
Launcelot seizes the opportunity to “try confusions,” (2.2.29–30)
by claiming that the son the father seeks has died. While the
joke no doubt carries an edge of oedipal aggression, what should
give pause is the full measure of “confusions” triggered by
Gobbo’s turning a blind eye, so to speak, to Launcelot’s ensuing
efforts to drive home the joke’s punch line – to stage his resur-
rection, as planned, and reclaim his “true” identity as Gobbo’s
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Launcelot finds his way out of the inadvertent trap he has
sprung, the thought of kenosis takes visceral shape, by reducing
the objectifying force of biological and culturally legible orders
of filiation. While Launcelot helplessly watches and hears
Gobbo mourn the loss of his son, categories of father and son
are emptied of given, normative significance in a way that is
reminiscent of Badiou’s reading of Paul.
What, indeed, is a father, or a son? Launcelot restores viable
communication with his father only through exasperated and
uncalculated proclamation of equivalent intimacy with a Jewish
paternal body and a Christian maternal body : “I am Launcelot,
the Jew’s man, and I am sure Margery your wife is my mother”
(2.2.90). The identity Launcelot seeks here owes its life to a
bond and a kinship deemed, from the point of view of Christian
patriarchal social order, either contingent and undesirable or
relatively inconsequential. Two bodies are also summoned into
a glancing type of union that would be dubious at best from
the play’s anthropological horizon, given its admixture of
Christian triumphalism and atavistic horror at the thought of
reversion from Christian to Jewish dispensations. Launcelot’s
“born-again” identity equalizes and dissolves salient differences
between Christian and Jew, employer and employee, male and
female. It is vested not just in the patriarch but also in the
webbed givenness of all relationship.
Perhaps Launcelot’s transient disorientation expresses an
involuntary memory of Paul’s use of the word “son” to mean
“apostle” or messenger: the discourse of the son is the posi-
tion taken up by the subject of grace who gives apostolic witness
to the (Pauline) truth of the resurrection, where resurrection
refers not to a biological event in defiance of the “law” of
nature, but to subjective exposure to an unsought intuition 
of what it takes to be reborn – that is, detachment from all
the social specifics we think of as the substance of our selves.19
Accordingly, while Launcelot and Gobbo do not come to see
quite the same thing, their face-to-face encounter rediscovers
the thrilling ethical charge of kenosis: its capacity to disclose
the transfiguring claims of the Other within the Same, a
perception which undermines the legislation of social, ethnic,
or confessional difference. Bereft of his conventional identity,
the play’s most conspicuous clown flashes for a moment with











































enlightenment not been excluded from the play as a whole,
Shylock’s fate might have been very different.
Doves and more
The kenotic subtext to Launcelot’s joke assumes an even wider
compass in the career of the dish of doves. Leo Rockas is right
to observe that the gift Gobbo carries with him appears in,
and as, the play’s “most inconsequential” moment (Rockas
1973: 348). As we found in my initial review of Gobbo’s gift,
it is perhaps best thought of as a vanishing event, where diverse
intuitions of gift-giving cross each other without coalescing into
a stable entity. Pre-eminent among these are the gospel
accounts of the revelation at the baptism of Jesus, where the
“Spirit of God” descends from the heavens in the form of a
dove, while the voice of the Father identifies Jesus as the
“beloved Son” (Matt 3:16–17).20 Given the specific trajectory
of Gobbo’s gift, doves carry collateral significance as metonyms
of the anti-Judaizing edge to the gospel accounts of Jesus’s
repudiation of Second Temple sacrificial practices: the over-
turning of the money changers’ tables and the “seats of those
who sold doves” (Mark 11:15).21 What is overturned in Merchant,
as noted earlier, is Gobbo’s intention to give the doves to
Shylock. Launcelot substitutes Bassanio for Shylock, voicing
the hope that his prospects for hire by a new, Christian master
will be enhanced by the grace note of a gift.
It is easy enough to see in the substitution the elemental
figure of the play’s ambivalent narrative of Christian triumphal-
ism, whereby the Jewish body is both expelled from and
incorporated into the Christian fold. But the play’s triumphalist
gesture is not everything. In this case, its alignment with
Launcelot’s caprice shows more than the play can say. What
remains unsaid is the spirit of Gobbo’s gift. It would be tempting
to say that what Gobbo offers is the gift of simple kindness. But
kindness is rarely simple, not least because it translates readily
into liberal humanist complacency. So, rather than calling it
simple, let’s call it impossible. The spirit of Gobbo’s gift is the
impossible thought of unconditioned giving. It is a thought
harbored by Christian agape – Paul’s word for the animating
power of love – and by agape’s parent, the Levitical instructions
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thought can be construed merely as an index of social interest
in the symbolic capital to be accrued by gift-giving (this is the
anthropological argument on behalf of reciprocity), or as symp-
tom of the mystifying subtleties of Christianity’s supersessionist
ambition (consider the manifold ironies of Portia’s legal dis-
course on mercy). But it is irreducible to these prescriptive
imperatives.
One detail conveys the point. From where Gobbo stands,
the dish of doves is no more and no less of a gift for Bassanio
than it would have been for Shylock. Nominally, Gobbo’s 
“suit” (2.2.121) is to appease Launcelot’s master, whoever he
may be. But Launcelot’s confused tongue – calling the suit
“impertinent” (2.2.122) instead of “pertinent” – discerns 
the truth of the matter. As Bassanio indicates, the suit is in-
deed impertinent, because Shylock and Bassanio have already
worked out the details of the transaction. The intended suit
shears off from the gift, and with it goes the determinative
character of the master–servant bond. The dish of doves 
fades from view, but not before its self-evident fields of 
reference – the master–servant bond, as well as the confes-
sional and social differences known as “Christian” and “Jew”
– have been vacated, if only for a moment. In that moment
flickers the mystery of giving – not as servants currying favor
with their master, not as Christians mollifying a superior 
Jew, but for its own sake. The dish of doves, still visible as object
but only uncertainly so as gift, expresses the precarious prox-
imity of Derrida’s and Marion’s opposing views of the gift’s
impossible surplus. Is the dish no more than a standing but
strangely empty promise of the gift, as Derrida might say? 
Does its identity as gift thoroughly saturate its material 
form to the effect that it is indistinguishable from it, as Marion
would have it? Each prospect sees a future worth striving
toward, the former by holding fast to the thought that its 
advent is not here, not yet, and the latter by soundlessly
descending into what is already at hand, needing only the
further impulse of grace (Paul’s “not . . . but”) to be revealed
and declared. Merchant does not, perhaps cannot, choose
between the two. Indeed, it is precisely the indeterminacy of
the dish of doves that enables it to disclose the gift’s excess as
a “no thing” charged with eschatological and ecumenical desire:











































The prickly exchange between Launcelot and Lorenzo in
Act 3 ventures even further into this domain. Jessica has just
repeated to her husband the lesson Launcelot has taught her:
that their marriage is anathema in every imaginable way.
Lorenzo’s attempt to chastise the meddlesome servant takes
the form of a reminder that Launcelot has trespassed the bounds
of propriety and decency by consorting with the Moor and,
through “the getting up of the Negro’s belly” (3.5.32), giving
body to the specter of miscegenation. Launcelot’s laughing reply
to the accusation: “It is much that the Moor should be more
than reason; but if she be less than an honest woman, she is
indeed more than I took her for” (3.5.34–6).
The aim of recent commentaries on the pun has been to
quarry the ideological ironies of Launcelot’s quibble on “Moor”
and “more,” as in Kim Hall’s reading of the manner in which
the quibble exacerbates rather than neutralizes the cultural
anxieties driving the accusation. On this account, Launcelot’s
pun conjures the “image of the black woman as both consum-
ing and expanding” (Coyle (ed.) 1998: 97). The depicted
intimacy of these contrasting actions says more about the unre-
solved contradictions informing the triumphalist narrative,
whether Christian or colonialist, than Lorenzo can bear to
listen to. The Moor’s pregnant body promises “not resolution,
but the potential disruption of Europe’s imperial text, because
in Merchant’s Venice – and Elizabeth’s England – the possi-
bility of wealth only exists within the dangers of cultural
exchange” (Coyle (ed.) 1998: 110).
Though compelling, this approach maintains the figural
scope of the Moor’s body under the material conditions of 
the triumphalist gaze and its structural antagonisms. On these
grounds, the conclusion that the “possibility of wealth only
exists within the dangers of cultural exchange” would likely see
its theoretical endgame in the anthropological emphasis on
reciprocity as the key to the gift. Which is to say that it would
not likely push the question of “cultural exchange” into the
phenomenological hinterlands of “possibility” and “wealth” all
too often discounted by materialist critical practice.
Yet Launcelot’s pun invites just such an excursion. The
proposed consanguinity of “Moor” and “more” recognizes
more than the perturbation to the Venetian state caused by
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extensive mental and interlocutory exercise of the adjective
“pregnant” in the early modern lexicon (quickness of wit,
imaginative resourcefulness, and sheer receptivity), Launcelot’s
pun figures the nature of his personal relation to the Moor as
well. The “more” factor conjures up the capacity of interper-
sonal relations to be aerated by the excess, or charism, of a
“no thing.” In other words, the pun proposes that the ultimate
paradigm of the excluded relation in Venice carries particular
evidence of the gift’s impossibility. The pun remembers the
“face,” the irreducibly personal singularity, of the unnamed
Moor.
The pun also reminds us of the profound kinship between
the Levinasian face, Marion’s saturated phenomenon, and the
grammar of kenosis, which transfigures the shape of the real
by emptying the given of its familiar horizons so as to uncover
the plenitude and infinity of “no thing.” Where least expected,
in Launcelot’s scorned sexual relations with “the Moor,”
Shakespeare’s text recognizes that eschatological desire does
not concern a distant utopian vista, but rather the present,
active “work of love.”22
And it recognizes in such work the presence of the Eucharist.
This is not the Eucharist of theological debate and liturgical
practice, and it is owned by no particular religious denomina-
tion or tradition. It is not owned, period. It is found in the
genuinely radical implication of kenosis, which is the thought
that the Other and the Same subsist in a profound though
precarious intimacy, within each social group, each particu-
larity, and each person. The name for this intimacy is the
universal: the “no thing” that is given to all and that makes
possible, universally, a transfigured perception of the real, out-
side the bounds of what can be incorporated or manipulated
as knowledge.
From this perspective, it is no accident that the exchange
between Lorenzo and Launcelot concludes with a comic
Eucharistic allusion: they reconcile by quibbling over the proper
way to “prepare for dinner” (3.5.46). In Merchant’s Venice,
where the question of hunger is never far from the question
of excess, whether gourmandizing or cannibalizing, the banter
touches more than one nerve. Transposed to matters of state
polity, the essential question raised by the banter is this: can











































gives way to the trial scene’s revelation of the impossible
literalism of the pound of flesh, and to the ensuing disavowals
of the universality of that revelation. Hence the partisan force
of the “difference” the Duke shows in the Christian’s “spirit”
(4.1.363), by commuting Shylock’s death sentence while making
the pardon contingent on the exchange of Antonio’s pound of
flesh for Shylock’s forced conversion and the Venetian state’s
de facto extortion of the deed of gift.
Yet in Act 3, before dinner is served, Launcelot’s quibbling
art once again, and for one last time, sees past the seductions
of the play’s historical and anthropological horizons and the
differences these horizons insist upon to articulate their domains
of knowledge. “Prepare,” he insists, is not quite the right word;
“ ‘cover’ is the word” (3.5.44). “Cover” is the word because it
allows Launcelot to disclose several different senses in which
to prepare for dinner: setting the table, wearing proper head-
gear, keeping meat warm before dinner is served. But “cover”
is also exactly the right word in the sense that it suggests 
the play of concealment and disclosure whereby the spirit or
excess of the Eucharist – the spirit of the gift – makes itself
felt through the material “accidents” of a communal meal, of
supper, of bread and wine. “Cover” knows the substance of
what it means to be brought to the table and to eat. It knows
that what is substantial sustains and turns on what is unapparent
in embodiment, and given unconditionally.
That such insight in Merchant remains for the most part
“covered” in a further sense – isolated from the principal
concerns of the plot – indicates the particular historical and
cultural circumstances which both shape and limit the play’s
field of vision. Not least among these is the emergent logic 
of the mercantile spirit, which partly accounts for the ease 
with which Antonio, at play’s end, equates “life” with “living”
in giving thanks for the unexpected bounty of the returned
argosies, just as Lorenzo, moments later, sees “manna” in the
deed of gift’s promise of solvency (5.1.284–5, 293). The equiva-
lencies drawn by Antonio and Lorenzo pre-emptively cast the
spirit of the gift in material and measurable terms. But it cannot
be said that their seemingly instinctive interpretive preference
is confined to Shakespeare’s early modern location.
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Notes
1 I refer to Newman’s second version of this essay (Newman 1996).
The earlier appeared in Shakespeare Quarterly: 38 (1987): 19–33.
2 See the concise account of these issues in Horner 2001: 12–14.
3 A helpful review of the central preoccupations of phenomenology’s
key figures, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, is in Horner
2001: 19–44.
4 From this vantage point, Merchant speaks to a pressing question in
our current epoch of globalization: whether intuitions of the “spirit”
of the gift can be meaningfully translated across specific cultural and
confessional traditions without being converted into instruments of a
hegemonic drive toward mere uniformity (as the “spirit” of capital
would suggest, for example).
5 For an argument that advances interests broadly sympathetic to mine,
though different in focus, see Jackson 2001. Jackson brilliantly traces
the secret affinity between Derrida’s aporia of the gift, as shaped by
Derrida’s readings of Søren Kierkegaard and Jan Patočka in The Gift
of Death (see Derrida 1995b), and the crisis of gift-giving in Timon of
Athens.
6 Derrida recurrently identifies the gift’s excess with what he calls khora,
one of his favorite names for the “absolutely universal place” (or,
more accurately, non-place) that comes before all distinctions between
presence and absence (Caputo and Scanlon 1999: 76).
7 Derrida, to be sure, is not alone in questioning the “theological turn”
in phenomenology. See Janicaud, et al. (2000). An impressive, and
more sympathetic, review of the issues is in Horner (2001).
8 Unless otherwise indicated, biblical citations are from the NRSV,
Metzger and Murphy (1994).
9 Geneva Bible (1599 ed.) at http://www.genevabible.org/Geneva.html
(28 June 2004).
10 The word’s currency in contemporary philosophy is directly related
to the word’s position as matrix of thought in the history of incar-
national, Trinitarian, and Eucharistic theologies, to say nothing of 
the concept’s deployment in the grammar of sublation in Hegelian
dialectic, and its genetic link to “death of God” a-theologies in
modernity. Lucid accounts of these developments are in Coakley
1996, Ward 1998, and Ward 1999.
11 Representative examples of each thinker’s use of the image of kenosis
are in Derrida 1995a: 50; Marion 2004: 62, 78; Levinas 1994: 114–15,
126; Levinas 1998: 53–5; and Badiou 2003: 110.
12 The 1582 Rheims New Testament tries to preserve the theological
notion of emptying through the use of a neologism concocted from
the Latin term for kenosis in the Vulgate. Thus Phil. 2:8 reads “He
exinanited himself.”
13 Important contributions to the debate within feminist theology over











































and Frascati-Lochhead 1998: 149–209. Levinas’ remarks on the
relation between kenosis and humility are relevant here (Levinas 1998:
53–60).
14 Loomis 1991: 28–9, 60–1.
15 OED, “gob,” n. 1.2, “A large sum of money”; n. 1.3a, “A lump or
large mouthful of food”; “gobbet” n. 1b, “A piece of raw flesh.” A
secondary sense, from the Italian “gobbo,” suggests the hunchback’s
deformity. OED “gobbet” n. 1b, “A piece of raw flesh.” Famously,
in the den of Errour, Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight discovers the
monstrous figure of Errour spewing poison “Full of great lumps of
flesh and gobbets raw” (Spenser 1977 1.1.20). For a discussion of the
scene’s Eucharistic argument, see Gregerson 1995: 96.
16 The presiding force of such logic partly explains why the central
antagonism in Merchant (Shylock vs. Antonio) has lent itself to a double
reading, as reflection of the historical division between Jewish and
Christian orthodoxies and as symptom of further divisions within 
the Christian church wrought by Reformation controversies over the
nature of the Eucharist. A helpful account of the fundamental issues
in Eucharistic debates, from patristic culture to modernity, is in
Milbank 2003: 122–37.
17 For a lucid account of the theological range to these questions in
Christian discourse on kenosis, see Coakley 1996.
18 The well-known prohibitions of sacramental and theological repre-
sentation on the early modern English stage virtually guarantee that
Merchant’s investment in theological argument will be oblique. The
more germane point, however, is that the factor of obliqueness also
enables the play’s turn from historical horizons to phenomenological
intuitions of the “no thing” which kenotic theologies contemplate as
well.
19 See Badiou 2003: 42–5.
20 Further gospel proof-texts: Mark 1:9–11, Luke 3:21–2, John 1:31–4.
While the Trinitarian implications of Gobbo’s dish of doves do not
rise to the level of theological argument in the play, the Trinitarian
element suggests how the idea of thirdness marries well with the gift’s
impossible surplus. Thirdness is what disrupts the closed field or
restricted economy of binary relations. An account of the important
relation between Trinitarian theology and kenosis is in Ward 1998.
On a different register, Salerio’s impatient and cynical mention of
the erotic caprice of “Venus’ pigeons” (2.6.5) reasserts the fragility,
if not the aporia, of the gift, transposed to the lexicon of humanist
mythography.
21 See also Mark 11:15, John 2:13–16.
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4
‘Salving the mail’
Perjury, grace and the disorder of
things in Love’s Labour’s Lost
Philippa Berry
I
Often described as Shakespeare’s most courtly but also most
obscure play, Love’s Labour’s Lost is much preoccupied with the
riddling word-games that appear to have been fashionable at
the Elizabethan court in its last decade. The comedy’s explicit
posing of textual ‘enigmas’ has famously prompted several
critics to pillage it in search of secrets, in the form of allegor-
ical references to contemporary aristocrats as well as writers
and thinkers; since the 1970s, however, it is the secondary
meanings that appear to be secreted in the text’s wordplay that
have attracted most critical attention. In its focus upon the
play’s evident interest in the affinity between the materiality of
signification and bodily desire, my chapter owes an important
debt to the latter kind of study, in particular to Patrica Parker’s
essay, ‘Preposterous Reversals’ (Parker 1993). But in the specific
context of this collection, my aim is to foreground how Shake-
speare’s ‘pleasant conceited Comedie’ (as it is described in 
the quarto of 1598) invites us to look beyond its self-conscious
staging of solipsistic word-games, together with the amorous










































to reflect upon what kind of ‘end’, natural or unnatural, may
follow or come after ‘the posterior’ or latter end of man’s brief
play-time.
Biron confirms in Act 5 that ‘Our wooing doth not end like
an old play./Jack hath not Jill’ (5.2.851–2). And in its obstruc-
tion of the lords’ quest for erotic gratification, the play’s closing
deferral of comedic resolution also emphasises the ambiguous
affinity between the ostensibly different ‘ends’ of sexuality and
mortality. At the start of the play, significantly, it is a mortal
‘end’, rather than sexual consummation, that is anticipated by
Navarre in his appeal to his male courtiers to join him in
studious seclusion: ‘Let fame, that all hunt after in their lives,/
Live registered upon our brazen tombs,/And then grace us in
the disgrace of death’ (1.1.1–3). Navarre evokes a tomb that
he aspires to have posthumously dignified by a ‘registered’,
textually recorded form of ‘grace’: specifically, that of intel-
lectual fame. But this is a worldly ‘grace’ whose value the plot
of Love’s Labour’s Lost explicitly questions, in part through insist-
ent repetition of the word. In its concluding act, the shallowness
of the lords’ language-games is exposed as ‘maggot ostenta-
tion’ (5.2.409), while the inherent corruption of scholarly
memory that converts the ‘registered’ fame of dead heroes to
unintentional comedy is emphasised by the concluding pageant
of the Nine Worthies.
Parker has brilliantly explicated the sexual and scatological
implications of the ‘preposterous’ trope of coming after that is
introduced in the first scene of the play (Parker 1993). Yet 
in reconsidering the comedy’s implicit question of what kind of
grace may follow man’s surrender to ‘sin’ (here associated with
a breaking of oaths due to erotic desire), I read the play as
intertwining the comedic motif of courtship with a distinctive
dimension of sacrality.1 And my contention is that the self-
referential materiality of Shakespeare’s play-text is imbricated
with a riddling and distinctly heterodox meditation upon the
grace and salvation that may – or may not – follow man’s
mortal ‘end’. In this respect Love’s Labour’s Lost can be read as
anticipating or achronically intersecting with late modern or
postmodern meditations upon subjectivity – as a being-in-the-
world that discovers, in the very materiality of that experience,
an opening to non-human modes of alterity. In anticipation of
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play substitutes for the abstract study proposed in its opening
scene a different, phenomenal or ‘natural’ model of knowledge,
allied to both desire and death. In this ‘end of study’ the puta-
tive stability and singularity of the human is unsettled – stirred
or ‘keeled’, like the ‘pot’ evoked in the final song of Hiems 
– through a fuller engagement with the mutability of the
phenomenal world, and specifically, with what Michel Foucault
identified as the order of things.2 This redefinition of courtly
grace through talking ‘greasily’ (4.1.133), or with bawdy word-
play, undoes the seeming oppositions of courtly and non-courtly,
grace and grease, cerebral and bodily, salvation and sin.
The exaggerated self-referentiality of this early comedy has
a notably metadramatic dimension, expressed not simply in the
form of the courtly and rustic entertainments that are staged
in the last act of the play, but also in the play’s striking pre-
occupation with using texts as props. The circulation of multiple
texts within the plot draws insistent attention to the work’s
status as a play-text. These textual props include a written
‘schedule’, the petition presented to the King by the Princess,
numerous love-letters, Nathaniel’s ‘table-book’ or common-
place book, and the ‘paper’ that is the script for the pageant
of the Nine Worthies. Yet the simultaneous substantiality and
mobility of words in this play, which attests to their implica-
tion in the mutable world of material things, is given further
emphasis by the figurative imbrication of these textual props
within an extensive network of other material or non-human
objects. Here it is the disorder of things that reveals the
limitations of ‘taffeta phrases’ (5.2.406). For like the misdirected
letters of Biron and Don Armado, each of these things – 
plants, animals, birds, coins and favours, ointments, shields 
and scutcheons, and textiles including smocks and shirts – has
a mobile, and sometimes even an uncanny, potency. And as a
nexus of puns reveals, and briefly elides, the porosity not just
of bodies but also of things, the oscillating significance of the
play’s cluster of inorganic and organic objects produces mean-
ings that are both material and suggestively metaphysical. The
phenomenologist Martin Heidegger called for ‘the step back
from the thinking that merely represents – that is, explains –
[things] to the thinking that responds and recalls’, declaring in
a riddling idiom of his own that as ‘the thing things world’,











































and mortals’ are no longer experienced as separate, but as
joined (Heidegger 1971: 181). Heidegger coined the term a
‘gathering’ for the expanded significance that can inform the
things that touch us, and through which we are touched, not
simply by others, but by the difference of the inorganic, of the
everyday world.
To Biron’s question in the first scene – ‘What is the end of
study, let me know?’ – the King replies, ‘Why, that to know
which else we should not know’. Biron explicates and supple-
ments this definition with ‘Things hid and barred, you mean,
from common sense?’ (1.1.55–7, my emphasis). A decade or so
after the publication of Love’s Labour’s Lost, in the works of
seventeenth-century philosophers such as René Descartes and
Sir Francis Bacon, a reassertion of the distinction between
matter and human intellection was posited as the key to a 
new order of knowledge. Both these writers placed particular
emphasis upon the objective empirical truths afforded by
‘things’. Of his opposition between res extensa, raw matter, and
res cogitans, thinking substance, Descartes comments that ‘there
being only one truth of each thing whoever finds it knows as
much about it as can be known about it’ (cited in Benjamin
1993: 54). But in the cultural ferment of the 1590s, when the
accelerating expansion of English commodity-culture was being
paralleled by the equally rapid augmentation of the English
vernacular, the excessive and often grotesque rhetoric of authors
such as Thomas Nashe and Gabriel Harvey was stimulating a
vogue for literary interrogations of the curious effects of things
– or objects – upon human subjects. In establishing strange
affinities between humans and ‘things’, the literary texts of the
1590s appear to anticipate a strikingly anti-Cartesian comment
by Blaise Pascal, in which complex variety is seen as a prop-
erty common both to the human soul and to ‘things’: ‘Things
have diverse qualities, and the soul diverse inclinations, for
nothing of that which is offered to the soul is simple and the
soul never offers anything simple to any subject’ (cited in
Benjamin 1993: 75).
In its comedy of mistaken props, Love’s Labour’s Lost can be
read as affording an interesting parallel to the chiasmic reci-
procity of Pascal’s notion of the soul as a thing and the thing
as soul-like. In the simple yet shrewd mind of the rustic Costard,
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a ‘mail’ (3.1.63); this was a bag in which ointment was carried
by a ‘quacksalver’, but the word also homophonically evokes
the amorous male. In the imagination of Biron, woman is like
a German clock ‘never going aright’ (3.1.175–6), and the dark
Rosaline is also compared to ebony – ‘O wood divine!’ (4.3.244).
In the concluding courtship scene, when the masquerading
Lords have been condemned as perjurers once again by the
ladies’ misplacing of their favours, Biron imagines his ‘silken
terms precise’ as a luxurious range of fabrics that have corrup-
ted his core humanity, like maggots breeding in the wool of
sheep:
Taffeta phrases, silken terms precise,
Three-piled hyperboles, spruce affectation,
Figures pedantical – these summer flies
Have blown me full of maggot ostentation.
I do forswear them, and I here protest,
By this white glove – how white the hand, God 
knows! –
Henceforth my wooing mind shall be expressed
In russet yeas and honest kersey noes.
(5.2.406–13)
A few lines later, Biron warns the mercurial Boyet, who has
mocked their page, ‘Die when you will, a smock shall be your
shroud’ (5.2.479). And this motif of repentance or purgation
as a return to the simple things and materials that denote our
bare humanity reappears at the end of the pageant of the Nine
Worthies, when Costard wants to fight Armado in his ‘shirt’,
only to find that Armado has no shirt at all.
The timeliness of redirecting critical attention to the
materiality of objects within Renaissance culture, and simul-
taneously of beginning to articulate new relations between
subjects and objects, was emphasised in Subject and Object in
Renaissance Culture, edited by Margreta de Grazia, Maureen
Quilligan and Peter Stallybrass. In their introduction to this
volume the editors suggest that:
Reading ‘ob’ as ‘before’ allows us to assign the object a
prior status, suggesting its temporal, spatial and even causal











































the way material things – land, clothes, tools – might
constitute subjects who in turn own, use, and transform
them. The form/matter relation of Aristotelian metaphysics
is thereby provisionally reversed: it is the material object
that impresses its texture and contour upon the noumenal
subject. And this reversal is curiously upheld by the
ambiguity of the word ‘sub-ject’, that which is thrown under,
in this case – in order to receive an imprint.
(de Grazia et al. 1996: 5)
However, my reading of Shakespeare’s paronomastic explora-
tion of things, and of the human’s relations both to and through
them, differs from that of these critics in its emphasis, first, upon
the perceived mutability of things (not simply as props, but also
as imagined and reconfigured solely by language); and second,
upon the subtle, implicitly uncanny and even soul-related,
effects that are attributed to the supplementary slipperiness –
or the ‘greasiness’ – of these mutable objects, as they reveal
hidden flaws in the human subject.
In the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx wrote of the
‘mystical’ character and the strangely spectral secrecy of the
commodity-form, which Jacques Derrida redescribed as ‘it
ghosts’ (Es spukt) (Derrida 1994: ch. 5). In Love’s Labour’s Lost,
the uncanny affinity of things with a ‘ghostly’ set of meanings
that can affect man’s spiritual destiny is indicated from the
very start of the play, when the ‘schedule’ signed by the King
and his lords allies literary signification (both writing and 
the ‘study’ of books) with a spiritual version of legality: this 
is the quasi-monastic oath of three years’ celibate study that is
taken by the group. Subsequently, each of the numerous texts
embedded within the play emphasises the affinity between the
textual attempt to fix meaning and some form of vow, debt or
obligation that results in deviation or transgression. Like the
love-letters on the one hand or Armado’s missing shirt on the
other, the play’s interest in the recurrent errancy of trivial
‘things’ exposes a ‘naked’ human fallibility that does not merit
grace, but hopes for it none the less. So Armado finally admits:
‘The naked truth of it is, I have no shirt. I go woolward for
penance’ (5.2.694–5).
In the first scene of the play, Biron voices his scepticism
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army of the world’s desires’ by studying in Navarre’s ‘little
academe’ (1.1.10, 13): ‘For every man with his affects is born,/
Not by might mastered, but by special grace’ (1.1.149–50). As
a result of their rapid enslavement to erotic desire, neither
Navarre and his companions, nor Costard or Armado, are able
to keep this oath even for a day. In consequence of their perjured
oaths – but also because of their gracelessness in the arts of
amorous courtship – the lords gradually discovery their mistaken
relationship to both words and things, as they admit to needing
‘some salve for perjury’ (4.3.284). It quickly becomes clear, there-
fore, that the entire community lacks Biron’s ‘special grace’,
which plausibly alludes to the Calvinist conception of ‘partic-
ular’ grace, or election. The European and implicitly Catholic
character of this all-male community (especially given its quasi-
monastic character) appears thereby to be highlighted.3 But in
spite of its seeming topical reference to the recent conversion
to Catholicism (in 1593) of the French king, Henri IV (formerly
King of Navarre), the comedy cannot simply be read as a
critique of Catholicism. The play’s structural opposition between
‘his grace’ and ‘her grace’ – that is, between the King of
Navarre’s entourage and that of the Princess of France, who
ends the play as ‘Queen’ – accords figurative and material shape
to a heterodox mode of grace, natural as well as supernatural,
whose supplementary (Marian?) character seems far more
Catholic than Protestant, as does its metonymic association with
the play’s female characters.
On her first entrance to sue for the restoration of Aquitaine,
Boyet praises the Princess of France as a repository not just of
all the graces (in a reference to the female Graces of classical
culture) but of a ‘dear grace’ that is apparently unique. Yet he
appeals to her to bestow this grace ‘prodigally’, or lavishly:
Be now as prodigal of all dear grace
As nature was in making graces dear
When she did starve the general world beside
And prodigally gave them all to you.
(2.1.9–12)
Christ as the word of God was defined by St Paul as the 












































In that yee are manifest, to be the Epistle of Christ,
ministred by vs, and written, not with yncke, but with the
Spirite of the liuing God, not in tables of stone, but in
fleshly tables of the heart. And such trust haue we through
Christ to God: Not that we are sufficient of our selues, to
thinke any thing, as of our selues: but our sufficiencie is of
God, Who also hath made vs able ministers of the Newe
testament, not of the letter, but of the Spirite: for the letter
killeth, but the Spirite giueth life.
(2 Cor.3: 3–6)4
In Love’s Labour’s Lost, however, it is a feminised and sexualised
model of grace that initiates the revelatory process which shows
the limitations both of the men’s law and of their letters, and
ends by imposing a different law upon them.
II
The complicated relationship between textuality and different
forms and temporal contexts of ‘salving’, or healing, is a
dominant, albeit puzzling, trope in the comedy’s central scene
and act. Here a sequence of cryptic puns seems to foreground
a textualised as well as sexualised form of supplementary grace:
this is evoked by the rustic Costard’s enigmatic allusion to ‘no
salve in the mail’ (3.1.63), which anticipates the Lords’ desire
for ‘some salve for perjury’ after the breaking of their oaths.
In this riddling exchange between Costard (identified in the
play-text as either a swain or a clown), the ‘man of fire-new
words’ (1.1.176), Armado, and his page Mote, masculine subjec-
tivity is troped as wounded or fallen – as ‘broken in a s[h]in’
(3.1.61), but also as much preoccupied with an ambivalent
conception of end(s). Although a lowly ‘swain’, Costard carries
a heavy weight of allegorical significance in this play, since his
name was not only the slang term for a ‘head’ but also signi-
fied a rib as well as an apple. Thus not only does he appear
to personify man’s Adamic nature on the point of a sexual fall
(in the production of Eve from his rib and the temptation by
the apple); Costard also parodies the intellectual pretensions
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fall. Through interlingual punning, the central scene equates
a love-letter with a medical salve, via the Latin for a greeting,
‘salve’. But Costard’s assertion that there is ‘no salve in the
mail’ initiates a witty discussion about the beginnings and
endings of texts that seems to pose a question about appro-
priate healing for the soul as well as for the body. Mistakenly
identified by Costard with a ‘l’envoi’ – part of a literary text
that comes not before but after – his ‘salve’ initiates a medi-
tation upon endings that concludes by alluding to concepts of
‘purgation’, ‘enfreedoming’ and ‘remuneration’ which have an
obvious spiritual as well as a bodily and sexual implication.
The pivotal passage begins some 70 lines into Act 3, when
Mote enters with Costard, who is to be an ‘envoi’ or messenger
for Armado. Costard has been apprehended in the opening
scene of the play for ‘following’ the country wench, Jaquenetta.
Now he is in a physically and emotionally distressed state, seem-
ingly because of his love for the same wench to whom Armado
is sending his love-letter:
Mote A wonder, master! Here’s a costard broken in a shin.
Armado Some enigma, some riddle; Come, thy l’envoi. Begin.
Costard No egma, no riddle, no l’envoi, no salve in the mail,
sir. O, sir, plantain, a plain plantain! No l’envoi, no
l’envoi, no salve, sir, but a plantain!
Armado By virtue, thou enforcest laughter – thy silly thought
my spleen. The heaving of my lungs provokes me to
ridiculous smiling. O, pardon me, my stars! Doth the
inconsiderate take salve for l’envoi and the word ‘l’envoi ’
for a salve?
Mote Do the wise think them other? Is not l’envoi a salve?
Armado No, page, it is an epilogue or discourse to make plain
Some obscure precedence that hath tofore been sain.
I will example it:
The fox, the ape and the humble-bee
Were still at odds, being but three.
There’s the moral. Now the l’envoi.
Mote I will add the l’envoi. Say the moral again.
Armado
The fox, the ape and the humble-bee












































Until the goose came out of door,
And stayed the odds by adding four.
. . .
A good envoi, ending in the goose. Would you desire more?
Costard The boy hath sold him a bargain, a goose, that’s flat.
Sir, your pennyworth is good an your goose be fat.
To sell a bargain well is as cunning as fast and loose.
Let me see: a fat l’envoi – ay, that’s a fat goose.
Armado Come hither, come hither. How did this argument
begin?
Mote By saying that a costard was broken in a shin.
Then called you for the l’envoi.
Costard True, and I for a plantain: thus came your argument
in. Then the boy’s fat l’envoi, the goose that you bought,
and he ended the market.
Armado But tell me, how was there a costard broken in a shin?
Mote I will tell you sensibly.
Costard Thou hast no feeling of it, Mote. I will speak that
l’envoi.
I, Costard, running out, that was safely within,
Fell over the threshold, and broke my shin.
Armado We will talk no more of this matter.
Costard Till there be more matter in the shin.
Armado Sirrah Costard, I will enfranchise thee.
Costard O, marry me to one Frances! I smell some l’envoi,
some goose in this.
Armado By my sweet soul, I mean setting thee at liberty, enfree-
doming thy person. Thou wert immured, restrained,
captivated, bound.
Costard True, true, and now you will be my purgation, and
let me loose.
(3.1.61–116)
In this intricate allusion to the ways in which texts aspire
to touch upon the most intimate of bodily matters, Costard
makes overt reference to different kinds of medical as well as
literary innovation. His initial mishearing of the word ‘l’envoi ’,
in conjunction with the Greek enigma, converts an artful literary
device into a ‘salve in the mail’. Possibly misunderstanding
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mishear ‘l’envoi ’ as ‘lenify’, a verb first imported from Latin in
1568.5 The word alludes to the softening or mitigation of a
physical condition, often through the application of a purga-
tive substance that lenifies or softens, and that is applied
inwardly or outwardly as a lenitive or ‘salve’. Thus a literary
greeting at the text’s end is converted, through the pun on salve
(Latin for ‘hello’), into an ointment carried in a bag or ‘mail’
by a ‘quacksalver’ or mountebank, whose basic constituent
would be grease, and which could be applied inside the body,
in the form of a clyster or enema, or externally, to a wound.6
Salves could be made from a single herb or ‘simple’, but in
the Paracelsan or ‘chemical’ medicine that was then the subject
of fierce debate, they were typically prepared from chemical
compounds.7 It is this practice that Costard initially rejects
when he calls instead for ‘a plain plantain’; this herbal remedy
for bruising may also connote that Costard wants a ‘plain’, or
sexual, treatment for his ambiguous ‘broken shin’.8
But the wordplay in this scene also draws our attention to
the self-referentiality of Love’s Labour’s Lost, through its use 
of the literary device of the envoi or tornada. Derived both from
the Italian canzone and from French troubadour verse, the envoi
was enjoying renewed popularity in English verse of the mid-
1590s, where it was appropriated by learned poets such as
Edmund Spenser and George Chapman as well as by Gabriel
Harvey and Thomas Nashe. Equated with the closing lines or
final stanza of a poem, the envoi was a literary device through
which the poet, in turning inwards and self-consciously com-
menting upon his text, could also speak directly to his addressee
or to other poets. This conflation of inside and outside, text
and recipient, figuratively anticipated the process of the poem’s
transmission in the world, and thus the question of literary
ends.9 In Shakespeare’s text, however, the structural singularity
of the envoi is significantly multiplied. Not only does an envoi
make a paradoxical appearance in the middle of the play-text
(albeit at the end of the witty exchange), as the last two lines
of a brief beast-fable involving fox, ape, ‘humble-bee’ and
‘ending in the goose’; a doubled envoi is also used to end the
play, in the two songs of the owl and cuckoo. At both junctures,
a human ‘envoi’ or messenger is used to personify and implicitly
to comment upon the literary envoi ’s meaning.











































witty completion of an act of communication, along with the
mysteriously material and greasy benefits – ‘remuneration’ –
that are seemingly encoded in and attendant upon it: ‘Let me
see: a fat l’envoi – ay, that’s a fat goose’. The interlingual pun
on the ‘oi’ ending of ‘l’envoi ’ alludes to the French word for
goose, oie, in seeming reference to the male’s ‘end’ or objective
of obtaining sexual favours in the form of a greasy greeting or
reception from a ‘fat goose’ – a fertile or sexually available
woman. Goose grease was frequently used in the preparation
of salves, but was also commonly used to lubricate bodily orifices
(whether vaginal or anal) for sexual intercourse. Armado’s
‘l’envoi’ ‘ending in the goose’ may additionally pun on the Latin
for goose, anser, since ‘goose’ is the answer to his riddle. (Indeed,
when Armado’s letter is delivered to the Princess’ entourage
after it has been mistakenly substituted for that of Biron, its
feathery metamorphosis is completed, since it is received as a
‘capon’ whose ‘neck’ or seal must be broken and which must
be carved in order to be read (4.1.56–9).)
Like the greasiness of the ‘fat goose’, the capacity of salves,
plasters, or enemas to be externally or internally applied to the
human body depended primarily upon their greasy contents.
And in its additional play upon the release of secret ‘matters’,
as discharges or secretions, from the greasy ends of humans as
well as things, this central scene reconfigures the materiality 
of everydayness, investing it not simply with a shifting, multi-
faceted character, but also with a suggestive dimension of
hiddenness that may imply pollution, given the possible allusion
to syphilis in ‘goose’ and ‘shin’.10 Indeed, the wordplay in 
Act 3 seems also, more ambitiously, to be reopening – or tenting
– a painful and highly contemporary set of spiritual wounds,
in an allusion to theological concerns about the relative merits
of Calvinist theories of special grace or predestination versus
Catholic concepts of penance and purgation. Although the
precise date of Love’s Labour’s Lost is not certain, it now seems
likely to have been written after 1594, in a period when Shake-
speare was to quibble explicitly on the doubtfulness of grace
as ‘prologue’, when Falstaff comments to Hal in 1 Henry IV
that ‘grace thou wilt have none . . . not so much as will serve
to be prologue to an egg and butter’ (1.2.15–18).
In the Lambeth articles of 1595, the Church of England
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predestination’. But during this decade predestination was also
beginning to be vocally challenged by anti-Calvinist divines
who anticipated Arminianism in arguing for universal grace.11
On the other hand, among Elizabethan Catholics belief survived
in grace, not as prologue, but as epilogue to man’s life, in
doctrines of the efficacy of penance, Purgatory and the merciful
intercession of the saints – above all, in the intercession of the
Blessed Virgin. Eamon Duffy observes:
The Mother of Mercy was one of Mary’s most resonant
medieval titles, unforgettably carved, painted or engraved,
extending her sheltering cloak over the suppliant faithful
and enshrined in the most haunting of Marian prayers, the
‘Salve Regina’. All over Europe the singing of the ‘Salve’
each night after Compline had become a popular devo-
tion, and English testators left bequests for lights, incense,
and musical accompaniment to dignify this most tender of
tributes to the Virgin Mary.
(Duffy 1992: 264)
Invoked in the ‘Salve Maria’ or ‘Hail Mary’ that begins the
rosary prayers, Mary was also greeted at the end of the rosary
prayers with an especial ‘l’envoi ’, a recitation of the antiphon
of the ‘Salve Regina’, which appealed to Mary as a holy queen.
Like use of the rosary, the singing of the ‘Salve Regina’ and
all other traces of the cult of the Virgin Mary had been banned
by Archbishop Cranmer in 1547.
By inviting us to anticipate a ‘salve’ that is not a ‘salve’ –
a greeting that paradoxically comes at the end, and that is
both like and unlike a healing ointment, the comedy connects
erotic courtship with man’s quest for salvation, in a heterodox
meditation upon the temporality of grace and the possible
destination of the soul. And in anticipating the lords’ desire for
‘some salve for perjury’ the artful ‘salving’ or healing that is
viewed so dubiously by Costard glances proleptically toward
the play’s equally curious conclusion, which makes repeated
reference to the terminus of death. The name of Mercadé, the
French envoi who arrives bearing news of another king’s death,
evokes not only the god Mercury, as messenger and psycho-
pomp of souls, but also the Latin word merces, meaning reward,











































meant ‘at great cost’) and hence death as the ironic reward or
‘remuneration’ that is accorded to fallen man. In this respect
this second human envoi has an obscure relationship to the first
envoi in the play, Costard, the punning significance of whose
name seems to denote the fall of man in relation to the temp-
tations of (sexual) knowledge. But it is a literary envoi that
concludes the play, in the songs of Ver and Hiems. Here
riddling allusions to two ‘fowls’ or birds foreground the marked
ambivalence of the play’s conclusion. For the cuckoo and the
owl emblematise both the uncertainty of marital endings (which
are implied to be vulnerable to the mutability, the ‘foulness’
or ‘greasiness’ of an errant female agency that can manifest at
either ‘end’ of the year), and also the uncertain meaning of
life’s beginning and end. While the song of Ver alludes to the
fear of female erotic infidelity that haunts the married man, in
the final song, that of Hiems, a dense sequence of non-human
objects – a wall, a nail, logs, a hall, milk, a pail, a pot, crabs
and a bowl – is figuratively allied with the deviation and frustra-
tion of erotic desire. Each verse of the owl’s song culminates
with the otherworldly, folkloric image of ‘greasy Joan’ and the
cooking ‘pot’, that she is ‘keeling’ – stirring or skimming in
order to cool: ‘a merry note,/While greasy Joan doth keel the
pot’ (5.2.893–4, 901–2). Given earlier references in the play to
Joan as a non-courtly object of desire, this pot seems figura-
tively to correspond to that greasy feminine end, or ‘fat goose’,
in and through which Costard earlier hoped to be ‘enfran-
chised’. But like the penalty-imposing ladies of France, the
materiality of a pleasure-affording feminine end is here invested
with a purgative or punitive quality, in an imposed cooling of
desire that parallels the ladies’ refusal of ‘courtesy’ to their male
suitors. Given the lords’ painful awareness of their double
perjury, these forms of female-directed ‘keeling’ or purgation
appear to correspond to a process of supernatural judgement
that is also, paradoxically, an intimation of the future possi-
bility of grace. Indirectly identified, in the central scene, with
man’s eventual ‘remuneration’ or receipt of a ‘guerdon’ for
good works or penance (3.1.120ff.), the feminine grace in ques-
tion seems to require above all a quasi-theological,
quasi-medical purgation of the graceful or witty language of the
male courtier and humanist scholar. Through the mutating










































‘Salving the mail’ 107
letter mutates into l’envoi, ‘salve’, ‘mail’, ‘goose’, and finally, on
its receipt by the ladies, ‘capon’ – we are reminded of the
seeming inevitability of deviations from and of the word.
Thereby, both the noblemen’s perjury (which may imply a
rejection of justification by faith) and the ‘miscarrying’ of the
language of desire (in the form of the love-letters soon to be
misdelivered by Costard) are implied to be an inevitable
process.
The quasi-culinary agent of this natural grace is not the
poet, however, but rather the strangely emblematic figure of
‘greasy Joan’. She is imaged as substituting for the erotic touch
a paradoxical act of stirring which implies that both pleasure
and purgation, both the incitement to and the obligatory
cooling of sexual desire, are necessary ingredients in the poet’s
figurative concoction of a textual salve. This is a ‘fowl’ or
‘greasy’ mode of salvation, to be dispensed by a female or femi-
nine source of mercy whose future ‘remuneration’ or ‘guerdon’
is seemingly both sacred and profane. For this errant feminine
salve is also implied to be closely allied to the peculiar effects
that are engendered by the disorder of things.
Notes
1 In this preoccupation with the ambiguity of bodily ends, my chapter
builds upon the argument set out in Berry 1999.
2 The redisposition of ‘things’ in the modern episteme was brilliantly
anatomized by Michel Foucault in Foucault 1991.
3 ‘For why is one person more excellent than another? Is it not to
display in common nature God’s special grace, which in passing many
by, declares itself bound to none?’ (Calvin 1961: 276).
4 The reference is taken from the Geneva Bible.
5 See the New Penguin edition of John Kerrigan (Shakespeare 1982).
6 The OED lists the first usage of ‘mail bag’, as a bag of letters, as
1670 (Mail sb. 3 2), but it seems clear that Shakespeare is using the
word in this sense, as well as in reference to a bag holding ointment.
7 See Hoeniger 1992.
8 See Rubinstein 1989 for the possible bawdy overtones of ‘plain’, ‘shin’
and ‘matter’.
9 For an account of the function of this device in troubadour verse,
see Phan 1991. I am indebted to Bill Burgwinkle for directing me to
this essay.
10 See Williams 1997.














































What Freud discovers in the fetish is the emptiness of the object.
Freud, in this at least, is the true heir of Protestantism.
(Stallybrass and Jones 2000: 32)1
For an astonishingly long time in the contentious modern
history of literary criticism – for a full quarter century, an entire
lit-critter generation – we’ve been telling ourselves essentially
the same story about psychoanalysis, gender, religion and
Renaissance lyric poetry.
The story is a powerful one; it explicates “Petrarch’s char-
acteristic descriptive moves – fragmentation and reification”
(Vickers 1985: 112) by way of the self-consciously idolatrous
stance of the poet-lover. The Petrarchan lover’s praise unfolds
in rime sparse, in “scattered rhymes,” parceling out the beloved
in emblazoned bits “of hand, of foot, of lip, of eye, of brow”
– piecing out upon a pedestal the catalog that Shakespeare
calls “the blazon of sweet beauty’s best” (Sonnet 106: 5–6).
And, as we’ve further come to understand, such idolatrous










































It behooves us, however – we chroniclers of “spiritual
Shakespeares” in particular – to consider this story of the
Petrarchan fetish a bit more carefully: especially given our disci-
pline’s current surge of interest in what’s coming to be known
as “the new materialism.”2 For a number of recent critics, the
cultural history of fetishism has afforded an important vantage
point from which to re-assess early modern materialities. Peter
Stallybrass’ and Ann Rosalind Jones’ discussions have been
exemplary in this vein, and have proved singularly influential
in foregrounding the cultural critic William Pietz’s work on the
history of fetishism.3
Pietz charts the evolution of the pidgin term fetisso from
its sixteenth-century origins in the intercultural context of the
West African gold and slave trades, to the modern day concept
of the fetish as used in anthropology, political economy and
psychoanalysis (see Pietz 1985, 1987, 1988). As Pietz demon-
strates, the origin of the term is difficult to characterize. The
complex of usages comprised by the word cannot be simply
derived from the nearest etymological root (namely, the Portu-
guese characterization of West African religion as witchcraft,
or feitiçaria). Nor can we trace the array of discrete cultural
artifacts that fetisso comes to designate, back to a single con-
ceptual or discursive field – or even to a single colonial power
or colonized people. Instead, the fetisso only evolves in the
course of translation and transaction across competing cultures,
practices, spiritualities. Fetisso mediates between Portuguese
Catholic, Iberian Jew, Dutch Calvinist, Islamicized as well as
non-Islamicized African.
For scholars like Stallybrass and Jones, Pietz’s account offers
a chapter in the history of the modern individual as “private”
or privé self: i.e. as disencumbered, as deprived of material entail-
ments.4 According to this account, the fetisso helps a nascent
European capitalism define itself and its commodities, over and
against a benighted ethnic Other: an Other incapable of recog-
nizing the “true” value of objects. For the European, the fetisso
emerges somewhat paradoxically as the expression of an inex-
pressive materiality – of the material world in all its brute and
meaningless density. It is this literally stupid world that the
savages venerate, and thus their fetissos, defined by the
Europeans as worthless stuff, enable a critique of unsublimated











































its status as a material embodiment.” Importantly, the fetisso is
hence no idol, “for the idol’s truth lies in its relation of iconic
resemblance to some immaterial model or entity” (Pietz 1985:
8). In contrast, the fetisso resists spirit, resists the “elsewhere”
of the material world. The fetisso finds itself, then, on the other
side of the emerging classical divide between mind and body,
participating in the new discourse of the classical subject. By
the eighteenth century, it will come to epitomize all that a self
must bracket, in order to realize “his” disembodied and fully
rational autonomy. In this manner, the early modern fetisso
paves the way for the Enlightenment. The secularization that
fetisso bespeaks, augurs progress – albeit a progress only
achieved at the expense of a demonized Other. As Pietz argues:
“The discourse of the fetish has always been a critical discourse
about the false objective values of a culture from which the
speaker is personally distanced” (Pietz 1985: 14).
For critics who are critical of this Enlightenment critique,
the reappraisal of fetishism – the effort, as Stallybrass and Jones
put it, to find “the utopian moment of the fetish” (Stallybrass
and Jones  2000: 32) – proves uniquely helpful. The question
of the fetish lies at the intersection of matter and spirit; to study
the history of fetish is to study the very question of sublima-
tion itself, of spiritual transcendence. Its reappraisal is essential
not only for scholars of the “new materialism” but also for
those of us intent on a newly “spirited,” as it were, discourse.
Nonetheless, I remain dubious of utopian fetishism – if only
for the simple reason that, logically speaking, there can be no 
positive discourse of fetishism: the discourse of the fetish is irre-
ducibly and originally negative. As Pietz argues, the discourse
“always posits this double consciousness of absorbed credulity
and degraded or distanced incredulity” (Pietz 1985: 14). In 
the twentieth-century psychoanalytic language of fetish, this
doubled consciousness finds its theory within the psyche, in the
“double attitude” of Freudian Verleugnen, or disavowal: a simul-
taneous denial and asseveration (Freud [1927] 1957: 203).
I argue that the fetish is better understood as the vehicle of
a triangulated perspective – not a doubled one. Indeed, its
discourse of critique, I argue, always entails three positions: (1)
the stance of the fully credulous; (2) the stance of the disillu-
sioned; and (3) that of the disillusioned who nevertheless










































The Shakespearean fetish 111
the doubleness of Verleugnen, but such duality logically entails
the first two dichotomous positions of total credulity, on the
one hand, and unremitting skepticism on the other. Moreover,
it is just this triangulation in the context of belief that the
Protestant Reformation brings to a traditional iconoclast
discourse. Pace Stallybrass and Jones, it is not Protestantism per
se that supplies the appropriate perspective on the fetish, but
rather the triangulated viewpoint of Luther’s Protestantism in
particular. For Luther, the world of the faithful is split into
three camps: the naively idolatrous Papists; the skeptically icon-
oclast radicals; and the true believers (like him) who recognize
iconoclasm as idolatry in another guise. Indeed, according to
Luther, the iconoclasts are the worst idolators of all, since their
fanatical destruction of images now entails an absolute – if
absolutely negative – investment in material form.
In other words, Luther triangulates a traditional discourse 
of idolatry – and in so doing, I argue, he generates an early
modern precursor to fetish discourse. In the final section of this
chapter, with my reading of Shakespeare’s “thing” – “that one
thing to my purpose nothing” (20:12) – it is toward such triangula-
tion, and toward the decidedly non-utopian “something-
nothing” at its center, that my reappraisal of the fetish will turn.6
Shakespeare’s “thing,” I will suggest, also splits the world into
three camps: the haves; the have-nots; and those who have
enough to know that they have not.
Silencing Diana . . .
At stake in discussions of Petrarchan fetishism is the alignment
between rhetorical strategies, spiritual pieties, and gender
politics. Specifically at stake is the logic of “descriptive dismem-
berment” (Vickers 1982: 109) that Nancy Vickers identified 
so cogently and influentially more than twenty years ago.
Vickers built upon arguments advanced in the 1970s by Robert
Durling, John Freccero and Giuseppe Mazzotta – arguments
that accounted for Petrarch’s “poetics of fragmentation” (the
phrase is Mazzotta’s) in terms of the poet-lover’s self-conscious
idolatry.7 Freccero’s formulations are notably pithy: the “funda-
mental strategy of the Canzoniere,” he writes, is to transform
“the thematics of idolatry . . . into the poetics of presence”











































the idolatrous love of Laura proves poetically efficacious.
Tracing out a laudatory circle from Laura to lauro (laurel), the
poet effectively crowns himself poet laureate. Thematic self-
abasement translates into rhetorical self-promotion.
At the same time, the self-reference of Petrarch’s rhetoric
precisely mirrors a patristic analysis of the semiotics of sin.8
In a universe where the Word of God is both origin and
eschaton – both that divine intention that precedes all creation
and that transcendental signified that secures its final mean-
ing – the idolator’s error is to mistake signs for things. He eschews
the rightful referentiality of the Creator’s creatures, enjoying
as a thingly end-in-itself that which rightly only signifies the
one true End. The idolator errs, in other words, by refusing
signification; he literally re-ifies, makes thing-like (res), the 
signs (signa) of God.9 Here, Freccero’s formulations are again
noteworthy:
[I]f the gentiles, in the Jews’ interpretation of them, sought
to make their gods present by reifying their signs, then we
might say that Petrarch sought to reify his signs, objectify
his poetic work, by making his ‘god,’ the lady Laura, the
object of his worship.
(Freccero 1986: 27)
Petrarch’s reified signs, no less than the idols of the pagan gods,
thus pervert an incarnational logic. Instead of salvation, these
signs-made-thing offer what Freccero calls “a kind of fetishism”:
they offer, that is, the worship of a “sign” that has been voided
of all significance. In turn, such fetishes can only yield a poetry
of fragments: to treat signs as things is to disarticulate them
from that “principle of intelligibility” (ibid.: 29) which transforms
a collection of parts into a unified whole. Without reference to
the divine Signified – to God as Word, as telos or summum bonum
– Petrarch’s Laura quite literally dis-integrates.
The Petrarchan fetish is thus a part without a whole. It is
a member disarticulated from its body, joint by joint.10 And
yet, such dismemberment just may be the price of immortality.
So it is with Laura. Her virtues and her beauties are
scattered like the objects of fetish worship: her eyes and










































The Shakespearean fetish 113
of her face is lost; her fingers are like ivory and roses or
oriental pearls. . . . Like the poetry that celebrates her, she
gains immortality at the price of vitality and historicity.
(ibid.: 29)
We’re at the core of the idolatry argument now. Let’s push
this logic a bit further yet. To say that Laura is “fetishized” is
not to say in any simple way that she has been “objectified,”
treated as an object to be used rather than as an end in herself.
Such instrumentalization, after all, is precisely what should
happen in an Augustinian universe of signs. But instead,
precisely, the poet refuses to objectify Laura in this sense; he
rejects the use of Laura as sign, hoarding the nuggets of a well-
mined semantic field as if the lifeless hunks of earth were in
and of themselves things of value. Gold, topaz, ivory, pearl. In
their dead weight, wrenched from their living and historical
context, such signs “forget” their use, and instead are scattered
“like the objects of fetish worship.”
And so the Petrarchan idolator is also a hoarder: one who
lays up his treasure in this world. His problem isn’t that he
won’t defer his pleasure; the idolator differs, in that respect,
from the glutton. Rather, the idolator seems to take pleasure
in deferral itself. Thus, for instance, the shivery erotic charge
delivered by the fetish of Rime 52: that delicate metonym of
the pretty little veil, the leggiadretto velo watched as it’s washed
in a mountain stream. Non al suo amante più Diana piacque. . . .11
The poet surveys the scene in delight, no less pleased by this
rustic laundry vision, than Acteon was by his chance glimpse
of Diana naked in the pool. And yet, it is not nakedness that
pleases here. As metonym – as synecdoche, even – the veil
pleases by obscuring. It is simultaneously representation and
impediment; it signifies by displacement. Instead of Laura
herself, the poem’s metonymic chain yields a signifier at least
three removes distant from the Lady: a “cruel” shepherdess
keeps us from the graceful veil while she protectively bathes
it; the veil itself stands between the lovely blond head of hair
and the breeze; and finally, il vago et biondo capel, the lovely
blond head itself, stands in for the Lady in her own, whole
person. And yet even so, trembling with an “amorous chill,”
the poet avails himself of this chance encounter with a thrice-











































should impede his pleasure.12 The mediation of signs becomes
itself a source of immediate gratification. Petrarch’s veil thus
“functions as a fetish, an erotic signifier of a referent whose
absence the lover refuses to acknowledge” (ibid.: 31). Insofar
as the idolator takes pleasure in that which should forestall
pleasure, his sin reveals itself as erotic perversion. Theology
unveils itself as psychoanalysis.
When Nancy Vickers, for her part, picks up the thread 
of this narrative, she establishes an even clearer reference to
psychoanalysis. Reminding us of Rime 52’s opening conceit
(Diana didn’t please her lover more . . .), Vickers addresses the analogy
between Acteon’s “voyeuristic pleasure” and the speaker’s
“fetishistic” delight. The two satisfactions are not as incongru-
ous as they might seem; what links the poem’s two stories is
in fact a third story: the mythic scenario of taboo and trans-
gression at the heart of the castration complex. In this light,
as Vickers explains, the Acteon–Diana encounter
reenacts a scene fundamental to theorizing about fetishistic
perversion: the troubling encounter of a male child with
intolerable female nudity, with a body lacking parts present
in his own, with a body that suggests the possibility of
dismemberment. Woman’s body, albeit divine, is displayed
to Actaeon, and his body, as a consequence, is literally
taken apart.
(Vickers 1981: 273)
That amoroso gielo of Rime 52, that amorous chill of vision, is as
much shudder as orgasmic release; if it marks arousal, it also
registers shock and horror. This is a vision that both pleases
and petrifies, as if the price of delight were destruction. And
indeed, so it is, within the castration narrative that Vickers
recounts, where the longed-for vision is quite literally the site
or sight of trauma. Yet, at least in fantasy, the possibility
remains of holding a space open between longing and trauma,
between prohibited seeing and threatened dismemberment.
The Rime sparse, Vickers argues, hold open just that “median
time” (ibid.: 270) by projecting the threat of dismemberment
on to the vision itself. Disarticulated into the language of fetish,










































The Shakespearean fetish 115
Vickers’ argument is a potent one, made all the more
intuitive by its tacit appeal to a now-familiar critique of modern
visual culture. Let us make no mistake: for Vickers, Petrarch’s
gaze doesn’t merely reprise that of an Acteon; more import-
antly, it prefigures “the gaze” of a Laura Mulvey.13 When
Vickers invokes the “theorizing about fetishistic perversion,”
the theorizing she has in mind has already been focused through
the lens of “psychoanalytically influenced feminist theory”
(Mulvey 1993: 3). All the same, and despite the fact that Vickers’
reading of the Canzoniere has become all but canonical, her debt
to feminist psychoanalytic theory has remained unchallenged
and untheorized – even though she herself is explicit about 
her assumptions: “Silencing Diana is an emblematic gesture;
it suppresses a voice, and it casts generations of would-be Lauras
in a role predicated upon the muteness of its player” (ibid.:
278–9). Vickers leaves no room for doubt here: in her view,
to read Petrarch aptly is to read him emblematically. It is to
interpret his terms from the standpoint of the future: from the
vantage of generations of always-already silenced women.
The problem with Vickers’ account is not simply the
hermeneutic circle it entails – that circle of the always-already,
where the vantage point of the women who will have been
silenced determines the poetry’s “original” status as emblem.
Far more problematic than the paradoxes of the future anterior,
is the logical hole at the argument’s center. On the one hand,
Vickers explicitly builds upon the account of Freccero and
others, for whom the Petrarchan fetish is vestigial: an idol 
or relic that metonymically signifes, as Freccero puts it, an
“absence the lover refuses to acknowledge” (Freccero 1986: 31).
At the same time, and on the other hand, Vickers invokes the
fetish as Freud comes to understand it: as a monument that
fills the amnesiac void of trauma, memorializing the horror of
castration. Vickers’ argument requires both accounts, yet offers
no bridge between them. Indeed, in the last analysis, what
remains most problematically untheorized in her argument is
not her use of theory, but instead this gulf at the heart of her
theory: the gap that lies between vestige and trauma – between
relic and monument. Nonetheless, what her discussion thereby
neatly reveals is the very same hole at the center of the history
of fetish: that epistemic break that, for William Pietz for
instance, separates a pre-modern discourse of idolatry from a











































Curiously enough, we find the same hole at the heart of
Freud’s discussion of fetish. It is the break that separates his
early writings on the subject from his later ones.
When the fetish comes to life . . .
In Freud’s earliest discussions (e.g. 1905–10), the fetish functions
a bit like a religious relic: its power and its value can be traced
back to a specific moment in early childhood – i.e. a partic-
ular sexual encounter or impression – with which the future
fetish was originally associated, and for which it will later be
substituted. The fetish, in other words, is a metonym: linked to
the original sexual object by the tenuous threads of contiguity
and contingency, its allure is both easily dismissed and easily
understood (see Freud [1905] 1975: 19). It’s only, after all, a
pretty little veil . . . ah, yes, but it’s Laura’s veil!15 The fetish,
properly considered, belongs somewhere – belongs to someone.
No matter how “inappropriate” the object is for the aims of
sexuality, a sense of property – of where and to whom it belongs
– tempers its impropriety.
And thus, it comes as little surprise that in his 1905 account
Freud is unable to draw a clear distinction between normality
and pathology: “A certain degree of fetishism is . . . habitually
present in normal love, especially in those stages of it in which
the normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its fulfillment
prevented.” Significantly, Freud illustrates this point with a
quote that summons Petrarchan categories in all their glitter-
ing, apostate allure. He quotes Goethe’s Faust, fresh from the
Witches’ Kitchen: “Get me a scarf from her breast, or the garter
of my love’s desire!” (Freud [1905] 1975: 20). If the lover is
sufficiently deluded (Faust has just been given a love potion)
so that the beloved is sufficiently overvalued (as Mephistopheles
tells us: Faust will now see Helen of Troy in every woman) 
– in other words, if one’s discourse is sufficiently Petrarchan –
then it’s only normal to fetishize. In a pinch, any Gretchen
can become a Helen, and any old garter or scarf will serve
your Liebeslust quite nicely.
Garter, scarf or little veil: Freud’s early theory of fetish
explicates the utility of such Petrarchan part-objects very well.
Like the material fragments of sacred history (“the comb of










































The Shakespearean fetish 117
and lice-infested hair shirt of Thomas Becket”)16 – fragments
around which a reliquary of precious metals might be fashioned,
and a cathedral built to house it; so, too, do the metonymic
relics of Petrarchism become a break point for our investments,
damming up and redirecting libido like a kayaker’s “cushion”:
that bulge of water that builds up over river rock.17 The fetish
thus conceived articulates the semiotics of idolatry perfectly: as
relic, the fetish becomes the cultic locus of our enjoyment,
rather than the mediating sign that directs us to that enjoy-
ment. Nonetheless, from Freud’s account of the fetish-relic, it
would seem that such idolatry is not necessarily perverse – 
if by “perversion” we mean behavior that departs from (and
doesn’t merely delay) normative sexual aims. A certain degree
of fetishism, Freud here suggests, is not merely “habitually”
but indeed quite essentially entailed in the “normal” course of
things, thanks to the “psychologically essential overvaluation 
of the sexual object, which inevitably extends to everything
that is associated with it” (ibid.: 20). We’re all, ultimately,
Petrarchists.
Or so we would be, if Freud’s story ended here. That ending
would leave us with the idolatrous logic of the reliquary, but
without that “scene fundamental to theorizing about fetishistic
perversion” (Vickers 1981: 273): the primal scene of the castra-
tion complex. It isn’t until Freud develops the concept of
disavowal (Verleugnung) in the 1920s that he’s able to articulate
a coherent theory of the fetish as “memorial” or “monument”
– as Denkmal – to the “horror of castration” (Freud [1927]
1957: 200). In the earlier theory, the fetish-character of the
object derived from the historical weight of its moment of
origin: from that original sexual encounter and sexual object,
in all their possible specificity and detail. Registering the “after-
effect” (Freud [1905] 1975: 20) of this intense immediacy, the
fetish-as-relic takes the place of this historical whole (e.g. the
body of the beloved); the member replaces the body, to which
it once literally belonged.
What is substituted for the sexual object is some part of
the body . . . or some inanimate object which bears an
assignable relation to the person whom it replaces and











































or underlinen). Such substitutes are with some justice
likened to the fetishes in which savages believe that their
gods are embodied.
(Freud [1905] 1975: 19)
Now, in the later 1927 discussion, the fetish object also bears
an “assignable relation” to that which it replaces; the principle
of the object’s selection is still metonymic, following a logic of
spatial contiguity. “Thus,” as Freud tells us in that later essay,
“the foot or shoe owes its attraction as a fetish” to the fact
that the curious little boy used to “peer up the woman’s legs
towards her genitals” (Freud [1927] 1957: 201). But, even so,
now our efforts to trace this metonymic chain back to its origin
will fail. The pun is unforgivable, but irresistible: at the origin
of this chain of metonymies is a hole instead of a whole. The
fetish as Freud finally comes to define it, is memorial instead
of relic, and further, it is a memorial that commemorates quite
literally nothing. It erects itself as Denkmal (both memorial and
monument) to an event that cannot be remembered (e.g. the
traumatic sight of castration), and to a loss that we can never
lose (e.g. the missing maternal penis).
More specifically, Freud explains that the monumental/
memorializing fetish emerges to negotiate a compromise
between avoidance and acknowledgement of the mother’s lost
penis. The boy, of course, is unwilling to see the “fact” of his
own possible castration, but he is also unable simply to
obliterate what he’s seen – in part because there’s literally
nothing to obliterate. The boy has not seen a thing. The only
possible compromise is, somehow, to adopt both positions: to
see and not to see. As Penisersatz, the fetish substitutes for a
missing penis that was never lost. “[T]he fetish is a substitute
for the woman’s (mother’s) phallus which the little boy once
believed in and does not wish to forego” (ibid.: 191). At the
same time, however, this replacement part can’t help but fore-
ground the fact that there’s nothing to replace. Freud explains:
“The horror of castration sets up a sort of permanent memorial
to itself by creating this substitute” (ibid.: 200). The fetish serves
as castration’s Denkmal neither in spite of, nor alongside, 
its role as penis-replacement. Indeed, it is precisely because it
replaces nothing that the fetish is the perfect memorial. As a
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help but memorialize that loss it hopes to lose. As Denkmal the
fetish, then, is perhaps less relevant to us for the meaning it
bears – i.e. as a sign or a symbol – than it is for the meaning
it performs. The Denkmal, with its interpellating name (Denk mal!
Just think! ), prompts, points, marks. . . . It functions, that is to
say, at the level of its utterance: as performative. As Denkmal
the fetish is a speech-act. A disavowal, in short: simultaneously
a denial and an admission.
If the Denkmal defines the fetish as signifying form, its
signifying content takes shape as the Penisersatz: the replace-
ment piece that is neither dildo nor prosthesis. The logic that
governs the substitutions of this substitute-penis, is not, exactly,
mimetic; not, exactly, representational; not even, exactly, a
matter of distribution or compensation. There’s nothing absent
to be re-presented; nothing hidden that must be re-produced;
nothing out of balance that must be set right.
One would expect that the organs or objects selected as
substitutes for the penis whose presence is missed in the
woman would be such as act as symbols for the penis 
in other respects. This may happen occasionally but is
certainly not the determining factor. It seems rather that
when the fetish comes to life, so to speak, some process
has been suddenly interrupted – it reminds one of the
abrupt halt made by memory in traumatic amnesias. In
the case of the fetish, too, interest is held up at a certain
point – what is possibly the last impression received before
the uncanny traumatic one is preserved as fetish.
(ibid.: 201)
Freud’s Penisersatz is not a symbol, although occasionally and
coincidentally it may look like one. The object in which that
last impression is preserved may, sheerly by coincidence, be the
sort of object that in other contexts would act as penis-symbol.
But in this context, those semantic links are interrupted.
So, the Penisersatz is not a symbol. But it certainly is a figure,
since its emergence marks a moment of displacement and
substitution (Ersetzen): a moment of trope. And yet this moment
is strangely asymmetrical, oddly static; the moment is devitalized
and frozen, almost before it begins. It seems that when the fetish











































impression . . . is preserved as fetish. . . . The problem, of course, is
that in general, symbolic discourse works by presenting one
thing in the place of another. Symbols (let’s just call them signs)
stand in for things in their absence; but what that truism really
means – at least from our standpoint, we makers and readers
of signs – is somewhat more balletic: as x comes to stand for
y, y fades out, and x pulsates into view. In fact, it is this dance
of scintillating presence that drives the engine in a universe of
signs, insuring that the presence of what is keeps passing from
us, even as what is not, dances into view. But the Penisersatz
wakes into presence, and has nowhere to go. It is not a penis-
symbol; not a prosthesis. It is not meant to replace a penis that
is absent. Instead, as Freud so carefully explains, this fetish is
a substitute for a penis whose absence is missing.18
Classical rhetoric offers us a ready way to understand the
oddities of this trope. As a substitution for nothing, the figure
at work in Freud’s fetish looks a bit like metonym – a bit like
Laura’s veil or the scarf of Faust’s Gretchen. But if this is
metonym, it is acephalic metonym: headless metonym. Where
we expect to find the origin-cause of trauma’s rippling after-
effects, where the displacements of trope should find their
closure: instead, we find a void. Amnesia. A process that simply
comes to a halt. On the other hand, because of this hole at
the heart of signification, the substitution entailed by Freud’s
Penisersatz demands a certain leap across semantic discontinuity:
a synaptic spark arcing across disparate points. In this sense,
the rhetorical structure of the Penisersatz looks a bit like the
flash of metaphor.
The figure I have in mind here is neither, strictly speaking,
a form of metaphor nor of metonymy. If it is anything, it is
the figure that arises when metaphor crashes into metonymy,
and vice versa. It is the figure called catachresis by the Greek
rhetors, or abusio in Latin. In George Puttenham’s Elizabethan
English, this is the “figure of abuse”:
[I]f for lacke of naturall and proper terme or worde we
take another, neither naturall nor proper and do vntruly
applie it to the thing which we would seeme to expresse 












































The Shakespearean fetish 121
For Puttenham – who follows Quintilian closely in this
respect – catachresis marks an abuse of language, a misapplica-
tion of a name, although the abuse may well be commendable.
Catachresis acts in the absence of a “naturall and proper
terme”; it fills the gaps in a lacking lexicon, “adapting the
nearest available term to describe something for which no
actual term exists” (Quintilian [88] 1959: 8.6.34). Catachresis
thereby names an abuse that is practically unavoidable; it 
tropes the lacunae of a symbolic order into neologism. In this
way, the figure that is not metaphor, nonetheless functions like
it. Like metaphor – or translatio, as the Latin rhetors call it,
from the past participle of transfero – catachresis transfers a proper
name from one object to another. At the same time, however,
catachresis also functions like metonym, since the principle that
guides the transfer is one of contiguity or propinquity – adapt
the “nearest available term” – rather than mimetic likeness.
If the rhetorical structure of Freud’s monumental fetish is
catachrestic, it is so because it too “vntruly applies” the ersatz
where the natural should be – and yet, it does so almost
commendably, since, indeed, there is nothing “naturall and
proper” to be found in place beforehand. The Penisersatz fills
a signifying gap not because it takes the place of something
else, but because it takes the place of the gap itself. Like all good
catachreses, the Penisersatz substitutes for nothing.
That one thing to my purpose nothing . . .
Elsewhere I have argued that Shakespeare’s response to the
traditional Petrarchan blazon – to those “lip, eye, brow”
catalogs that he mocks in Sonnet 106 – is the kind of catachresis
we see in his most triumphant, most highly anthologized lyric
image: “thy eternal summer shall not fade” (18: 9).19 The image
is “vntruly applied” (as Puttenham might say): neither the young
man’s beauty, nor a summer’s day, is eternal, for as Sonnet 18
also tells us: “every fair from fair sometime declines” (18: 7).
Nothing beautiful lasts forever. And yet, what is beauty if not
an ideal, and as such unchanging and immortal? And so, despite
the blatant untruth that Sonnet 18 advances – “thy eternal
summer shall not fade!”20 – the sonnet does speak true: beauty
is not beauty that alters when it alteration finds. In a world











































perfection but a little moment, the proper name for beauty 
is already “vntrue.” Neither “naturall nor proper,” our most
direct designations of beauty are already figures of speech, for
they ascribe eternity to that which is bound to time. Every fair
from fair declines: beauty is, indeed, also not beauty. Thus, if
Shakespeare’s version of the Petrarchan blazon looks a bit
perverse, if the poet offers denials and negations as readily 
as affirmations – e.g. “every fair from fair sometime declines”
or “my love is as fair/As any mother’s child, though not so
bright/As those gold candles fixed in heaven’s air” (21: 11–12)
or “my mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun” – if he disavows,
in other words, his own visions of beauty, he does so because
his sonneteering has shifted from a logic of relic to a logic of
memorial – from holy vestige, to monumental loss.
I am, in short, suggesting that we simply take Shakespeare
at his word. When he exhorts, “Let not my love be called
idolatry” (105: 1), we should listen. Shakespeare’s desire is not,
strictly speaking, Petrarchan; it is not, that is to say, structured
metonymically. His beloveds, whether fair or dark, leave no
trace behind; they do not “show” as idols (105: 2). In place of
the reliquaries of traditional Petrarchan verse (those sonnets
built like pretty rooms to house a veil here, a golden hair there),
Shakespeare gives us a poetry without icon. My mistress’ eyes are
nothing like the sun. . . . Shakespeare’s desire thus takes the rhetor-
ical form of abuse – of abusio. His love is catachrestic. It is the
love of – or, more precisely, love as – fetish.
In place of a decisive proof of this claim, or even a full-
fledged exposition of it, I will offer a single close reading: an
“emblematic” reading, as Nancy Vickers might say. The poem
I turn to in closing has been positioned, for well over two
hundred years, at the ground-zero of debates over Shake-
spearean sexuality and gender.21 All the more remarkable, then,
that one of the most obvious readings of the poem has, up
until now, escaped notice.
A woman’s face with nature’s own hand painted
Hast thou, the master-mistress of my passion;
A woman’s gentle heart, but not acquainted
With shifting change as is false women’s fashion;
An eye more bright than theirs, less false in rolling,










































The Shakespearean fetish 123
A man in hue, all hues in his controlling,
Which steals men’s eyes and women’s souls amazeth.
And for a woman wert thou first created,
Till nature as she wrought thee fell a-doting,
And by addition me of thee defeated
By adding one thing to my purpose nothing.
But since she pricked thee out for women’s pleasure,
Mine be thy love and thy love’s use their treasure.
Sonnet 20, we all know, is a just-so story: the story of how the
young man got “pricked.” However, in our focus on the story
of this “one thing” we have put ourselves in the position of
the women in line 14: we’ve been unable to take our eyes off
this treasure. And, accordingly, we’ve missed the sense in which
the sonnet presents a somewhat different creation story. At
stake in this poem is not so much the story of the penis, but
the story of the Penisersatz: of the part that replaces nothing.
Understood as an allegory of the fetish, the celebratedly
indeterminate volta of the poem now offers a quite pointed
reading. “And for a woman wert thou first created”: as count-
less readers have noted, thanks to the ambiguous preposition
“for,” we can’t help but read this line twice. “For” can either
denote intention (“intended for”) or representation (e.g. “pansies,
that’s for thoughts”). The argument of the octave, however, has
set us up for the first denotation: you’ve combined the best of both
worlds; you’re as beautiful as a woman and as constant as a man; you’re
as alluring as both sexes, and alluring to both sexes. . . . And yet, you
were created only for one sex: you were intended for a woman’s pleasure.
Of course, no sooner do we reach the next line, than we realize
that we’ve been set up: “Till nature as she wrought thee fell
a-doting. . . .” Oh, I see, Nature wanted you for (denoting ‘intention’)
herself. . . . But at first she created you ‘as’ a woman: ‘for’ denoting ‘in
imitation or representation of’. . . . And so, the just-so story unfolds.
Most typically readers dismiss the doubleness of “for” as just
another of Shakespeare’s fatal cleopatras – just another quibble.
But the carefully structured sequence of readings here enforces
the “double attitude” of the fetish. After all, this is not The
Crying Game. Instead of being surprised by the phallus, the
octave makes us expect a phallic woman from the very start.
You have the best of both worlds. In this context, the quibble on











































what it had appeared to grant. What we discover, as the just-
so story unfolds, is not the unsettling presence of a penis, but
its far more uncanny absence. This is a story of the castration
trauma.
And yet, of course, this poem is not actually traumatic.
Instead of the horrified, amnesiac little boy of Freud’s 1927
account, we have the infatuated – but also generative – folly
of a female figure: Nature. And instead of the “overvalued”
fetish object, we find in Sonnet 20 that “one thing to my
purpose nothing.” Indeed, ultimately, instead of Freud’s
familiar “double attitude,” Sonnet 20 gives us a triangulated struc-
ture of desire where disappointment is a trap in its own right.
The story of the lost object, we learn, is mitigated by the prior
recognition of our own loss. Just as the young man himself
manages to straddle both sexes – managing to be both pricked
and unpricked, both created for a woman’s pleasure, and
created as a woman – so too is the poet simultaneously with
and without. For that matter, however, so are we. If the poem
tempts us with our own desire for the phallus, thereby aligning
us with the women of line 14, it equally aligns us, like the poet,
with a particular woman: Nature. Like the poet, we are all quite
capable of crafting the image of our desire. Like Nature, we
want the phallus: penis, offspring, Galatea-like beloved. And
like Nature, we already have one, wrought from and as our
own desire. The penis is already a fetish.
Shakespeare’s story of the fetish is not the story of trauma
because, as it turns out, we are already fitted with one. Or, to
put the same point another way: Shakespeare is telling a version
of Freud’s story, but he does so neither from the credulous
standpoint of belief (the little boy before he sees) nor from the
skeptical standpoint of disillusion (the little boy after). Shake-
speare tells his story instead from the apex of the triangle: from
the position where spirit finally matters. This is where the fetishist
stands.
Alternatively, it is the position of the analyst.
Notes
Shorter versions of this argument were presented at the Shakespeare
Association of America and the American Comparative Literature
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at both conferences for their incisive feedback. I’d also like to thank John
Parker for his generous and helpful comments on fetishism and
materialism in his own work, and for sharing with me an advance copy
of his essay “What a Piece of Work is Man: Shakespearean Drama as
Marxian Fetish, the Fetish as Sacramental Sublime” (The Journal of
Medieval and Renaissance Studies (Fall 2004 34: 643–72)). Finally, I am
indebted to Richard Halpern and, especially, to my colleague Ben
Saunders, whose comments and critique at various stages of the project
have been invaluable.
1 James Kearney argues the Reformation brings a new element to the
centuries-old discourse of Christian iconoclasm: namely, a “demysti-
fying and trivializing discourse [of the religious icon as] trinket” 
(J. Kearney 2002: 4). For Kearney as for Stallybrass, through its
castigations of Roman Catholic and heathen religious forms as paltry
“trinkets,” Protestantism prefigures “the modern conception of the
fetish” (ibid.).
2 For the term “new materialism” see Bruster (2001). Examples of this
so-called new materialist criticism abound. Even as I write these
words, The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies goes to press
with a special issue on the “Marxist Premodern” (Fall 2004); the
question of material culture was in the air everywhere at the April
2004 convention of the Shakespeare Association of America; and
a spate of essays and anthologies have sought to interrogate our 
field’s emphasis on emerging subjectivities, arguing instead for the
importance of sustained focus on early modern objects. The pivotal
anthology in this latter regard is the 1996 Subject and Object in Renaissance
Literature, edited by Margreta de Grazia, Maureen Quilligan and Peter
Stallybrass.
3 Would it be too extreme to cite a Penn Fetish in this recent 
publishing trend? Much of the recent fetish-oriented work in early
modern studies has been generated by faculty associated with the
University of Pennsylvania (e.g. Stallybrass, Jones, de Grazia) and by
their former students (e.g. John Parker, James Kearney).
4 See for instance Stallybrass and Jones’ (2000) characterizations of the
modern “individual” as dematerialized and hence indivisible, because
abstracted from a body that has been reduced to mere object, i.e.
fetish.
5 The third position – where “simple truth” is suppressed (see Sonnet
138) – corresponds to Manonni’s famous “je sais bien, mais quand
même”: the rhetorical stance of the fetishist. See Manonni 1969.
According to Slavoj Žižek, of course, this is the position of all ideo-
logical belief. See Žižek 1989. Our relation to the Big Other of
ideology is like our relationship to Santa Claus: we all know that he











































6 “For nothing hold me, so it please thee hold/That nothing me, a
something sweet to thee:/Make but my name thy love, and love that
still,/And then thou lovest me, for my name is ‘Will’” (136: 11–14).
– A fuller account of the Shakespearean fetish, and of its relation-
ship both to Luther’s triangulated reform, as well as to an emerging
discourse of commodity, appears in my forthcoming study: The Use
of Shakespeare.
7 The crucial essays are Durling 1971, Freccero [1975] 1986 and
Mazzotta 1978. See also Durling’s “Introduction” to his bilingual
edition of Petrarch’s poems (1976). All references to and translations
of the Rime sparse as in this edition.
8 For Augustine – and with him, Petrarch – idol worship is at the heart
of all sin as such; it defines the fundamental error of fallen man. The
point may seem obvious – and indeed, it passes for self-evident in
Freccero’s account – but this represents a profound commitment to
Platonism. It is precisely this commitment to a rationalist, platonic
metaphysics that will be called into question by the sixteenth-century
reformers and counter-reformers.
9 Augustine’s distinction between signum and res – the cornerstone of
his “Christian doctrine” – is also the linchpin of this orthodox critique
of idolatry. See Augustine [397] 1958: 1.2.2ff.
10 Cf. Rime 15: “[C]ome posson queste membra/da lo spirito lor viver
lontane. . . .”
11 Non al suo amante più Diana piacque
quando per tal ventura tutta ignuda
la vide in mezza de le gelide acque,
ch’a me la pastorella alpestra et cruda
posta a bagnar un leggiadretto vel
ch’a l’aura il vago et biondo capel chiuda;
tal che mi fece, or quan’egli arde ‘l cielo,
tutto tremar d’un amoroso gielo.
12 It would be useful to explore Petrarch’s veil as an example of Lacan’s
objet petit a. Recently Henry Krips (1999) has explicated the relation-
ship between the objet a and the logic of fetishism; in a complementary
discussion, Richard Halpern (2002) has explored the early modern
conception of sodomy in terms of the Lacanian Thing. Both Krips
and Halpern offer extraordinary glosses of Lacan, but their readings
can be misleading if applied to the early modern fetish. The logic 
of the objet a is in fact the logic of idolatry; missing from the discus-
sion is precisely that “double attitude” that the concept of disavowal
brings to Freud’s 1927 “Fetishism” essay.
13 In particular, Vickers cites the two now-classic analyses of spectator-
ship, gender and pleasure: Berger 1977 and Mulvey 1975.
14 “Far from representing a continuation of the idea of idolatry, the
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adequacy of the earlier discourse under quite specific historical condi-
tions and social forces” (Pietz 1985: 6).
15 If time allowed, it would be helpful here to consider Rime 16, where
another little piece of fabric – St Veronica’s handkerchief – reveals
in quite literal terms the relationship between religious relic or icon
(Veronica as verum ikon), and the Petrarchan “fetish.”
16 I’m citing Peter Stallybrass’ discussion of the medieval relic (2002:
178). For Stallybrass, the great problem with modernity – a problem
he sees, as I’ve already suggested, articulated in the history of the
fetish – is the disavowal of materiality. It would seem that the pre-
modern cult of the relic marks one version of what Stallybrass and
Jones call elsewhere the “utopian moment of the fetish.”
17 The image of a “damming up of libido” (Libidostauung) is Freud’s, and
can connote either a healthy retention/redirection of libidinal energy
(e.g. the civilizing effects of sublimation), or the pathogenic frustra-
tion of libido that only finds discharge in, for instance, a neurotic
symptom.
18 For Freud, what truly horrifies in the castration scenario is not, in
other words, the sight of an amputation, but rather the perception
that there is nothing to be amputated. It is this uncanny sight – the
uncanny site of the vagina as absolute void or no thing – that consti-
tutes the trauma per se. The logic here is well known in Hollywood;
I’m reminded of the only truly frightening sequence in the Wachowski
brothers’ Matrix films. These films are dense with invaginating images,
but only one of these achieves the uncanny pitch of horror. When
“Mr Anderson” is first interrogated by Agent Smith, his efforts to
resist by screaming are thwarted when his lips melt together and his
mouth dissolves into a disgusting, gummy goo. The sight is unpleasant,
but the moment only becomes nightmarish when the goo disappears:
then, there isn’t even the absence of a mouth. What terrifies, finally,
is not the gash, but the smooth, impassive blank where the wound
used to be. The missing mouth is now uncannily missing.
19 See my discussion of catachresis and the young man sonnets in
Freinkel 2002.
20 The full thought of the sonnet is, of course, somewhat more complex
than I’ve rendered it: “thy eternal summer shall not fade . . . when in
eternal lines to time thou grow’st” (etc.). At first sight, what seems 
to mitigate the untruth of the “eternal summer” is the vision of future
readers who give life and breath to the written word. But since Sonnet
17 has just demonstrated the ways in which literature itself is subject
to time and decay (“So should my papers, yellowed with their age,/Be
scorned. . .” (17: 9–10)), Sonnet 18’s concluding image of the book
only manages to shift the catachresis slightly. “Eternal lines” is, of
course, every bit as much a figure of abuse as “eternal summer” was.
21 The lines of this debate have been, from the start, perhaps all too











































terms of Shakespeare’s eighteenth-century editors. Steevens’ famous
1766 protestation (“it is impossible to read this fulsome panegyrick,
addressed to a male object, without an equal mixture of disgust and
indignation”) – along with Malone’s 1780 response (“such addresses
to men . . . were customary in our author’s time, and neither imported
criminality, nor were esteemed indecorous”) – have, between them,
crafted what now seems to be an inescapable critical legacy (see
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6
Bottom’s secret . . .
John J. Joughin
I need help in my state of bliss. For I am well practised
in the arts of resignation and in the prayer that they
provoke. O God, take away this pain, this punishment –
prayer in adversity. Yet I have no liturgy for thanksgiving,
for praise, for consummation; for my well-being, love-
ability, or for a new sensation; a constant awareness of
existence, alone or in the company of others, imbued with
a silly palpability, a beauty at once tactile and visual – as
if on each intake of breath one were immersing one’s hands
in the deep folds of some fine material saturated with
glorious colour. How to give this beauty back? . . . The
withdrawal of the abyss, the overwhelming plenitude of
every moment leaves me more vulnerable than the busy
tumult of distress: I have nothing to clutch, nothing to
point to as my burden, nothing from which to beg allevia-
tion. My soul is naked: it has lost its scaffolding of regret
and remorse or even repentance: it is turned: and the unex-
pected result is the sensation and the envelope of invisible
and visible beauty. This does not make me ecstatic, unreal,










































. . . but it needed some response, some way of singing its
mystery so that I can concentrate as ever on any fellowship
or fickleness which presents itself.
(Rose 1999: 21–2)
In her final work Paradiso, the philosopher Gillian Rose faces
what she terms ‘doxological terror’, as, on confronting a
terminal illness, amidst new-found bliss and serenity, she
contemplates the movement from a state of loss to a state of
grace.
Fragments of an unfinished manuscript, Rose’s last words
on faith and philosophy constitute their own particular form
of incomplete completeness; yet at this extreme they also offer
the defiance of self-creation, an absolute beginning without
preconditions – a lyrical act of autopoeisis (cf. Rose 1999: 
45, 63). Where, in her previous Love’s Work (1995), her reader
was left in purgatory, emboldened to ‘keep your mind in hell
and despair not’, here, in her Paradiso, Rose embraces the
sublime in the pedestrian, her ecstasy as ordinary as it is myster-
ious. Paradoxically, the ultimate gift of death resides in a
renewal of the infinite possibilities of the everyday.
In the face of misfortune, spiritual malaise and disenchant-
ment, recent criticism in the Humanities has suffered more
from resignation than hope. Ours tends to be a spectral criti-
cism ‘companioned by ghosts’ and beset by melancholia and
loss, which Rose describes in terms of the ‘interminable
mourning play and lament of postmodernity’ (Rose 1996: 64).
In Shakespeare studies there is certainly a current tendency
to redeploy texts and characters in terms that demand 
redemption but in forms that simultaneously refuse redress 
(cf. Joughin 2000a: 14–17).1 In Hamlet in Purgatory, for example,
Stephen Greenblatt speaks explicitly of Shakespeare’s theatre
as ‘a cult of the dead’ (2001: 258). Indeed, in some sense, as
Greenblatt reminds us, our negotiation of old Hamlet’s 
death is an exemplary case in point, insofar as it effectively
constitutes the singular act of witness or memorial, which will
continue to assure and maintain our literary critical life – ‘Thou
art a scholar, speak to it, Horatio . . .’ (Greenblatt 1997: 481).
Questions of how we remember, of disenchantment and re-











































visibility and hiddenness, knowing and not knowing, are them-
selves necessarily linked in intricate ways to the inventive
capacity of what we might term the literary critical ‘event’. 
Yet in Specters of Marx (during another negotiation with old
Hamlet’s death) in speaking of and to apparitions, Jacques
Derrida speaks not just of those ‘who are no longer there, of
those who are no longer’, but also of those ‘who are not 
yet present and living’ (Derrida 1994: xix), the ghosts of those
who are not yet born; reminding us that the gift of the appari-
tional resides in speaking in a relation of absolute singularity
to others:
Whether he knows it or not, Hamlet is speaking in the
space opened up by this question – the appeal of the gift,
singularity, the coming of the event, the excessive or
exceeded relation to the other – when he declares “The
time is out of joint.” And this question is no longer
dissociated from all those that Hamlet apprehends as such,
that of the specter-Thing and of the King, that of the event,
of present-being, and of what there is to be, or not, what there
is to do, which means to think, to make do or let do, to make
or to let come, or to give, even if it be death.
(ibid.: 23)
If, with its own ‘scaffolding of regret’, our literary life is nothing
more or less than a preoccupation with perpetual mourning
and endless loss – purgatorio rather than paradiso – then in letting
lost ones go we ought to embrace the gift of death as a precipi-
tation towards the opening up of new relations to others yet
to come. In turn the singularity of literature and its defiance of
extant modes of understanding, also resides in an utopian 
or messianic impulse, in the ‘coming-to-be of that which is not
yet’ and its ‘incalculable novelty’.2
Littered with dreams, visions and a host of other apparitions
there can be no doubt that the world of Shakespeare’s drama
is, as Greenblatt puts it, ‘hyperanimated’ (Greenblatt 2001). For
his contemporary audience, witnessing the revival of ancient
spirits and the birth of things to come seems to have consti-
tuted an everyday occurrence while also remaining a crucial










































132 John J. Joughin
relation between the phantasmatic power of the playwright 
and its reliance on categories that are, or were, religious also
seems evident. However, insofar as it constitutes a site of
reincarnation and continual renewal, the revelationary capacity
of Shakespeare’s stage is not just bound to a cult of mourning,
but also invites a singular encounter with singularity, a quasi-
messianic apprehension of blissful new beginnings – an
anticipation of what Rose terms ‘the overwhelming plenitude
of every moment’. In this chapter, in pushing this relation
between the sacred and the secret of the future-to-come, I want
to explore the paradoxical novelty of the apparitional as the
vocation of the everyday: ‘both invisible, hidden’ and quite
‘ordinarily [rudely?] visible’ (cf. Rose 1999: 19).
Bottom’s secret, or the visible-invisible of
apparitions
[I]n the temporal world God and I cannot talk together, we
have no common language . . .
(Kierkegaard 1985: 64)
– I have had a most rare vision. I have had a
dream past the wit of man to say what dream it was. Man
is but an ass if he go about t’expound this dream. Me-
thought I was – there is no man can tell what. Methought
I was, and methought I had – but man is a patched
fool if he will offer to say what methought I had. The
eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen,
man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive,
nor his heart to report what my dream was. I will get
Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream. It shall be
called ‘Bottom’s Dream’, because it hath no bottom, and
I will sing it in the latter end of a play, before the Duke.
Peradventure, to make it the more gracious, I shall sing
it at her death.
(A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 4.1.199–211)
Bottom’s mystery and the hidden wisdom whereof he speaks
threads together the aporia of the embodied and the non-
embodied, the visible and the non-visible – does the sanctity
of theatrical performance and its communion (its secret) lie in











































As several critics have noted, Bottom’s account of his 
‘rare vision’ constitutes a deliberately botched re-joining of 
the Pauline message of spiritual revelation as that which, in
being ‘past the wit of man’, cannot be spoken:
[W]e speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden
wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our
glory: Which none of the princes of this world knew: for
had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord
of glory. But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear
heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the
things which God hath prepared for them that love him.
But God has revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the
Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.
(1 Cor. 2:7–10)
Yet if Paul’s sense of the demonstration of the spirit equates
in some respect to the revelationary potential of Shakespearean
drama, the kinaesthetic confusion of the senses to which Bottom
refers undoubtedly complicates that connection. Bottom’s mala-
propisms of sense aside, it cannot after all be a matter of
‘knowing’ what Bottom knows, for as Paul adds: ‘[T]he natural
man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are
foolishness unto him: neither can he know them for they 
are spiritually discerned’ (1 Cor. 2:14).
Bottom’s initiation into the world of the spirit foregoes the
conventional criteria for ‘knowing’; it is unrepeatable (‘no man
can tell what’), absolutely singular. The play reserves the term
‘translation’ for its interrogation of this form of epistemolog-
ical and ontological transformation, and once, and only here
in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the notion of being ‘transfigured’
(cf. 5.1.24). How then can we translate Bottom’s astonishing
translation insofar as, as Kierkegaard puts it: ‘[I]n the temporal
world God and I cannot talk together, we have no common
language’?
As Peter Brook’s remarkable production demonstrated (at
Stratford, 1970) there is a sense in which the play’s proximity
to the visionary is not held in abeyance in some transcendent
realm but is already hibernating within the everyday. In a










































134 John J. Joughin
on trapezes, Brook hurled himself trustingly into the absurd.
Crucially, there was no attempt to conceal the mechanics of
flying, so that, as one critic noted, in making the invisible ordin-
arily visible, Brook had successfully invented: ‘an environment
for the Dream which removes the sense of being earthbound:
it is natural here for characters to fly’ (Griffiths 1996: 67–9).
In this, arguably the most Kierkegaardian of Shakespeare’s
plays, the sublime and the pedestrian are bound up together,
and credulity is unwitting and commonplace, precisely the
provenance of Kierkegaard’s ‘Knight of Faith’ who remains
open to the ‘astonishing nature of what is normally expected’
(cf. Rose 1999: 18 and Kierkegaard 1985) – rather than that
of Paul’s ‘princes of this world’, for whom knowing is construed
as certainty. In turn, one might say that Brook’s production
was ‘Shakespearean’ insofar as it understood the apparitional
quality of the play as a form of discovering what is ‘the very
least we need before understanding can be reached’ (Brook
1990: 55). As such the play exemplifies what the director terms
‘Holy Theatre’ or ‘The Theatre of the Invisible-Made-Visible’
where ‘we can try to capture the invisible but we must not
lose touch with common sense . . .’ (Brook 1990: 69, 47–72).
Crucially, and in contrast to what Brook terms the ‘deadly
theatre’, where we rush to give things a prescriptive ‘label’
(ibid.: 15), the ‘Holy Theatre’ embraces the potential of a
‘Happening’:
A powerful invention. . . . A happening can be anywhere,
any time, of any duration: nothing is required, nothing is
taboo. The theory of happening is that a spectator can be
jolted into new sight, so that he wakes to the life around
him . . . this visible-invisible cannot be seen automatically
– it can only be seen given certain conditions. The condi-
tions can relate to certain states or to a certain under-
standing. In any event, to comprehend the visibility of the
invisible is a life’s work. Holy art is an aid to this, and so
we arrive at a definition of a holy theatre. A holy theatre
not only presents the invisible but also offers conditions
that make its perception possible. The Happening could
be related to all of this, but the present inadequacy of the











































of perception. Naively it believes that the cry ‘Wake up!’ is
enough: that the call ‘Live!’ brings life. Of course more 
is needed. But what?
(Brook 1990: 61–3)
Brook’s sense of a ‘happening’ theatre is a variant of what I
have characterised elsewhere as an ‘aesthetic attitude’ – where
one is willing to embrace a form of critical thinking which
remains ‘eventful’ insofar as it refuses to be prescribed by pre-
determined categories and remains open to: ‘imagining the
possibility that the world and its objects might be otherwise
than they are’ ( Joughin 2000b; cf. Docherty 2003: 31). Where
conventional understandings of the emergence of a ‘representa-
tional’ theatre prescribe a fixed field of vision – a place of the
visibly present where that which is secret or hidden is only so
in the sense that all remains to be revealed – an aesthetic atti-
tude implies a willingness to remain open to the truth-potential
of the particular transformation wrought by aesthetic experi-
ence itself, where the distinctive articulation of truth in works
of art ‘discloses’ the world in new ways rather than copying or
representing what is known to be already there (cf. Joughin
2000a: 65–7 and Bowie 1997: 5, 301). In contrast, by adhering
to a correspondence model of self-evident truths and in failing
to see ‘more in things than they are’, traditionalist critics confuse
the apparitional with the merely empirical.3 This is not quite
right, for as Adorno reminds us, in the process of entering the
realm of their secular transcendence artworks already ‘posit a
more as what appears’ indeed ‘artworks become artworks in
the production of this more: they produce their own tran-
scendence’ (Adorno 1997: 78). Crucially, as Adorno goes on 
to suggest, insofar as such artworks become actual, ‘in appear-
ing empirically’ they are simultaneously ‘liberated from the
burden of the empirical’ (ibid.: 81). In a section of Aesthetic
Theory dealing with ‘Art Beauty’ he develops this distinction
further by comparing artwork’s apparitional potential to 
fireworks, observing that:
The phenomenon of fireworks is prototypical for artworks,
though because of its fleetingness and status as empty










































136 John J. Joughin
theoretical consideration . . . Fireworks are apparition . . .:
They appear empirically yet are liberated from the burden
of the empirical, which is the obligation of duration; they
are a sign from heaven yet artifactual, an ominous warning, a
script that flashes up, vanishes, and indeed cannot be read
for its meaning. The segregation of the aesthetic sphere by
means of the complete afunctionality of what is thoroughly
ephemeral is no formal definition of aesthetics. It is not
through a higher perfection that artworks separate from
the fallibly existent but rather by becoming actual, like fire-
works, incandescently in an expressive appearance. They
are not only the other of the empirical world: Everything
in them becomes other.
(ibid.: 81, my emphasis)
As Isobel Armstrong notes, glossing Adorno:
[Artworks/fireworks] are at once artefactual, actual and
other to the empirical world – a magical phenomenon
which is not a higher truth but an astonishment and a
wonder, intellectual delight and kinaesthetic happening. . . .
But ultimately it [the artwork/firework] never transcends
empirical reality; it needs the sensuous, the brute physical
existence of the material world, and depends on crude
mechanism for its very nature as apparition.
(Armstrong 2000: 180–2)
Rather than existing in an ephemeral domain then artworks
are fallibly existent. And in reminding us of the sensuous need
on which apparition simultaneously relies for its visionary 
power (for its ‘very nature as apparition’), Adorno’s theorisation
of aesthetic transcendence and disenchantment thus simul-
taneously draws us back to what he terms an ‘art-alien’ layer
– the material antecedent of all that is ‘spiritual’ in art, which
he proceeds to discuss in terms that are teasingly reminiscent
of Brook’s sense that the extraordinary is already secreted in
the ordinary:
It is not so much that artworks possess ideality as that 











































denied sensuality. That quality can be comprehended in
those phenomena from which artistic experience emanci-
pated itself, in the relics of an art-alien art, as it were, the
justly or unjustly so-called lower arts such as the circus. . . .
Art becomes an image not directly but by becoming an
apparition but only through the counter-tendency to it. The
preartistic level of art is at the same time the memento 
of its anticultural character, its suspicion of its antithesis to 
the empirical world that leaves this world untouched.
Important artworks nevertheless seek to incorporate this
art-alien layer. When, suspected of being infantile, it is
absent from art, when the last trace of the vagrant fiddler
disappears from the spiritual chamber musician and the
illusionless drama has lost the magic of the stage, art has
capitulated. The curtain lifts expectantly even at the begin-
ning of Beckett’s Endgame; plays and stagings that eliminate
the curtain fumble with a shallow trick. The instant the
curtain goes up is the expectation of the apparition.
(Adorno 1997: 81)
In its becoming apparitional then the artwork retains 
its common touch. Here again, as Isobel Armstrong notes,
Adorno’s dialectic begins ‘to swing back against itself ’ as para-
doxically ‘the very rapture of spirit conjures its antithesis, a
blocked corporeal existence. To be outside the empirical world
is to leave it untouched, and thus to be physical image, naïve
illusion, is art’s way of belonging to the world’ (Armstrong
2000: 180). When the magic of the circus eventually disap-
pears from drama and it sheds its ‘art-alien layer’ (Adorno
1997: 81) then ‘apparition will be displaced by the dry, trans-
parent artwork which is essentially dead’ (cf. Armstrong 2000:
180), or, to coin Brook’s term for the same process – theatre
will have become deadly.
Adorno’s eventual summary of his position on the appari-
tional quality of art – ‘In each genuine artwork something
appears that does not exist’ (Adorno 1997: 82) – could be
extended to a quasi-Cavellian understanding of the ontology
of drama. Amidst the dissymmetry of performance, as Cavell
reminds us, in occupying the same time as the characters, we










































138 John J. Joughin
even though characters do not exist as things in the world do.
This means that while, in one sense, we cannot put ourselves
in the ‘presence’ of characters during performance (where we
are absent), in ‘another sense’, in acknowledging characters
specificity as particular individuals: ‘we are in, or can put
ourselves in, their present’ (see Cavell 1987, esp. 108, Cavell’s
emphasis). Here again although ‘we do not share the same
space’ in performance ‘we share the same time’ (cf. Hammer
2002: 90), the apparitional brings something into our world –
something that ‘does not exist’ and yet is simultaneously tied
to its situation and to history. We can’t know what the other
knows – in that sense making contact with the actors’ world
is impossible – but in another sense our relation to what takes
place on stage cannot be dismissed as a mere illusion.
For Cavell of course the obverse side of detached incredulity
and scepticism is the wrong type of credulity. And in his seminal
essay on Othello he reminds us of the yokel who on attend-
ing a performance of the play and in mistaking Othello
strangling Desdemona for the real thing, leaps onto the stage
and attempts to intervene (cf. Cavell 1976 and Hammer 2002:
89). Curiously of course, the link between these apparent
extremes is evoked by the mechanicals’ interlude that in drama-
tising the conditions of the theatre also reminds us that the
aloof aristocrats are already cast, by the mechanicals at least,
as credulous yokels who might fear the spectacle of a lion
roaring. For their part the aristocrats are in turn exposed to
the actual danger of confusing kindness with stupidity. In short
there is already both more and less to this scene than meets
the eye and we will need to return to it later.
Bottom’s experience of the visionary ‘hath no bottom’, which
is to say that it is itself without foundation or prior fixity and
yet as his pun on ‘no bottom’ infers it is also bottomless because
‘unfathomably profound’.4 But of course we must not lose touch
with common sense. For all that it is ‘out of body’ Bottom’s
name is itself a type of ‘open secret’ – a reminder that the
experience of the spiritual secretes the ‘promise of a blocked 
or denied sensuality’. Still, Bottom’s experience is no doubt of
a singular nature. He is touched. And I mean that not just in
the sense of the superlunary madness that pervades the play











































side of the moon) but also in the sense that in being touched
Bottom is also singled out and blessed. In an analogous fashion
one might say that drawing close to the artwork’s utopian/
messianic impulse implies another type of contact at a distance
– where what touches us (however common) necessarily remains
itself untouchable. If, like Bottom’s dream, theatre is cast as tout
autre, wholly other (or ‘in another sense’), then here too we are
suspended without support, and this encountered otherness
ensures that the viewing subject experiences an analogous sense
of ungrounding and disorientation – he/she hath no bottom.
Inevitably then, in performance, there is also always a
sharing of the secret without sharing it. In this respect, however
complex and tangled it becomes, the analogy between a secular
theatre and Bottom’s experience of an untranslatable mysterium
tremendum proves sustainable. Each seems to adhere to a logic
of a surplus economy (this is true of course, as Walter Benjamin
and others remind us, of translation per se) where the true
nature of the sharing or the communion in question remains
secret. In a sense then ‘nothing is untranslatable’ (there is always
more) but like Bottom’s ‘more’, the ‘more’ of performance
simultaneously remains ‘in another sense’, where everything is
untranslatable.5 Yet, in coming close, our share of the secret
simultaneously raises ethical and political issues concerning the
possibility of community and credulity, even credence. How
then does one actually apprehend more? More than cool reason
ever comprehends? What further ‘sense’ can be made, in other
words, of Bottom’s garbled memory of the Pauline text (1 Cor.
2:9), with its messianic expectation of a spirit that transfigures
sense? In seeking an answer and in lieu of spiritual discern-
ment it will be necessary to learn to discern spirits, where one
apprehends both more and less.
Learning to live with apparitions
I cannot close my eyes and hurl myself trustingly into the absurd,
for me it is impossible, but I do not praise myself on that
account. I am convinced that God is love; this thought has for
me a pristine lyrical validity. When it is present to me I am
unspeakably happy, when it is absent I yearn for it more
intensely than the lover for the beloved; but I do not have faith;
this courage I lack. God’s love is for me, both in a direct and










































140 John J. Joughin
not coward enough to whimper and moan on that account,
but neither am I underhand enough to deny that faith is some-
thing far higher.
(Kierkegaard 1985: 63)
It is requir’d/You do awake your faith.
(The Winter’s Tale, 5.3. 94–5)
A spirit that transfigures sense? Barely discernible? ‘Something
epiphenomenal’? In our apprehension of the visionary or the
secret, then as Derrida reminds us:
We tremble in that strange repetition that ties an irrefutable
past (a shock has been felt, a traumatism has already
affected us) to a future that cannot be anticipated; antici-
pated but unpredictable; apprehended, but, and this is why
there is a future, apprehended precisely as unforeseeable,
unpredictable; approached as unapproachable. Even if one
thinks one knows what is going to happen, the new instant
of that happening remains untouched, still unaccessible, in
fact unlivable. . . . Hence I tremble because I am still afraid
of what already makes me afraid, of what I can neither
see nor foresee. I tremble at what exceeds my seeing and
my knowing [mon voir et mon savoir] although it concerns the
innermost parts of me, right down to my soul, down to
the bone, as we say.
(Derrida 1995b: 54)
These untimely disorientating repetitions that transgress con-
ventions, approached in fear and trembling (‘you’ll think –/
Which I protest against – I am assisted/By wicked powers’ 
(The Winter’s Tale, 5.3.89–91)) are a feature (a family trait?) of
unlikely scenes of apparition. In the statue scene (5.3) at the
end of The Winter’s Tale (exactly an irrefutable past tied to a
future that cannot be anticipated), apprehension is seeing as,
where, even if one thinks one knows what is going to happen,
the ‘new instant of that happening remains untouched’. Instead,
something comes to be seen as something in a new way 
– something that ‘happens’ outside an a priori grid of expec-












































Apprehension, here and elsewhere (in being apprehended
as unforeseeable), is a type of blind – but then isn’t love, isn’t
faith, always touchingly so? What exceeds ‘my seeing and
knowing’ produces a longing to touch, or at least to seal (to
heal?), touching with a kiss, or even to caress the hand (that
organ of touch and healing) with a kiss:
Perdita Give me that hand of yours to kiss.
(5.3.46)
Leontes Let no man mock me,
For I will kiss her.
(5.3.79–80)
Eventually, by Paulina’s instruction, that which remains
untouched –
Paulina O patience!
The statue is but newly fix’d, the colour’s
Not dry.
(5.3.47–9)
Paulina Good my lord, forbear:
The ruddiness upon her lip is wet.
You’ll mar it if you kiss it, stain your own
With oily painting . . .
(5.3.80–83)
– is also, eventually, a re-joining, a leading by the hand:
Paulina Nay present your hand
When she was young, you woo’d her. Now, in age,
Is she beome the suitor?
Leontes O, she’s warm!
If this be magic, let it be art
Lawful as eating.
(5.3.107–11)
The extraordinary brings us back to the staple diet of the
everyday.
Touch then, but touch only as trait, the remarking of absence










































142 John J. Joughin
touch the players though they come ‘something near’ (5.3.23).
In the very instant or event of transfiguration, Leontes’ own
‘rare vision’ or translation, is bound to be untranslatable, his
kinaesthetic confusion wholly akin to rapture:
Paulina My lord’s almost so far transported that
He’ll think anon it lives
Leontes O sweet Paulina
Make me to think so twenty years together!
No settled senses of the world can match
The pleasure of that madness.
(5.3.68–72)
The tremor repeats itself precisely ‘in anticipation of what is to
come’ as ‘a preliminary and visible agitation’ (again cf. Derrida
1995b: 53–4):
Paulina I have thus far stirr’d you; but
I could afflict you farther.
Leontes Do, Paulina,
For this affliction has a taste as sweet.
As any cordial comfort. Still methinks
There is an air comes from her. What fine chisel
Could ever yet cut breath?
(5.3.74–9)
Barely holding breath (where the body inhales and expires) in
this air of apprehension, a theatre of wonder actually rests on
the appearance of the everyday and of what is already ‘being’
(strange but true). As if the vestige of another discourse is 
still hibernating (a winter’s tail?) within the ordinary. Another
metaphysics then, the very one we need ‘in order to cognize
and transform the one we routinely inhabit’.7 Our experience
of Shakespeare’s drollery of the statue is no less wonderful 
and commonplace than Autolycus’ ballads – the silly songs 
of spring to Paulina’s winter’s tale – ‘very true’ (4.4.257) yet
overheard and overseen in mocking aloofness (do not mock),
beyond reason, yet still more wonderful, for their all their 
‘silly palpability’ (Rose epigraph), palpable gross silliness, ‘the












































Autolycus My clown, who wants something to be a reasonable
Man, grew so in love with the wenches’ song, that he
would not stir his pettitoes till he had both time and
words, which so drew the rest of the herd to me that
all their other senses stuck in ears. You might have
pinched a placket, it was senseless . . .
(4.4.592–7; my emphasis)
———————————
Paulina It is requir’d
You do awake your faith. Then, all stand still . . .
Leon Proceed.
No foot shall stir.
(5.3.94–8; my emphasis)
In stillness and faith and growing in love, the mystery of music,
visibility and their hiddenness.
Yet the moment of reunion and revelation will always remain
a mixed blessing – what’s lost as well as found:
Third Gentleman . . . their joy waded in tears. There was 
casting up of eyes, holding up of hands, with 
countenance of such distraction that they were to be 
known by garment, not by favour. . . . But O, the 
noble combat that ’twixt joy and sorrow was 
fought in Paulina!
She had one eye declined for the loss of her
husband, another elevated that the Oracle was 
fulfilled . . .
(5.2.41–4; 66–9)
Cross-eyed Paulina finds herself positioned between the ‘trans-
lation’ of the secular and the sacred – (‘The poet’s eye, in a fine
frenzy rolling,/Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth
to heaven . . .?’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 5.1.12ff.)).
So then how is all this to be divined? In the discrepancy
between seeing and telling? For if by secondhand report ‘then
have you lost a sight, which was to be seen, cannot be spoken’










































144 John J. Joughin
lies in learning to live in the instant ‘it appears she lives,/Though
yet she speak not’ (5.3.118–19). Remaining  ‘unspeakably happy’
(Kierkegaard, above) the revelation of the secret resides in
‘tongue-tied simplicity’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 5.1.104); it
cannot be spoken or divined. In fact, in its unknowability Leontes’
‘conversion’ secretes an almost Abrahamic paradox of faith.8 In
Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard’s narrator Johannes de Silentio
reminds us of Abraham’s bewildering silence concerning the
sacrifice of his son Issac:
All along he [Abraham] had faith, he believed that God
would not demand Isaac of him, while still he was willing
to offer him if that was indeed what was demanded. He
believed on the strength of the absurd, for there could be
no question of human calculation, and it was indeed absurd
that God who demanded this of him should in the next
instant withdraw the demand. He climbed the mountain,
even in that moment when the knife gleamed he believed –
that God would not demand. Certainly he was surprised by
the outcome, but by means of a double movement he had
come back to his original position and therefore received
Isaac more joyfully than the first time. Let us go further. We
let Isaac be sacrificed. Abraham had faith. His faith was not
that he should be happy sometime in the hereafter but that
he should find blessed happiness here in this world. God
could give him a new Isaac, bring the sacrificial offer back
to life. He believed on the strength of the absurd, for all
human calculation had long since been suspended.
(Kierkegaard 1985: 65)
Eventually Leontes’ overcoming of self-imposed solitude and
perpetual mourning – ‘Once a day I’ll visit/The chapel where
they lie, and tears shed there/Shall be my recreation’
(3.2.236–8) – like Abraham’s sacrifice resides in undertaking the
movement from loss and resignation to a state of grace; so that
now, against all probability, he believes that, impossibly, God
gives back that which is simultaneously beyond reparation –
‘stol’n from the dead!’ (5.3.116). Learning to live with wonders
means moving beyond erotic disappointment and yearning, as,
in embracing the movement of faith, Leontes finally learns how











































Again in any conventional sense there is no sound basis for
knowledge here. Like Abraham, like Leontes, we are each led
like the blind, so that, as Derrida comments:
God sees in secret he knows. But it is as if he didn’t know
what Abraham was going to do, or decide, or decide to
do. He gives him back his son after assuring himself that
Abraham has trembled, renounced all hope . . .
(Derrida 1995b: 95)
In the interim there is only the voice of another – Paulina,
the intermediary who (like the converted Apostle Paul) has
herself embraced faith and now ‘speaks between’, so that, even
when she speaks of the non-narratable disclosure of apparition,
she understands that it is only in being apart that something
still comes something near:
I like your silence, it the more shows off
Your wonder. But yet speak; first you, my liege.
Comes it not something near?
(5. 3. 21–3)
Because it is a shared relation in which we unknowingly share,
there is always a sacrificial component in the absolute secret –
again, what touches us itself remains untouchable. In unpacking
our self-possession, theatre invites us to join (in our disposses-
sion) with the other. Coming close, the proximity of performance
takes care, often in not touching – ‘Good my lord, forbear./The
ruddiness upon her lip is wet./You’ll mar it if you kiss it . . .’ 
(5.3.80–2) – to remind us of the capacity for rejoining that
which was apart or sundered; if only in wishing and dreaming
(as Kierkegaard’s ‘Knight of Faith’ does in Fear and Trembling)
in unwitting naivety that things could be other than they are.
As such, faith is an interior relation beyond the comprehen-
sion of an exterior from which those who view it could never
know the truth (cf. Derrida 1995b: 63 and 108). It follows then
that Leontes too is seen without seeing, for in the economy of
the apparitional and in the revelation of the secret, there is,
as Derrida reminds us: ‘a dissymmetry of looks that cannot 
be exchanged’ (ibid.: 93).9 Under this gaze we can’t ‘know’ in
any conventional sense either what we see or that which is










































146 John J. Joughin
We are in the remove here of a God (albeit now a deus ex
machina) who sees more – always more than we do. One might
say that the theatre itself holds us in regard.
To see in secret
To see in secret – what can that mean?
(Derrida 1995b: 88)
I see a voice . . .
(A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 5.1.190)
For German Romanticism, Shakespeare’s translative combin-
ation of the visionary and the everyday quickly became a
metaphor for the singularity of the playwright’s aesthetic
achievement and his capacity for poetic invention, so that as
Schlegel observes:
In The Midsummer Night’s Dream [sic], there flows a luxuriant
vein of the boldest and most fantastical invention; the most
extraordinary combination of the most dissimilar ingredi-
ents seems to have been brought about without effort by
some ingenious and lucky accident, and the colours are 
of such clear transparency that we think the whole of the
variegated fabric may be blown away with a breath. The
fairy world here described resembles those elegant pieces
of arabesque, where little genii with butterfly wings rise,
half embodied, above the flower-cups.
(Schlegel 1846 cited in Bate 1997: 470)
Schlegel’s evocation of a twilight zone of diaphanous folds and
‘poetic enchantment’ is echoed elsewhere by Keats in several
of his poems including ‘Ode to Psyche’; evoking a world of
liminal states between waking and dreaming – one which offers
a non-saturable context for prospective vision, inspiration and
further translation: a bower of bliss where the poet presides as
Priest pleading pardon ‘that thy [Psyche’s] secrets should be
sung’ (Keats 1983). Keats, Schlegel and others hint at a rich
kinaesthetic experience that is always already reliant on a
material antecedent, a weave of the sensible (albeit one ‘blown











































Yet even for Romanticism, this sense of the Dream’s poetic
reverie still tends to occupy a delimited field of vision – where
that which is barely concealed will eventually be revealed. For
his part, Schlegel goes on to complain that ‘the droll wonder
of Bottom’s translation [as an ass] is merely the translation of
a metaphor in its literal sense’, while the mechanicals’ inter-
lude is another piece of knowing disenchantment, a barely
concealed spoof of Romeo and Juliet wherein:
Pyramus and Thisbe is not unmeaningly chosen as the
grotesque play within the play; it is exactly like the pathetic
part of the piece, a secret meeting of two lovers in the
forest, and their separation by an unfortunate accident,
and closes the whole with the most amusing parody.
(Schlegel 1846 cited in Bate 1997: 470–1)
In many ways of course amidst claims and counter-claims
for the apparitional, the mechanicals’ scene quickly situates a
crux of interpretation for the play and in a rather different
vein, having assimilated the non-illusionary theatre of Artaud,
Brecht and Beckett, many critics would now readily agree with
Schlegel’s sense of Shakespeare’s ‘not unmeaningful’ parody.
As such the play within a play is cast as an ‘acknowledgement
of the limitations of theatrical illusion’ which in turn only serves
to enhance Shakespeare’s powers as a playwright in differen-
tiating him ‘from inept attempts to leave nothing to be supplied
by the imagination’ (cf. Marshall 1982: 545); in other words,
as David Young puts it still more succinctly: ‘Where the
mechanicals fail at dramatic illusion . . . A Midsummer Night’s
Dream succeeds.’ (Young 1966: 105 also cited in Marshall 
1982: 545).
Yet of course these and other distinctions actually sell the
play’s apparitional potential short. The tendency to read the
mechanicals’ scene as a knowing form of unknowing, ungener-
ously misses the point of a visionary theatre where, as Bottom
himself puts it, we must first ‘look to our eyes’ (cf. 1.2.20) –
and which in some sense escapes the field of vision altogether,
insofar as it proceeds to undo the relation between seeing and
knowing.
There are, after all, as Derrida reminds us, ‘two ways’ in










































148 John J. Joughin
There is . . . an invisible of the order of the visible that 
I can keep in secret by keeping it out of sight. This invisible
can be artificially kept from sight while remaining within
what one can call exteriority (if I hide a nuclear arsenal
in underground silos in a cache, there is a visible surface
involved . . . whatever one conceals in this way becomes
invisible but remains within the order of visibility, it remains
constitutively visible. . . . But there is also absolute invisi-
bility, the absolute non-visible that falls to whatever falls
outside of the register of sight, namely, the sonorous, the
musical, the vocal or phonic (and hence the phonological
or discursive in the strict sense), but also the tactile and
odoriferous . . .
(Derrida 1995b: 90)
No doubt each of these two forms of invisibility inform the 
other, but it is the latter that prevails during the mechanicals’
scene – an implicit emphasis on listening, smelling and touch-
ing, accessible to senses other than sight, odoriferous and sweet:
‘O sweet’ (like incense?). Allowing for the absurd within the sens-
ible (listen(ing) to the moon, see(ing) a voice) the mechanicals
return us to the untranslatable synaesthesia of Bottom’s vision,
reminding us insistently of that which is lost from sight.
In fact the kinaesthetic confusion of the mechanicals’ scene
bears an uncanny resemblance to Peter Brook’s exercise for
actors as, in his striving for a ‘Holy Theatre’, the director experi-
ments with an interior beyond exterior relation. The aim, Brook
notes, was
to discover what was the very least he [the actor] needed:
was it a sound, a movement, a rhythm – and were these
interchangeable – or had each its special strengths and
limitations?. . . . We worked by imposing drastic condi-
tions. An actor must communicate an idea – the start must
always be a thought or a wish that he has to project – but
he has only, say, one finger, one tone of voice a cry, or
the capacity to whistle at his disposal.
(Brook 1990: 55–6)
At times Brook observes it was ‘like crossing an abyss on a











































(‘we took an event, a fragment of experience and made exercises
that turned them into forms that could be shared . . .’ (ibid.:
58)) the actors in Brook’s exercise are never allowed to touch,
no realistic contact can take place, instead: ‘the actor found that
to communicate his invisible meanings he needed concentra-
tion, he needed will; he needed to summon all his emotional
reserves; he needed courage; he needed clear thought’ (ibid.:
57). In communicating invisible meanings Brook ‘experiments’
with silence, or, as he puts it himself: ‘we set out to discover
the relations between silence and duration . . .’ (ibid.: 58).
A faith in the absurd, beyond knowledge in any conventional
sense, entails a touching without touching, sharing without
sharing, remaining responsive to the irreducible otherness of
the other, in an encounter with alterity, a ‘dis-figuring’ that
refuses categorisation and which foregoes philosophical know-
ing – if that ‘knowing’ is construed in the narrower sense of
mere objectification (see Levinas 1991, passim and cf. Bruns
1990, esp. 619–20). In an ethical sense that which joins us 
in singularity to the absolute singularity of the other is this
exposure to ‘another sense’. And howsoever immersed they are
in their parts actors themselves occupy an analogous ‘space of
risk or sacrifice’ remaining together and open to interchange-
ability only in their acceptance of being apart (cf. Derrida 
1995b, esp. 68). They discover that ‘to be an actor’ is as David
Marshall puts it:
[T]o double and divide oneself, both the part and not the
part. The mechanicals feel compelled to acknowledge this
on stage: “tell them that I Pyramus am not Pyramus” (III,
I, 19) says Bottom the weaver; and so Snout the tinker
declares himself Snout and a wall, and the lion insists that
he is the lion and Snug the joiner . . .
(Marshall 1982: 563)
Or, as Peter Quince puts it even more succinctly, ‘We are not
here’ (5.1.115). The uncanniness of the ordinary. . . .
Yet curiously of course it is precisely in not knowing who
they are, that within a loss of self-possession the mechanicals
also rediscover their capacity for ‘joining’,10 demonstrating an
‘infinite capacity for self-creation and response to [their] fellow










































150 John J. Joughin
they might truly be said to ‘learn by heart’. This comes close
to the ‘learning by heart’ of a craft or mystery (and this is the
actor’s craft too) where ‘beyond semantic . . . comprehension
one gives without knowing’, and where ‘to share a secret is not
to know or reveal the secret, it is to share we know not what,
a secret: nothing that can be determined’ (cf. Derrida 1995:
97, 80).11 In our experience of playing, both as audience and
players, we share this condition of being apart together (the
same way that ‘sharers’ in a theatrical company owe every bit
to every bit of the other?). Even as they enact a tale of erotic
loss and disappointment the mechanicals accept ‘the conditions
of being sundered and being joined’ – a ‘union in partition’
perhaps best exemplified by the roughcast wall (cf. Marshall
1982): ‘Through which the lovers, Pyramus and Thisbe,/Did
whisper often, very secretly . . .’ (5. 1. 158–9) and which itself,
in ‘being sensible’, also constitutes a literal embodiment of our
own remove.
No epilogue, I pray you
In Puck’s epilogue this play on ‘sundering and joining’ 
(cf. Marshall 1982) is finally recast around another invitation
to ‘join hands’, not by touching, but by accepting disenchant-
ment as a necessary accomplice to dreaming – pardoning 
the remove and re-joining (or ‘mending’), that which in another
sense must remain sundered (epilogue). Yet for his part, 
Bottom’s promise of an epilogue (or is it a lament?) in ‘the
latter end of a play’, Peter Quince’s ‘ballad’, is never fulfilled
(5.2.390ff); for in Bottom’s play there can be no end, only ‘true
beginning’ (5.1.111).
Likewise, in his own brief ‘Epilogue’ to Fear and Trembling
Kierkegaard’s narrator Johannes de Silentio ‘begins again’ by
reminding us that there can be no epilogue and that every
generation begins afresh in faith and love:
However much one generation learns from another, it can
never learn from its predecessor the genuinely human
factor. In this respect every generation begins afresh, has
no task other than that of any previous generation, and
comes no further, provided the latter hasn’t shirked its task











































passion, in which the one generation also fully understands
the other understands itself. Thus no generation has learned
from another how to love, no generation can begin other
than at the beginning, the task of no later generation is
shorter than its predecessor’s, and if someone, unlike the
previous generation, is unwilling to stay with love but wants
to go further, then this is simply idle and foolish talk.
(Kierkegaard 1985: 145)
There is no counting on ancestors, rather ‘faith must be started
over by each generation’ (cf. Derrida 1995b: 80). This senti-
ment of course is all too apparent at the end of The Winter’s
Tale and is also partly echoed in the last lines of Lear where in
the play’s epilogue, in ‘coming after’ another new generation
nevertheless has to learn for itself how to go on and begin again:
The weight of this sad time we must obey;
Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say.
The oldest hath borne most; we that are young
Shall never see so much, nor live so long.
Exeunt with a dead march.
(5.3.322–5)
Notably, in the closing lines of the play ‘feeling’ and ‘speaking’
rather than feeling and seeing, are cast in tantalising proximity.
And again this is a form of obligation, a ‘speaking’ that even-
tually comes from the heart. If, in the old regime, Goneril and
Regan ‘spoke dutifully what they ought to say’ (see Foakes 1997:
392; Foakes’ emphasis, and cf. Lear 1.1) now there is a duty
which exceeds mere public duty and lies beyond the empty
rhetoric that attended the official investment of power and
authority at the beginning of the play. As a new beginning this
outcome is discordant yet it also re-marks a recognition that
‘the obligations imposed by the dead are the obligations we
discover and renegotiate in life’12 – a form of ethical demand
that lives on in ordinary day-to-day commitments and continues
to inform our relations with others. A duty beyond duty – a
response in part exemplified earlier on in the play by what Rose
would call the ‘love-ability’ of Cordelia’s childish ‘learning by
heart’, which, despite its unhappiness, refused to heave its heart










































152 John J. Joughin
yet loving and dutiful silence – and in doing so kept its secret
(cf. Joughin 2002: 79–81).
In learning to let go of loss, Shakespearean comedy and
tragedy-comedy alike embraces the possibility of ‘reinventing
tradition’ and beginning again. All this happens without prece-
dent and without cause, only by improbable creation. In
learning the lesson of love there is no time left for lament or
mourning. As such, just as resignation is often the accomplice
of maturity, the passion of faith lies in embracing the task in
hand anew with childlike credulity, demonstrating a willing-
ness to overcome weariness, for, as Kierkegaard adds:
So long as the generation only worries about its task, which
is the highest it can attain to, it cannot grow weary. That
task is always enough for a human lifetime. When children
on holiday get through all their games by noon and then
ask impatiently, ‘Can’t anyone think of a new game?’, does
this show that they are more developed and advanced than
children of the same generation who could make the games
they already know last the whole day? Or does it not rather
show that those children lack what I would call the good-
natured seriousness that belongs to play?
(Kierkegaard 1985: 146)
The analogy to ‘play’ here evokes a precise form of cogni-
tive re-negotiation, in that, as Isobel Armstrong reminds us,
children’s play itself achieves a special inversion:
Play achieves an extraordinary reversal, a transformation
of the very structure of perception. When one thing begins
to stand for another (a stick for a horse) the thing becomes
a ‘pivot’ for severing the idea of a horse from the concrete
existence of the horse, [lantern, dog, and bush of thorn
presenteth Moonshine?] and the rule-bound game is deter-
mined by ideas, not by objects. Play liberates the child into
ideas, into an understanding of categories and their relation
to objects . . . play is liberating through its capacity to be
interactive: because the child can create an alienated
meaning within the constraints of a specific, concrete situ-












































Tied to actuality, in ways that cannot be reduced to the empir-
ical or verifiable, the experience of ‘play’ allows instead for the
creation of new possible worlds. In its interactivity it encour-
ages us to explore, to respect and to learn to live together,
exploring the boundaries of blissful boundless love. Open to
new perceptions, immersed in childlike, silly palpability . . .
In contrast, within our own loss-laden philosophical and polit-
ical maturity, the infinite movement of faith has never been
harder to accomplish. Or more wearisome. In no small part
of course, this is because (amid ‘state of the art’ surveillance)
politicians wilfully misconstrue the nature of the secret. The
original lack of faith that now finds Tony Blair conceding that
weapons of mass destruction (WOMD) may never be found 
in Iraq – ‘I do not know is the answer . . . I believe that we
will [find WOMD] but I agree there were many people who
thought we were going to find this [sic] in the course of the
actual operation’ – betrays a ‘wait and see’ policy that itself
remains constitutively visible, and finally, in the name of
‘justice’, can only ever claim its alibi in the form of an ‘open’
‘objective’ verification:
I can assure you I have no intention of hiding away from
this at all . . . On the contrary, I am enthusiastic about
being at long last able to debate these issues on the basis
of an objective, independent judgment by a judge, rather
than speculation.13
In failing to understand that acts of faith lie ‘beyond the
economy of the terrestrial visible or sensible’ Blair (who himself
professes Christianity) would ‘take possession of the secret’
(Derrida 1995b: 87, 98). But his disingenuous admission that
he no longer believes confirms a betrayal of faith that is both
ancient and modern. Whether or not Bush and Blair pray
together, their vision for the future congregates alongside all
the other mad monotheisms within the current crisis of faith.
As such it constitutes a dogmatic and totalising response to the
‘emergency’ – a crusading faith that stakes its claim for certainty
around ‘homeland security’. In the wake of these destructive
alliances with God, Derrida calls instead for general messianic










































154 John J. Joughin
warring parties’ and make ‘war on the other’ (see Caputo 1997a:
195) calling instead for a ‘nondogmatic doublet of dogma . . .
a thinking that “repeats” the possibility of religion without reli-
gion . . . at bottom [Derrida suggests] this list has no limit’.14
In its infinite capacity for constant renewal and absolute
beginnings, Shakespeare’s drama (which itself could not openly
speak of God) offers us an analogous taste of, and for, the
invention of the wholly other. As such, its open secret resides
in joining and sundering and learning to live together apart,
sharing (we know not what) in the sacramental relation of the
visible-invisible of apparitions. Partaking in the good-natured
seriousness that belongs to play. Resisting the maturity of gener-
ational conflict and embracing love-ability.
Enjoining us to begin again . . .
Notes
1 Constituting a notable exception to the rule, Kiernan Ryan, a fellow
contributor to this volume, urges us instead to embrace the future,
asking:
What if the changing meaning of the most valuable [Shake-
spearean] works is not held in the gravitational grip of the past
or the present, but is printed into their form and texture by the
pressure of futurity, by the secret contract with a dispensation
that might do justice to our dreams?
(Ryan 2002: 175–6)
2 See Derek Attridge (2004), The Singularity of Literature (passim) and cf.
esp. p. 151 where he cites Badiou 2001.
3 For the time being it is worth noting that in attempting to discrim-
inate between reality and illusion in these terms critics necessarily
remain complicit with a claim for universal validity that as Derrida
and others remind us ‘inspires philosophy and ethics in their most
powerful and coercive forms’. Bound as it is to a schema of identity
thinking empirical-idealist variants of lit-crit reinstall a request for
truth, where as Derrida comments ‘the manifest is given priority over
the hidden or secret’ and where ‘there are finally no secrets for phil-
osophy, ethics or politics’ (cf. Derrida 1995b: 63).
4 See Brooks 2001: cxvii. I owe this reference to Geza Kallay.
5 Again compare Derrida, this time on translation: ‘In a sense, nothing
is untranslatable; but in another sense, everything is untranslatable; trans-
lation is another name for the impossible’ (Derrida, 1998: 56–7).
6 For more on ‘seeing as’ and a discussion of the revelationary poten-











































7 Again, see Joughin 2000b and also compare Bernstein 1992: 9.
8 Did God originally impart a secret to Leontes? – we will never know.
9 Cf. Derrida 1995b: ‘It is dissymmetrical: this gaze that sees me without
my seeing it looking at me . . . a gaze that sees me without my seeing
it’ (91, 93).
10 As Marshall notes, the mechanicals are all concerned with ‘some
form or manner of joining. Carpenter, joiner, weaver, bellows
mender, tinker, tailor’ as such he adds ‘their occupations enact the
preoccupations of A Midsummer Night’s Dream. . . . All join together
what is apart or mend what has been rent, broken, or sundered’
(Marshall 1982: 562).
11 In speaking of the secret Derrida reminds us:
It is a matter of learning ‘by heart’ beyond any semantic compre-
hension. In fact God asks that one give without knowing, without
calculating, reckoning, or hoping, for one must give without
counting, and that is what takes it outside of sense.
(Derrida 1995b: 97)
12 I owe this formulation to Wendy Wheeler (1999: 78) though I should
note that both Wheeler and I are indebted in turn to Gillian Rose,
cf. esp. Rose 1996.
13 These soundbites from Blair are taken from The Guardian, 12 January
2004.
14 Derrida 1995b: 49 my emphasis, though I owe the translation and














































Before religious dread comes ‘daemonic dread’ with its queer
perversion, a sort of abortive offshoot, the ‘dread of ghosts’. It
first begins to stir in the feeling of ‘something uncanny’, ‘eerie’,
or ‘weird’. It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of
primeval man, forms the starting point for the entire religious
development in history.
(Otto 1958: 14)
Shakespeare’s Hamlet is a play about spirits. But how should
this be read – theologically, aesthetically, psychoanalytically?
This is a question that has preoccupied many thinkers from
Kierkegaard and Lacan to Girard and Derrida. In what follows
I propose to revisit some of the most significant philosophical
interpretations of Hamlet’s phantoms from a contemporary
perspective. I will begin with a brief presentation of Hamlet as
a play about a crisis of narrative memory, before then going on to
review how several theorists have sought to interrogate its role
as a drama of holy and unholy ghosts. I will look at four main
readings: (1) the psychoanalytic paradigm of phantom-as-










































(3) the deconstructive paradigm of phantom-as-erasure; and (4)
the theological paradigm of phantom-as-conscience.
Hamlet is a play that opens with a spectre enjoining the
protagonist to remember something that cannot be remem-
bered. From the opening scene we find ourselves embroiled in
a play about the terrible impossibility – yet inescapability – of
memory. ‘Remember me’, says the ghost of King Hamlet to
his son (1.5.91). Tell my tale and transmit my memory to future
generations so that my role in history – abruptly cut off – can
be restored. It is common in Shakespearean plays to find kings
bidding their children to inherit their secret story, blessing or
birthright. And was not young Hamlet born for this? To tell
his father’s story to the people of the Union: the Union of two
nations, Denmark and Norway, sealed with the pearl won by
his father in the famous duel with Fortinbras the Elder. (A duel
fought, as is later recalled by the gravedigger, the same day that
young Prince Hamlet entered this world.) Was not Prince
Hamlet born, then, to respond to the summons of his father’s
spirit – namely, to carry on his father’s history and avenge his
murder?
But there’s a rub. First, we cannot be sure who speaks when
the spectre speaks. There is a profound ambivalence about the
origin and character of the ghost. Hamlet’s friend Horatio says
‘tis but our fantasy’ (1.1.21). Or worse ‘a guilty thing’ (1.2.129).
At best a ‘spirit’ (1.2.135), one moment there, one moment
gone, there and not there, present and absent, the past-as-
present. And when the sepulchral phantasm finally talks, after
much equivocation, he claims he is a creature come, not back
from Heaven (as we would expect for such a noble father), but
from Hell or Purgatory: from ‘sulphrous and tormenting flames’
(1.5.3). He is indeed a ‘questionable shape’ (1.4.24). So, from
the very outset of the play, it would appear that religious ques-
tions of guilt, sin, repentance, redemption and the afterlife
deeply inform Hamlet’s dilemma.
But there’s another rub. If we can’t be sure who the ghost
is, neither can we be sure of what he is trying to say. He bids
his son, ‘remember!’ Yes. But what is he to remember? His father’s
glories as illustrious monarch, faithful to his people, spouse and
son? Or the exact hidden details of his untimely murder? No.
The irony is that the first thing father tells son is what he cannot











































I am thy father’s spirit,
Doomed for a certain term to walk the night,
And for the days confined to fast in fires
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
Are burnt and purged away. But that I am forbid
To tell the secrets of my prison house,
I could a tale unfold whose lightest word
Would harrow up thy soul . . .
(1.5.9–16)
In other words, the very secret that the father is bidding his
son to remember is a ‘tale’ that the father is actually forbidden to
tell! No wonder the young Prince is going to experience – like
most other characters in the play – a crisis of narrative memory.
But there are further problems. King Hamlet’s ghost
proceeds to command his son to prevent the ‘royal bed of
Denmark’ from being ‘a couch . . . of damned incest’ (1.5.82–3).
Here again the Prince is thrown into disarray, for his father’s
spirit immediately adds: ‘nor let thy soul contrive against thy
mother aught’ (1.5.85–6). In other words, Hamlet is confronted
with another contradictory injunction. First: Remember
me/remember me not. Second: intervene/don’t intervene. The
paralysis of narrative memory is thus doubled as a paralysis of
moral action.
In this light, the spectre’s opening injunction – ‘Remember
me!’ – can be reread as a double command: (1) to commem-
orate the ghost’s memory by honouring his summons to avenge;
and (2) to recall what ‘foul crimes’ the Ghost-King actually
committed in his own youth, if he could only recount them
(which alas he is ‘forbid’). This self-contradicting summons
represents what we might best describe as a tragedy of narrative
memory. Hamlet has a history to express, and to vindicate in
action, but cannot express it; and he cannot express it because
he is not permitted to remember it.
Hamlet, then, is a play (an enacted story) about the simulta-
neous necessity and impossibility of stories. And without stories,
there are no histories. For histories too are narrated memories.
Ophelia cannot tell her story until she goes mad (when she
tells everything but is no longer herself: ‘There’s rosemary,










































Spectres of Hamlet 159
story, even in the confessional, and so it has to be acted out
for him by the play-within-the-play. Gertrude cannot tell her
story because she is ignorant of it (she does not know that
Claudius killed the King). Polonius and his fellow courtiers –
Rosencrantz, Guildenstern, Osric – cannot tell their stories
either since they contrive only to serve others’ versions of events.
But most dramatically, of course, Prince Hamlet cannot tell his
story for as long as conscience makes a coward of him. Not,
that is, until dying of a fatal rapier wound he begs his friend
Horatio: ‘[a]bsent thee from felicity awhile . . . [t]o tell my
story’ (5.2.289–91). All of which means that this is a play where
no one actually tells their story, where no one truly remem-
bers. Until Prince Fortinbras arrives too late on the scene, and
announces: ‘I have some rights of memory in this kingdom/
Which now to claim my vantage doth invite me’ (5.2.333–4;
my emphasis).
What exactly these rights of ‘memory’ are, Shakespeare never
tells us. And if he could have told us the play would probably
not have survived the first act. In other words, the play is about
a cover-up, the concealment of a crime (but which? whose?
King Hamlet’s or Claudius’s?) that the hero is trying to uncover
– and ultimately recover from. And the way in which Hamlet
seeks to do this is by having his story told, even if it is after
his demise. Only thus, it seems, may the disjunction of time,
signalled by the anachronistic return of the Ghost, be finally
addressed. For the telling of the tale is an attempt to respond
to the time being ‘out of joint’ (2.1.189), to bring concordance
back, to synthesise the heterogeneous. But the matter is not
simple. The Ghost is not about to yield his secret easily. Hamlet
will have to pay a tragic price for the recovery of this deeply
buried ‘crime’.
In short, the task of remembrance, staged here by
Shakespeare, is deeply paradoxical. Indeed, were it less so one
wonders if Shakespeare would have succeeded in turning a
standard revenge play into a spiritual masterpiece. It’s true ‘the
play’s the thing/Wherein [we’ll] catch the conscience of the
king’ (2.2.581–2). But which king are we speaking of? King
Hamlet, King Claudius or King Fortinbras? Who is the rightful
king in this whole sorry history of poison and betrayal? Who
truly possesses the legitimate ‘rights of memory’? And who speaks











































with which the play opens and closes – not itself a crisis of legit-
imacy that in turn expresses itself as a crisis of identity: the famous
‘[t]o be, or not to be’ (3.1.58)? It is because there’s no quick
solution to these interlocking puzzles that Hamlet the play
survives to this day and Hamlet the prince is the most written
about person in Western culture after Jesus and Napoleon.
Psychoanalytic reading
Freud, as we know from his famous comment on the play in
the Interpretation of Dreams, reads these paradoxes as sympto-
matic betrayals of Hamlet’s Oedipus Complex. Memory is
playing tricks, he argues, because of Hamlet’s repressed desire
to destroy his father and possess his mother (Freud 1983: 365–8,
575–6). Certain followers of Freud go much further and deeper
than their mentor, however, in describing Hamlet’s double
injunctions as deep symptoms of loss and melancholy. But all
agree that the ghosts of Hamlet have less to do with a theology
of spirit than with a psychology of trauma.
Jacques Lacan, for example, declares that Hamlet is, from
first to last, a play about mourning.1 And he relates this in turn
to the fact that the play should be read, at an ontological level,
as a ‘tragedy of desire’ – expressing the protagonist’s excessive
sense of his ‘lack of being’ (manque-à-être). Although Lacan does
not focus explicitly on the crisis of narrative provoked by the
breakdown of the father–son relation, with its attendant crises
of identity and legitimation, he does offer some fascinating
observations on the play’s obsession with doubles, ghosts and
the un-mourned dead.
Lacan writes, ‘I know of no commentator who has ever
taken the trouble to make this remark, however hard it is to
overlook once it has been formulated: from one end of Hamlet
to the other, all anyone talks about is mourning’ (Lacan 1982:
38–9). He cites as prime evidence (1) Hamlet’s return to find
his father already buried without proper funeral rites; and (2)
Gertrude’s remark that the cause of Hamlet’s ‘distemper’ is
‘[h]is father’s death and our o’erhasty marriage’ (2.2.55, 7).
The entire play, on this reading, revolves around the ‘rela-
tionship of the drama of desire to mourning’. The recurrence
of the Ghost is attributed to the insufficiency of mourning










































Spectres of Hamlet 161
in the castle thereby preventing a proper funeral rite). And this
explains, furthermore, the intimate link between ‘the lack, skip-
ping or refusal of something in the satisfaction of the dead’
and ‘the appearance of ghosts and spectres in the gap left by
the omission of the significant rite’ (Lacan 1982: 39). This insuf-
ficiency of mourning is exacerbated by the fact that for Hamlet,
as for Oedipus – the two dramatic heroes who captivate the
imagination of psychoanalysis – there is an uncanny secret
behind the crisis of mourning.
Lacan, and several of his followers, interpret the play accord-
ingly as a process of successive detachments from fetish-objects
of lure and illusion: what Lacan calls the ‘little a objects’ (objets
petit a) that stand in for the missing phallus. This process even-
tually leads to the moment of truth when Hamlet confronts
the ‘real’ by meeting his own death – the ultimate act of detach-
ment – and so finally succeeds in mourning. It is only with the
decline of the Oedipus Complex, argues Lacan, that the phallus
(as stand-in for the original lost object) can be mourned. In
other words, it is only when ‘Hamlet’s hour’ finally comes at
the moment of death, that he can act and accept the ‘hole in
being’ – the uncanny abyss of the Real anticipated by the
empty grave of Act 4. Until then, Hamlet is unable to act, a
paralysis most evident in his incapacity to avenge his father by
striking at the phallic substitute, Claudius. ‘It’s a question of
the phallus’, says Lacan, ‘and that’s why he (Hamlet) will never
be able to strike it, until the moment when he has made the
complete sacrifice . . . of all narcissistic attachments, i.e., when
he is mortally wounded and knows it’ (ibid.: 51). In this light,
Lacan construes the entire drama as a critique of the power
of the phallus – and its passage towards ‘symbolic castration’
via a progressive disillusionment with the various objets petit a
supplements. In other words, the play interrogates the phallic
compulsion to draw agents into imaginary identifications 
with the phallic to the point of psychotic splitting and doubling
– a point epitomised by the upsurge of spectral visitations and
voices.
Prince Hamlet’s arduous journey through the ‘guts of a
beggar’ (4.3.31) is interpreted thus as a progressive disenchant-
ment with the claims of the illusory fetish-phallus: (1) the Ghost’s
appeal to a fallacious paternal authority and vengeance; (2)











































(reinforced by the erotic desire of Gertrude); (3) Ophelia’s incar-
nation of phallic substitution; (4) Laertes’ rival phallic passion
that represents the ‘desire of the other’ and sets the phallic
signifier in motion.
Only when Hamlet finally undergoes symbolic castration in
the hour of death, liberated at last from the desire of the other
and its endless fetishistic signifiers, can Hamlet become his own
subject and accept the ‘real’: namely, the truth that the phallus
is ‘nothing’ and that the ‘readiness [to accept this] is all’
(5.2.100). Hamlet may well be a melancholic neurotic for most
of the play; but when he dies, he dies ‘cured’. It is then he
realises that the phallus does not exist – or, in Hamlet’s own
words, that ‘the King is a thing – . . . of nothing’ (4.3.26–8).
In short, it is only when Hamlet faces the true strangeness of
death, and sees through the paralysing estrangement of the
Ghost (his father’s returned double), that he is freed from illu-
sory attachments to the phallus, qua spectral phantom, and
from the mimetic cycles that hold him in thrall. But, sadly,
Hamlet only comes into his own desire posthumously, when it
is too late. His desire dawns in the moment of dying, which
is why his desire is tragic.
In an essay entitled the ‘The Phantom of Hamlet’, Nicolas
Abraham takes this psychoanalytic line of argument in a some-
what different direction when he claims that what haunts
Hamlet is an ‘unspeakable’ event that has been buried and
entombed. Abraham reads the whole crisis of narrative memory
as a symptom of the gap left in Hamlet by the untold secrets
of those who came before him. What the ‘phantom’ objectifies
is the cavity carved within the unconscious ‘by the concealment
of some part of a love object’s life’ (Abraham 1988a: 171).
Abraham advances the following bold hypothesis:
The appearance of the Father’s ghost at the start of the play
objectifies the son’s awareness-unawareness. Awareness-
unawareness of what? Of his own uneasiness due to a cir-
cumstance not to be doubted: the late King must have taken
a secret with him to the grave. Does the ghost appear in
order to lift the state of unawareness? If that were the case,
the ghost’s objectification would have no more object than










































Spectres of Hamlet 163
to haunt with the intent of lying: its would-be ‘revelations’
are false by nature.
(Abraham 1988b: 188)
Abraham concludes that what audiences and critics have gener-
ally ignored for over four centuries is that the so-called ‘secret’
revealed by the ghost – that he has been murdered and so
must be avenged – is itself but a subterfuge for another more
secret secret: ‘this one genuine and truthful, but resulting from
an infamy which the father, unbenown to his son, has on his
conscience’ (ibid.: 189). Read in this manner, Hamlet provokes
the phantom effect of a repressed generational secret encrypted
in the ‘spirit’ of Hamlet’s father. The Ghost is a symptom of
blocked memory. A phantasmatic past repeating itself as present
through its absence. In sum, a phantom.
Abraham argues that the aim of Shakespeare’s play ‘is to
cancel the secret buried in the unconscious and to display it
in its initial openness’ (ibid.: 189). But how can such a secret
be exposed given that the shame and guilt attached to it persist?
Their exorcism, suggests Abraham, leads not to the punish-
ment, real or imagined, of the other, but rather to a ‘higher
wisdom about oneself and the world of humans at large’ (ibid.).
But to exorcise the phantom, to lay the ghost, is to ‘reduce the
sin attached to someone else’s secret and state it in acceptable
terms so as to defy, circumvent, or domesticate the phantom’s
(and our) resistances, its (and our) refusals, gaining acceptance
for a higher degree of “truth”’ (ibid.).
Abraham proceeds, accordingly and rather brazenly, to write
a fictional sixth act to the play in which Hamlet and Fortinbras
become reconciled. In this supplementary act, the two enemy
sons acknowledge their respective fathers’ secrets and ‘restore
to Poland the kingdom which their fathers had stolen from it
. . . even returning the usurped Pole, Polonius, to his native
Poland for proper burial!’ (ibid.).
A related psychoanalytic perspective on spectral represen-
tation in Hamlet is offered by André Green in his pioneering
book, Hamlet et Hamlet (1982), where he claims that the whole
play is a theatrical uncovering of the buried, covered-up
memory of murder. For Green, it is precisely the play as form
(rather than content) that functions as disclosure. Theatrical repre-











































with dramatic fantasy, an operation of proto-psychoanalytic
‘showing’ of the unshowable primal scene. And this, in turn,
serves a therapeutic-cathartic role for audiences. This of course
gives extra weight to Hamlet’s throwaway line after his staging
of the play-within-the-play – ‘The play’s the thing/Wherein
I’ll catch the conscience of the king’. In sum, Green’s basic
hypothesis is that Shakespeare’s drama actually succeeds in
staging the unconscious and enables us to show/say what
cannot otherwise by shown/said at a purely conscious, and
therefore censored, level.2
What Lacan’s reading fails to sufficiently appreciate, it seems,
is that Hamlet’s tragedy also comprises narrative catharsis. 
If the phantom has the first word, it does not have the last.
The spirit as haunting spectre is finally overcome by another
kind of spirit, the spirit of surrender to a ‘divinity that shapes 
our ends/Rough-hew them how we will’ (5.2.10–11). In the
terminal scene, after all, Denmark is saved from its ‘rotten-
ness’, and the memory of Hamlet’s successful (if tragic)
overcoming of phantoms lives on, thanks to the testimony of
Horatio who absents himself from felicity to tell his story. And
thanks also, we should not forget, to Hamlet’s supposed rival,
Fortinbras-the-son, who, himself ultimately liberated from the
cycle of mimetic desire and revenge, ensures that Hamlet-the-
son has the proper mourning and burial that Hamlet the father
never received.
It appears that Shakespeare is aware of a healing power that
escapes Lacan and his apocalyptic apostles of ‘nothing’: namely,
the power of narrative memory and imagination. Hamlet, I would
argue, can teach contemporary culture – crippled as it is with
phantasmatic crises of desire, identification and legitimation –
that spirits can be holy or unholy, allies or adversaries, and that
some sons can truthfully acknowledge the secrets of their fathers.
In sum, that certain stories heal. When one considers the vast
number of contemporary tales – literary, cybernetic and cine-
matic – dealing with the collapse of the father–son relation
(Ulysses, Magnolia, American Beauty, Star Wars etc.), one appreci-
ates that if the Hamlet narrative is indeed perennial it is especially
pertinent to our postmodern predicament of paralysis, simula-
tion and psychosis. Wherever the logic of doubling rules,
phantoms proliferate; and where phantoms proliferate, the story
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Existential reading: Kierkegaard
While psychoanalytic readings construe the paradoxical injunc-
tions of the ‘spirit/spectre’ in terms of repressed memory or
blocked desire, Søren Kierkegaard signals a more existential
and dialectical interpretation. In an appendix to Stages on 
Life’s Way, entitled ‘A Side-Glance at Shakespeare’s Hamlet’,
Kierkegaard raises the question of Hamlet as a religious play.
The pseudonymous narrator, Father Taciturnus, confesses that
he is ‘engrossed’ by the claim that ‘Hamlet is a Christian drama’
(Kierkegaard 1988: 453).3 This claim is attributed to a certain
Borne who shares the determination, in common with two of
his contemporaries, Heine and Feuerbach, to have nothing to
do with the ‘religious’. But precisely because of this, says
Taciturnus, such thinkers can often offer us a unique insight
into the religious. Just as a jealous lover can know as much
about the erotic as a happy one, so those offended by the reli-
gious can be just as insightful about it as believers. And in an
age where great believers are few and far between, we should
be grateful that we have at least ‘a few really clever people
who are offended (by religion)’ (ibid.: 452).
After this mischievous preparatory remark, the author comes
to his main statement on the matter: ‘Borne says of Hamlet: “It
is a Christian drama”. To my mind this is a most excellent
comment. I substitute only the word a “religious” drama, and
then declare its fault to be not that it is that but that it did not
become that or, rather, that it ought not to be drama at all’
(ibid.). Once unpacked, this dense formulation seems to be
saying that Hamlet should be really considered a failed religious
drama. Or to be more precise, Hamlet is a work that should have
been properly religious, and therefore not an aesthetic drama
at all. Or else, it should have been properly aesthetic and there-
fore not a religious work at all. The fact is, however, that it is
neither. It falls between the religious and aesthetic stools and
so, as T.S. Eliot would famously pronounce a half century later,
Hamlet is a dramatic failure (Eliot 1951). This is not, of course, to
deny that it is the most fascinating drama ever written. Hamlet,
as both Kierkegaard and Eliot were aware, is the literary char-
acter who most fascinates modern minds.
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym spells out his evaluation of Hamlet











































Prince Hamlet of religious presuppositions and doubts that
conspire against him and prevent him from acting, then he is
merely a ‘vacillator’ in a comedy. In other words, if Hamlet
is not paralysed with genuinely religious visions and moral-
spiritual misgivings there is no good reason for him not to
proceed with the summons to avenge his father’s murder and
restore Denmark to its former state. But Kierkegaard does not
think that Shakespeare does make Hamlet religious in this
manner. And the play fails to be the great religious drama it
could have been.
So how should Shakespeare have written this play according
to the author of the ‘Side-glance’? Well, first, Hamlet’s grand-
iose plan to become the avenger to whom vengeance belongs
should have been confronted from the start with the religious
prohibition on revenge killing. But since one does not see
Hamlet sink religiously under his revenge plan, his conscience
stricken by biblical prohibitions, one expects quick action as
in a normal revenge tragedy where one deals only with
‘external’ obstacles. Alas, however, in the case of Hamlet there
seem to be neither internal subjective religious doubts nor
external objective obstacles to action – yet Hamlet fails to act.
And as a result the whole vacillating, procrastinating drama
becomes one huge introspective psychodrama where Hamlet’s
misgivings take on a purely psychological form of ‘dialectical
repentance’ – a non-religious and ultimately unfounded repen-
tance that, in Taciturnus’ reckoning, ‘comes too early’. As a
result, Hamlet comes across as simply ‘morbidly reflective’. In
short, for Kierkegaard, Hamlet is not a genuinely religious
drama because the genuine act of ‘repentance’ is lacking.
Returning to the guiding idea of a Revenge Plan that Hamlet
sets himself but fails to realise, Taciturnus argues as follows:
If the plan remains fixed, then Hamlet is a kind of loiterer
who does not know how to act; if the plan does not remain
fixed, he is a kind of self-torturer who torments himself for
and with wanting to be something great. Neither of these
involves the tragic.
(Kierkegaard 1988: 453)
In short, without the presence of the religious, Hamlet simply
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purpose; or (2) a reflective melancholic with no real purpose
at all who analyses himself to death in the name of some empty
(i.e. areligious, amoral) imago. Taciturnus then goes on to
repeat his argument, for a second time, that Hamlet is neither
properly aesthetic nor properly religious. (Anticipations of Derrida’s
concepts of ‘aporia’ and ‘undecidability’ perhaps?)
If Hamlet is kept in purely esthetic categories, then what
one wants to see is that he has the demonic power to carry
out such a resolution. His misgivings have no interest what-
soever; his procrastination and temporizing, his postponing
and his self-deluding enjoyment in the renewed intention
at the same time as there is no outside hindrance merely
diminish him, so that he does not become an esthetic hero,
and then he becomes a nonentity.
(ibid.)
On the other hand, says the author, ‘if he is religiously
oriented, his misgivings are extremely interesting, because they
give assurance that he is a religious hero’. But this, were it the
case, would not lead to good drama either because it would
belong to the order of the ‘interior being’ where alone such
religious misgivings could have their ‘essential significance’
(ibid.: 454). In sum, trying to make a good drama out of the
religious struggles of subjective inwardness is like trying to make
a silk purse from a sow’s ear. It simply cannot be done. If it
could be done, Kierkegaard seems to be saying (via his pseu-
donym) that he, SK, might well have tried his hand at religious
drama himself ! But religious drama is, according to the above
logic, a contradiction in terms – at least for our modern age
of Reformed Christianity where the religious gravitates inwards
toward subjective solitude and away from external action.
Father Taciturnus contrasts this to Medieval Catholicism where
a zealous believer could become a tragic hero for the sake of
the Church. In other words, for pre-modern Roman Catholics
the idea of being a militant actor on behalf of a religious
messianic politics – i.e. a saintly agitator, crusader, missionary
or martyr – was still a possibility. Were Shakespeare a religious
author in the Medieval Catholic Church, attuned to Aristotelian











































a genuinely religious-aesthetic drama. But he was not; and, for
Kierkegaard, those days are gone.
Yet Taciturnus has not totally given up. In the same ‘Side-
Glance’ appendix, he tries a third tack. What, he asks, if
Shakespeare had allowed Hamlet to carry out his plan of action
– in keeping with the dramatic demands of the aesthetic model
– and then, having murdered Claudius (and perhaps Gertrude
too), realised his sin and collapsed back into an attitude of
genuine religious repentance after the event? First the evil
action, then the good reaction. First the aesthetic (imitation of
an action), then the religious (pardon and peace). It could thus
be argued that Hamlet exposes the folly of mimetic desire and
sacrificial revenge in favour of a true Christian revelation: No
to revenge, yes to providence! This is how Kierkegaard has his
pseudonym, Taciturnus, tease out his final, yet still self-defeating
attempt to save Hamlet as religious drama:
If Hamlet is to be interpreted religiously, one must either
allow him to have conceived the plan, and then the reli-
gious doubts divest him of it, or do what to my mind 
better illuminates the religious (for in the first case there
could possibly be some doubt as to whether he was capable
of carrying out his plan) – and give him the demonic 
power resolutely and masterfully to carry out his plan 
and then let him collapse into himself and into the reli-
gious until he finds peace there. A drama, of course, can 
never come from this; a poet cannot use this subject, 
which should begin with the last and let the first shine out 
through it.
(ibid.: 454)
Thus this third scenario is also impossible, for no matter
how subtly and dialectically one might try to manage such a
move, it would ultimately make for a moralising-sermonising
tract where the aesthetic action of revenge is used merely to
make a religious point. In that instance, the drama would be
no more than a means towards an end, a pretext for a pre-
established doctrine, the moral of the story having been set
from the start – rendering the action of the drama entirely
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would be as religious propaganda. And this prospect is unpalat-
able for Kierkegaard.
So it would seem that, for Kierkegaard, Hamlet is neither
a religious activist nor an aesthetic (tragic) actor but something
in between. Neither fish nor fowl. A hybrid creature. In short
an aesthetic-religious mess. Perhaps not unlike Kierkegaard
himself.
In the piece immediately following the ‘Side-Glance’, Taci-
turnus makes a supplementary and useful distinction between
the two kinds of hero. By way of trying to get a final fix (if
that were possible) on what Kierkegaard is really getting at, 
I think it might be worthwhile bearing with Taciturnus on 
this ostensibly laboured point. So let’s take one last spin of the
dialectical wheel. The tragic-aesthetic hero is, we are now told,
great by suffering in such a way that he conquers in the external
– which is what ‘uplifts the spectator while he weeps for the
dying one’ (ibid.: 455). As such the suffering of the tragic 
hero ‘must arouse fear and cleanse the passions’, provoking the
spectator’s sympathies, which differ within the various views 
of the world (ibid.: 454, 636). No surprises here, standard
Aristotelian poetics. Now, by contrast, the religious hero is great
by suffering without conquering in the external, and therefore
without inviting the spectator to be purified (as Aristotle put
it) through pity and fear. The religious hero, in other words,
is someone ‘emancipated from externals’ and from the tragic
world of actions and passions. But precisely because of this, 
he is uniquely capable of that ‘qualitative qualification that is
reserved for the religious, where a farthing is worth just as
much as kingdoms and countries’ (ibid.: 455). One thinks 
here not only of the Gospel allusions to the widow and her
farthing or the kingdom of heaven as a mustard seed, but also
of the passages in Hamlet itself where the hero observes how
important it is ‘to find quarrel in a straw’ (4.4.9.45), or to
realise ‘when our deep plots do pall(fail)’ that ‘there’s a divinity
that shapes our ends,/Rough-hew them how we will’ (5.2.9–11).
But, Kierkegaard insists, Hamlet does not ultimately pass
muster when it comes to the religious category. Why? Because
as we learn from a journal entry of 1844 (deleted from the
‘Side-Glance’ appendix to Stages on Life’s Way): ‘The mistake in











































doubts. If he does not have them, then it is sheer nonsense
and indecision if he does not settle the matter straight away’
(Kierkegaard 1967: journal entry 1561).
Since (according to Kierkegaard) Hamlet does not have reli-
gious doubts, he does not qualify as a religious hero; and
because he does not settle the matter straight away in a dramatic
act, he does not qualify as a tragic hero. So what, we might
ask at this point, is Hamlet to Kierkegaard that he should weep
for him? Apart from the fact that both are morbidly reflective
Danes – enough perhaps in itself to justify the connection –
there would seem to be other, less avowed, reasons.
First, it would seem obvious that Kierkegaard himself had
keen concerns during the writing of Stages on Life’s Way in
1844–5 about his own vocation as a religious individual. Indeed,
his view of himself is probably not much different from that
of Hamlet: namely, that he is (1) too interior, subjective, shut-
up and inactive to be properly tragic, provoking sympathy and
fear in his readers; and (2) too full of morbid reflection ever
to be able to make a proper leap of faith! In short, Kierkegaard
sees in his compatriot Hamlet a symptomatic embodiment of
the in-between condition he once confessed to – namely, being
too religious to fit into the aesthetic category of Climacus 
but not religious enough to meet the religious category of 
Anti-Climacus (Kierkegaard 1967: journal entries 6431, 6433).
Second, Kierkegaard appears to identify with Goethe’s
remark about Hamlet that in ‘relation to his body his soul was
an acorn planted in a flower pot which at last breaks the
container’ (quoted in Kierkegaard 1959: 209). The Dane of
Copenhagen seems to have shared with the Dane of Elsinore
a deep sense not only of being ill-fitted for his task in life, inca-
pable of heroic action or passionate love, but also of being
shackled with a summons to amend a wrong that cannot be
atoned for. (I am thinking here of Kierkegaard’s father’s cursing
of God and misbehaviour with his maid; and of Hamlet’s
father’s ‘foul deed done in his days of nature’ and his mother’s
incestuous relations with Claudius.) Indeed, Kierkegaard must
have been fascinated by the way in which Hamlet is caught
in the paralysing bind of his father’s double injunction:
remember me/I cannot tell you what to remember.
It could be said that this is not entirely dissimilar to Kierke-
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his famous Easter conversion experience of 1848: he initially
believed he had received a direct summons from God to 
‘speak out’ – only to revert subsequently to the aesthetic and
pseudonymous ploys of ‘indirect communication’ once again.
Reflecting upon the event afterwards, Kierkegaard was horri-
fied by his own demonic hubris at supposing himself 
to be a chosen martyr of God – like the medieval hero-martyrs
he considers so anachronistic in ‘Side-Glance’. This critical
reflection was later to be corroborated by his disapproval 
of the self-proclamation of Pastor Adler as chosen advocate of
divine mission, recorded at length in the pages of Kierkegaard’s
Authority and Revelation (1848). Kierkegaard’s ultimate sentiment
seems to have been that of the spectator of tragic aberration:
‘there but for the grace of God go I . . .’
The fact, moreover, that for both Kierkegaard and Hamlet
the legacies of their heavenly father and their ghostly father 
were at times so diabolically intermixed, made their lan-
guage, and their lives, a process of inevitable and ineluctable
vacillation.
Third, and finally, it is almost certain that Kierkegaard saw
in Hamlet’s relationship to Ophelia a mirror-image of his 
own relationship to Regina Olsen. The vehemence of Kierke-
gaard’s criticism of Hamlet in this regard – as failing to live
up to his ‘secret’ religious mission by distracting himself with
Ophelia and loving her almost by default – surely betrays a
veiled criticism of his own behaviour. The analogy between
Kierkegaard–Regina and Hamlet–Ophelia is not explicitly
mentioned in Stages on Life’s Way but it surfaces in the following
entry to his journal. Let us read the passage deliberately in
light of our above hypothesis:
Hamlet and Ophelia. Hamlet cannot be regarded as really
being in love with Ophelia. It must not be interpreted in
this way, even though psychologically it is quite true that
a person who is going about hatching a great plan is the
very one who needs momentary relaxation and therefore
can well use a love affair. Yet I do not believe that Hamlet
is to be interpreted this way. No, what is indefensible in
Hamlet is that, intriguing in grand style as he is, he uses
a relationship to Ophelia to take the attention away from











































This is how it should be interpreted, and one can also add
that precisely because he is so overstrained he almost goes
so far that momentarily he actually is in love.
(Kierkegaard 1967: journal entry 
1562 entitled ‘Hamlet’)
And yet in spite of all, and especially in spite of Kierkegaard’s
complaint about how ‘incredible’ he finds it that ‘Goethe has
taken such great pains to uphold Hamlet’ (Kierkegaard 1988:
635), Kierkegaard himself feels compelled to conclude with this
admission:
On a specific point, one may have a doubt . . . and yet
agree on the one opinion that has been the opinion of one
and two and three centuries – that Shakespeare stands
unrivalled, despite the progress the world will make, that
one can always learn from him, and the more one reads
him, the more one learns.
(ibid.: 454)
That this final admission is ostensibly inconsistent with all the
criticisms of Hamlet that precede it, is typical of a point of view
so deeply contradictory that it begins to look like a decon-
structive aporia.
Deconstructive reading
No analysis of philosophical readings of Hamlet’s ghosts should
ignore Derrida’s allusions to this theme in Spectres of Marx. For
Hamlet, the spectre in question was his own father. For Derrida,
it is the less personal surrogate father figure of Marx (as well
as Shakespeare himself ). In spite of this obvious difference, the
logic of posthumous influence is, Derrida suggests, similar in
both cases. It is, as he says in the Exordium, the ‘non-contem-
poraneity with itself of the living present’ (Derrida 1994: xix).
One is prompted, in the light of our analysis of Kierkegaard’s
‘Side-Glance’, to think here of what the latter had to say about
the out-of-kilter temporality of Shakespeare’s failed attempt at
a religious drama (where the end informs the beginning); or
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But before teasing out such matters, let’s see what Derrida
himself has to say about this spectral temporality – or what he
calls ‘spectropoetics’. The context is that of trying to do justice
to those who are no longer – or not yet – part of the ‘living
present’; and the passage in question culminates, tellingly for
our purposes, with a reflection on Hamlet: ‘To be just: beyond
the living present in general – and beyond its simple negative
reversal. A spectral moment, a moment that no longer belongs
to time, if one understands by this word the linking of modalised
presents (past, present, actual present: “now”, future present).
We are questioning in this instant, we are asking ourselves
about this instant that is not docile to time, at least to what
we call time. Furtive and untimely, the apparition of the 
spectre does not belong to that time, it does not give time, not
that one: “Enter the ghost, exit the ghost, re-enter the ghost”
(Hamlet )’ (Derrida 1994: xx).
Derrida’s first chapter, entitled ‘Injunctions of Marx’, opens
with an explicit citation from Act I, scene V of Hamlet. The
passage in question concerns the episode where Hamlet and
his companions are sworn to silence by the Ghost; yet we know,
since it is the opening act of the play, that the matter will not
rest there. Though Hamlet does indeed admonish his guards,
‘And still your fingers on your lips, I pray’ (2.1.188), he goes
on immediately to state his deep unease at the fact that while
he is not responsible for what has occurred, he is obliged
nonetheless to ‘set it right’. The voice from the past is sum-
moning him to his future. ‘The time is out of joint: Oh cursed
spite,/That ever I was born to set it right’ (2.1.189–91). Derrida
then proceeds to invoke the opening reference to another ghost,
this time in Marx’s Communist Manifesto – ‘A spectre is haunting
Europe – the spectre of communism’. He suggests the following
analogy between the two kinds of ghost:
As in Hamlet, the Prince of a rotten State, everything
begins by the apparition of a spectre. More precisely by
the waiting for this apparition. The anticipation is at once
impatient, anxious, and fascinated: this, the thing (‘this
thing’) will end up coming. The revenant is going to 
come. It won’t be long. But how long it is taking. Still











































reapparition, but a reapparition of the specter as appari-
tion for the first time in the play.
(Derrida 1994: 4)
Derrida does not hesitate to suggest that ‘in the shadow of
a filial memory, Shakespeare will have often inspired Marxian
theatricalization’ (ibid.: 5). A strange use of the future anterior
tense here! Or as he puts it, invoking Valéry’s famous text on
the ‘European Hamlet’, ‘Shakespeare qui genuit Marx . . . (and
a few others)’ (ibid.). (We are inclined to include Kierkegaard
and Derrida himself, of course, among these other few, but
more of that anon.) What the spectre represents for Hamlet,
as later for Marx and others, is a ‘Thing that is not a thing’.
Or as Derrida says: ‘One does not know what it is’ (ibid.: 6).
One does not know if it corresponds to a name or an essence
or any specific identity; and yet this invisible thing looks at us
even though we cannot look at it. ‘The Thing meanwhile looks
at us and sees us not see it even when it is there. A spectral
asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-synchronizes,
it recalls us to anachrony’ (ibid.: 6–7). Derrida calls this the
‘visor effect’, namely, the impression that ‘we do not see who
looks at us’. Or more specifically in the case of Hamlet’s father,
‘Even though in his ghost the King looks like himself (‘As thou
art to thy selfe’, says Horatio), that does not prevent him from
looking without being seen: his apparition makes him appear
still invisible beneath his armor’ (ibid.). Derrida claims that this
definition of the visor effect will be presupposed by everything
he, Derrida, has to say on the subject of the spectre in general.
And as will become more obvious later in the book, what is
at issue is not just Marx and Marxism but the whole ‘spec-
tropoetics’ of messianicity in general. This is the very religious
structure of existence as what Derrida calls ‘religion without
religion’, which, broadly speaking, is the form of religion
without any predetermined, dogmatic content: an openness to
whatever is beyond.
Now replace the spectres of Hamlet or Marx with the Holy
Ghost of messianic Christianity, and we are no longer a million
miles away from Kierkegaard. Indeed, if we compare (1) what
Kierkegaard has to say about Hamlet not being sufficiently
‘religious’ in his doubts, with (2) Kierkegaard’s contrasting
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Trembling, we can read the entire analysis of spectral logic in
a more evidently Kierkegaardian light. The following descrip-
tion by Derrida of Hamlet’s response to his ghostly father could,
I submit, as easily have been written about Abraham’s response
to the voice of the angel in Fear and Trembling (or, for that
matter, about Levinas’ religious response to the summons of
the infinite Other): ‘This spectral someone other looks at us,
we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony,
even before and beyond any look on our part, according to
an absolute anteriority . . . and asymmetry, according to an
absolutely unmasterable disproportion’ (ibid.). More specific-
ally, we might consider the relevance of this analysis for the
notion of messianic commitment or summons – the very thing
which, according to Kierkegaard, Hamlet would have had to
be more struck by if he were to be a properly religious character:
Here anachrony makes the law. To feel ourselves seen by
a look which it will always be impossible to cross, that is
the visor effect on the basis of which we inherited from
the law. Since we do not see the one who sees us, and
who makes the law, who delivers the injunction (which is,
moreover, a contradictory injunction), since we do not see
the one who orders ‘swear’, we cannot identify it in all
certainty, we must fall back on its voice. The one who says
‘I am thy Father’s Spirit’ can only be taken at his word.
An essentially blind submission to his secret, to the secret
of his origin: this is a first obedience to the injunction. It
will condition all the others. It may always be a case of
still someone else. Another can always lie, he can disguise
himself as a ghost, another ghost may also be passing
himself off for this one . . .
(ibid.: 8–9)
In short, how can we ever be sure which kind of ghost, holy
or unholy, is here before us? Especially if, as Derrida often
says: ‘every other is every (bit) other’ (tout autre est tout autre)?
And the simple answer is: we can’t be sure.
Moreover, this question of the undecidability of the spectral
injunction is in turn related, for Derrida, to the dilemma of
mourning. Here we find curious echoes of the psychoanalytic











































Derrida, than confusion about the identity of the one dead and
gone. ‘One has to know who is buried where – and it is neces-
sary (to know – to make certain) that, in what remains of him,
he remain there. Let him stay there and move no more’
(Derrida 1994: 9). Or as the prayer for those finally buried
goes: requiescat in pace. May they rest in peace! Now Hamlet,
as we know, is notorious as someone who cannot properly
mourn his dead father precisely because he cannot pro-
perly identify his father’s nature or his past (e.g. ‘those foul
deeds committed in [his] days of nature whose very tale would
harrow up [his, Hamlet’s] soul’ etc. (1.5.12 ff.)). It is, of course,
natural for anyone who has lost a loved one at sea or in some
natural disaster to want to recover and identify the body so
that the work of mourning can take place. But this is experi-
enced as an even deeper anxiety by Hamlet. For not only has
he missed his father’s burial (he returned too late from
Wittenburg), but he can’t even be sure that the paternal spectre
who is summoning him to murder his uncle is really his father
at all – or at least the father he thought he knew! Hamlet, like
the Ghost who confronts him, is riven with undecidability –
and so he is unable to mourn (his father), to love (his mother),
to desire (Ophelia) or to act (by taking revenge on Claudius).
But, in Kierkegaard’s reading, this undecidability is even more
accentuated. For we recall Taciturnus’s view that Hamlet is
not only confused by the undecidable vision of an invisible
ghost – a thing that is nothing; he is doubly confused in that
he has no real religious experience of a God who forbids
revenge (e.g. ‘Vengeance is mine says the Lord!’ (Rom. 12:19)).
In short, Kierkegaard’s Hamlet is deprived of both an earthly
father and a divine one. And the same might – who knows?
– have been true of Kierkegaard himself in certain ‘non-
religious’ moments of vacillation, inaction or faithlessness –
moments almost too disturbing to be acknowledged. For
remember, not only did Kierkegaard have a most troubled
relation with his own father (who cursed God and crushed his
own son), he also experienced moments of deep hesitation and
confusion, especially prior to his Easter conversion. (An experi-
ence during which he felt summoned by God to speak out and
write directly in his own name and voice. And why one might
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But there is, I think, another key point at which the Kierke-
gaardian and Derridean readings of Hamlet overlap. Derrida
concludes the second chapter of his Marx book by stating that
the ‘deconstructive procedure’ he practices attempts to put into
question our inherited ‘onto-theological’ notions of historical
time by way of thinking another kind of temporality or
‘historicity’. This, says Derrida, would allow us to think ‘another
opening of event-ness as historicity that permitted one not to
renounce, but on the contrary to open up access to an affirm-
ative thinking of the messianic and emancipatory promise as
promise’ (1994: 74–5). As promise, insists Derrida, and ‘not as
onto-theological or teleo-eschatological program or design’
(ibid.). Derrida’s deconstructive thinking seeks to preserve this
very promise by inscribing the ‘possibility of the reference to
the other, and thus of radical alterity and heterogeneity (i.e.
of differance)’. And this in turn signals the impossibility of 
the present ever being fully contemporaneous or identical with 
itself (ibid.). Deconstruction maintains the indestructability of
‘emancipatory desire’, which is, Derrida concludes, the very
condition of ‘re-politicisation’, or perhaps even of ‘another
concept of the political’ (ibid.). In light of this rather ‘up-beat’
deconstructive reading of Hamlet’s undecidability, we can, 
I submit, reinterpret Kierkegaard’s verdict on Hamlet in a
variety of ways. Let me outline at least three.
First hypothesis: Kierkegaard was incapable of moving 
from a traditional Christian understanding of the religious to
a deconstructive understanding of religion-without-religion 
as ‘messianicity’ – and so he was unable to appreciate the
positive implications of Hamlet’s failure as a ‘religious hero’
(in the traditional sense). In other words, the problem with
Kierkegaard, on this score, would be that he hadn’t read
Derrida. Or to put it more plainly, he wasn’t deconstructive
enough – that is, sufficiently to realise that Hamlet’s undecid-
able reflectiveness is actually a very good and profoundly
religious thing, once one accepts the notion of ‘religion without
religion’.
Second hypothesis: Kierkegaard failed to move beyond the
old alternatives of the aesthetic versus the religious to embrace
a new category of the political. There is not one mention of 
the political in all of Kierkegaard’s references to Hamlet. While,











































references to Hamlet in Specters of Marx that is not political. Had
Kierkegaard espoused such a new concept of the political 
he might have been able to escape the paralysing either/or of
aesthetic versus religious options to which he condemns
Hamlet.
Third hypothesis: Kierkegaard is prefiguring, in his ‘Side-
Glance at Hamlet’ and other texts, Derrida’s rethinking of the
religious and the political. Read in this manner, in tune with
commentators like John Caputo, Kierkegaard may be construed
as a ‘radical hermeneut’ whose deconstructive reading of
Hamlet as neither aesthetic nor religious in strictu sensu is already
opening up a new sense of that very ‘event-ness as historicity’
that Derrida sees as the precondition of emancipatory desire.4
By this account, Works of Love and other signed works, may be
seen as anticipating the possibility of just such a new politics.
Such a deconstructive politics might, I suggest, signal the
following six features: (1) a commitment to action in fear and
trembling – that is, in tolerance and vigilance; (2) a way of
acting and suffering in the world so that the inwardly subjec-
tive and reflective is never sacrificed to the dictates of the purely
‘objective’ and impersonal imperatives of the global techno-
capitalist network; (3) a way of reflecting and acting ‘religiously’
– that is, ‘messianically’ in Derrida’s terms, or ‘in light of the
Kingdom’ in Kierkergaard’s terms – so that the impossible
tasks of justice, pardon and hospitality (the three great 
works of love) become more and more possible in each instant
of decision and commitment; (4) a deconstructive-existential
hermeneutic that tempers our instinctive rush to judgement
and condemnation in favour of more refined deliberation; (5)
a new political practice based on Hamlet’s insight that ‘memory’
is indispensable and that amnesty can never be founded upon
amnesia: for the ‘story’ of the father needs to be told, the adver-
sary’s ‘rights of memory’ needs to be honoured, so that the
repetitive cycles of mimetic desire and revenge may be over-
come; (7) an acknowledgement, finally, that the best kind of
politics is one open to both endless responsibility and the
surprise of the unexpected – the possibility of the impossible.
Read in this proto-deconstructive way, Kierkegaard may be
conceived as a kind of Derrida avant la lettre. Maybe. It’s possible.
But I’m not certain. The ghost of Hamlet that migrated into
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the one that migrated into Derrida’s – however similar on ques-
tions of non-synchronous time, undecidability and the logic of
the spectral. For when it comes to spectres and spirits, as
Derrida reminds us, ‘there is more than one of them and they
are heterogenous’ (Derrida 1994: 75). This irreducible hetero-
geneity of ghosts is perhaps itself a guarantee of the
heterogeneity of Kierkegaardian and Derridean readings. That
question remains open. But one thing is sure: new concepts of
the ‘religious’ and the ‘political’ urgently need to be opened
up and thought through in our postmodern age of growing
indifference and indifferentiation. And if either Kierkegaard (as
read through Derrida) or Derrida (as read through Kierkegaard)
can help us in this task, which I suspect they can, we must be
grateful.
Theological reading
While Kierkegaard and Derrida argue that Hamlet is neither
aesthetic nor religious but something undecidable between the
two, there are other thinkers who claim that Hamlet is in fact
a deeply theological play – and that when Shakespeare 
talks about spirits, he sometimes means just that: ‘spiritual
spirits’! In his bold reading in A Theater of Envy (1991), René
Girard argues that Hamlet is nothing less than a profoundly
religious rewriting of a revenge play (Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy),
converting it into a drama of eschatological wisdom and 
peace.5 The ambiguities and ambivalences of the psycho-
analytic, existential and deconstructive readings here give way
to a theological solution.
Everyone in the play, notes Girard, is ‘to double business
bound’ (3.3.41). All are symptoms of an original forgetfulness that
has blighted the kingdom. No character escapes the mimetic
cycle of compulsive repetition and revenge, epitomised by the
return of the ghostly phantom and covered over with a rhetoric
of ‘seems’ and ceremony. Until, that is, reality is confronted at
the end of the play and young Fortinbras enters the scene to
reclaim his ‘rights of memory’ to the kingdom. Thus while
Girard’s diagnosis of the play as a pathological tragedy of desire
confirms in some measure the psychoanalytic perspective, his
conclusion is radically different: he moves from a hermeneutic of











































Girard begins with a critical reading of Hamlet’s imprison-
ment in the doubling mechanism of mimetic desire. He inter-
prets the play as a literary attempt to go beyond the stifling
logic of rivalry and sexual betrayal – a logic that he attributes
to Shakespeare’s ‘originary traumatism’ of the ‘cuckold bawd’
experience (Ann Hathaway’s betrayal with Shakespeare’s
brother alleged by Joyce). Hamlet is a parody of a revenge play,
says Girard, pointing to the disclosure at the play’s outset that
the one to be avenged – King Hamlet – is no innocent victim
but someone who is now purging his own ‘foul crimes’ in
Purgatory. In short, the fact that the assassinated victim (King
Hamlet) was himself an assassin undermines the whole revenge-
sacrifice mechanism. The exposure of this inner mechanism,
argues Girard, reveals Claudius’s crime to be just one more
loop in a chain of revenge-murders which the young Hamlet
will simply continue if he kills Claudius in turn, as he is
commanded to do by his father’s ghost.
Shakespeare’s play dramatises the way in which the mimetic
cycle of desire, imitation and revenge has led to a ‘crisis of
indifferentiation’ where each character loses his identity and
becomes the mirror-image of the other. This inability to distin-
guish one murderer from the next is powerfully expressed in
the boudoir scene where Hamlet presents his mother with 
two portraits – one of his father, the other of Claudius – only
to show, in spite of himself, that there is more of a symmetry
between the two brothers than he wishes to admit. The
alarming symmetry (non-difference) is further revealed by
Gertrude’s inability to distinguish between the two. It is not
the Lady that doth protest too much, however, but the Prince
himself who is becoming increasingly aware of how ‘undiffer-
entiated’ his father and his uncle actually were. The
interchangeability of those caught in the revenge cycle – the
‘crisis of indifferentiation’ – is also evident in the scene by the
graveside where Hamlet and Laertes are presented as twin-
images of each other.
For Girard, Hamlet is a play that re-enacts and subverts the
sacrificial logic of mimetic violence at the heart not only of
society but, at a more symbolic and originary level, of theatrical
culture itself. It serves as a dramatisation of drama exposing
the hidden structures of theatrical pretence and cover-up. Like










































Spectres of Hamlet 181
the conscience of the king’ – and of the rest of us as well. In
this respect, concludes Girard, Hamlet should be read as a quin-
tessentially moral and Christian play that endeavours to expose
the long repressed truth of the repetitive sacrificial logic upon
which most human societies, and not just Denmark, are
founded. The only way to answer the spirit of pathological
doubling and return, signalled by the demonic Ghost, is by
invoking a Holy Ghost that redeems us from mimetic revenge
and emancipates us into pardon and letting-go – a spiritual
‘divinity that shapes our ends’. This is finally the difference
between the two Hamlets: (1) a ghostly father caught in the
reiterative cycles of the past; and (2) an ultimately, if tragically,
enlightened son who opens up a future of forgiveness.
For any theological reading of the play, the graveyard scene
is of course pivotal. The moral recovery of the original cover-
up is already prepared for in the graveyard scene where Hamlet,
who was unable to properly mourn his own father, comes to
mourn his surrogate father, Yorick. A skull is thrown up by
the gravediggers – ‘as if ’twere Cain’s jawbone, that did the
first murder’ (5.1.71–2; my emphasis). But of course, Yorick is a
foster-father who has managed, through play-acting and
humour, to escape the mark of Cain, which condemns most
other characters in the play to a cycle of fratricide. And in so
doing he, the King’s jester, has proved capable of genuine
paternity towards Hamlet – ‘here hung those lips that I have
kissed/I know not how oft’ (5.1.174–5). Now he can be
mourned as a father after the event (nachträglich).
In the grave scene, Hamlet confronts the real. He comes to
acknowledge death. This acceptance of separation and loss
amounts, as noted earlier, to what Lacan and other psycho-
analytic readers of the play call ‘symbolic castration’. This
exposure of the ‘real’ is symbolised not only in the exhuming
of dead skulls – in particular that of Yorick – but also in a
whole metaphorics of vanity and ashes running through the
exchanges between Hamlet and the gravediggers. These include
jokes about how such mighty figures as Alexander and Caesar
were finally ‘turned to clay’ (5.1.196); and perhaps most point-
edly, Hamlet’s command to the skull that it go to the ‘lady’s
chamber and, tell her, let her paint an inch thick/To this











































Hamlet that no matter how much we cover over our earthly
origins we must all undergo the ‘fine revolution’ that returns
us to the ‘base uses’ of a ‘sexton’s spade’ (5.1.82–3, 187).
Ornamental pomp and make-up count for nought.
But arguably the most telling disclosure of the graveyard
scene is that Hamlet was born on the very day his father fought
the duel with King Fortinbras thirty years previously. This fact
is recalled by the gravedigger since he, coincidentally, became
a gravedigger that same day. So, the message seems to be that
this gravedigger’s uncovering of skulls reminds Hamlet of two
forgotten facts of paternity: (1) the crucial role played by his
foster-father Yorick (whom he now belatedly mourns); and (2)
the dispatching of King Fortinbras by his actual father on the
day of his birth. So we may reasonably suppose, may we not,
that the body the gravedigger committed to the ground on that
first day of his employment, coinciding with Hamlet’s birthday,
was the corpse of King Fortinbras? And we may surmise, by
extension, that it is to the recovery of his father’s body that
Fortinbras the younger refers in his closing allusion to his ‘rights
of memory in this kingdom’?
The ‘primal secret’ (or ‘sin’ in Girard’s reading) is what 
King Hamlet did to King Fortinbras – and what Claudius does
to both Hamlets: namely, poison them to secure the rights of 
kingship. The ‘rights of memory’ restored by young Fortinbras
in the last act would refer therefore to the final righting of the
wrong committed against Fortinbras’ own father by Hamlet’s
father. And the fact that King Hamlet’s ‘foul crime’ occurred
on Hamlet’s birthday becomes central to the un-concealing
plot: a crucial revelation confirming the Prince’s opening
invocation of the ‘dram of evil’ – that ‘vicious mole of nature
in (particular men),/as in their birth, wherein they are not
guilty,/since nature cannot chose his origin . . .’(1.4.18.8–10).
Only by passing through the guts of a beggar can Hamlet come
to his own self. By mourning his surrogate father (Yorick), and
then embracing his own death in Act V, Hamlet ultimately
undergoes – after the passage of much time – the spiritual
mourning and letting-go of his ghostly father. A letting-go that
sets him free. Hamlet gives up the ghost in every sense.
Such religious surrender itself coincides, finally, with the
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commemoration at his father’s grave. Some four thousand lines
after the ghost of King Hamlet bids his son to ‘remember’, we
find another son remembering his deceased father with cath-
artic mourning. Young Fortinbras, Hamlet’s princely double,
completes the latter’s insufficient mourning. And by mourning
Hamlet in turn – instead of gloating at his demise – Fortinbras
brings an eschatological end to the bitter cycle of repetition
and revenge.
Conclusion
In Hamlet Shakespeare transforms a revenge tragedy into a play
of cathartic remembering. He stages the working through of the
immemorial until it yields peace. This transfiguring of melancholy
– or what I call ‘impossible memory’ – into epiphanic mourning
is powerfully expressed in Hamlet’s final acceptance of the reality
of mortality. So much so that one has good reason to suspect
that if the Ghost were to return in the last act, he would be
given short shrift by his son. Indeed, were this to happen, the
mature and illusion-less Prince would, logically, neither hear
nor see the spectre. Why? Because his mourning would have
been activated. Moreover, I would claim that it is Hamlet’s final
passage from melancholy to mourning that not only enables
him to face death but to preserve life. And if not his own life
(since he must literally lose it to regain it) then at least that of
others after him. This is why Hamlet’s parting words to Horatio
are so crucial. He begs him to renounce suicide in order to
heal his (Hamlet’s) ‘wounded name’ by living on to serve as his
memorialist. ‘Absent thee from felicity awhile’, pleads the dying
Prince, ‘[t]o tell my story’ (5.2.286, 289–91).
Against the standard view that Hamlet marks the ‘majesty of
melancholy’, I prefer to read the play accordingly as a meta-
morphosis of melancholy into a miracle of mourning. Shake-
speare moves beyond a play of compulsive rivalry and revenge
to one of deep spiritual enlightenment by staging one of the
finest dramas of narrative memory in Western literature.
Notes












































1 See Lacan 1982. For an elaboration of this psychoanalytic thesis see
the entry on ‘Hamlet’ in Dictionnaire de la Psychanalyse (Chemama 1993:
60–2).
2 See Green 1982.
3 For a more extensive treatment of this subject see Kearney 2003.
4 See Caputo 1987.
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8
The last act
Presentism, spirituality and 
the politics of Hamlet
Ewan Fernie
In recent Shakespeare studies, ‘presentism’, a deliberate strategy
of interpreting texts in relation to current affairs, has emerged
to challenge the dominant fashion of reading Shakespeare
historically.1 Presentism relinquishes the fantasy of restoring
‘Shakespeare’s artistry to the earliest conditions of its realisa-
tion’ in favour of embracing its true historicity as something
irreversibly changing in time.2 As Terence Hawkes writes in
Shakespeare in the Present (2002), ‘none of us can step beyond
time. It can’t be drained out of our experience’. Hawkes recom-
mends presentism as the form of criticism whose ‘centre of
gravity is accordingly “now”, rather than “then”’ (Hawkes
2002: 3, 22). In this temporally specific sense, presentism
presents Shakespeare as he is. The reception of presentism, to
date, has been mixed. According to Helen Moore writing in
the Times Literary Supplement, ‘Presentism is the new kid on the
Shakespearean block’ (Moore 2003). But although presentism
has ‘arrived’, it is often criticised, at conferences and in print,
for eliding or dissolving historical difference.3
David Scott Kastan asserts that we must begin with
Shakespeare’s ‘difference from us’ (Kastan 1999: 16). This










































the past. Moreover, the difference of history offers a standpoint
from which to challenge the present. But, as this latter point
concedes, our primary and most urgent responsibility is to the
present not the past. And backward-looking historicism is in
no position fully to exploit what difference the past can make
now. I have argued elsewhere for a form of presentism more
deliberately attuned to the challenging strangeness of literature
– which I characterised in terms not just of historical alterity
but also of the extra, unforeseeable difference literature makes
to history.4 This chapter analyses the strange spirituality of the
last act of Hamlet as a striking epitome of literary difference
that speaks powerfully and provocatively in favour of a complete
commitment to the present.
The present isn’t a closed and coherent structure. Shake-
speare’s presence in the present is itself an excellent example
of this. I will begin by exploring the surprising scope for reading
Shakespeare spiritually in the present in Stephen Greenblatt’s
Hamlet in Purgatory (2001) and Jacques Derrida’s Hamlet-
inspired Specters of Marx (1994). But I also take off from the fact
that, for Greenblatt and especially for Derrida, spirituality
breaches the present from beyond. Derrida writes, ‘Hegemony
still organizes the repression and thus the confirmation of a
certain haunting’ (Derrida 1994: 37). Greenblatt spiritual-
ised historicism when he famously cast it as speaking to the
dead (Greenblatt 1988: 1ff.). If this first formulation seemed
whimsical, Hamlet in Purgatory lends it more weight. There
Greenblatt analyses Purgatory as the institution that kept 
the living in touch with the departed.5 He sees Hamlet as the
inheritor of that cultural function. It’s easy to share Hawkes’s
objection to Greenblatt that criticism should speak not to 
the dead but to the living; but the danger for presentist criti-
cism is that, unless it’s exposed to difference, it will tell 
the living what they already know.6 Derrida interprets the erup-
tion of Old Hamlet’s spirit as a revelation of ‘the
non-contemporanaeity with itself of the living present’ (Derrida
1994: xix): a disclosure of the difference of the past that intim-
ates the difference of the future and even the pure idea of
difference itself. The time, for Derrida, is always out of joint,
the present thoroughly ruptured by all kinds of difference. A
presentist criticism that wishes to avoid historical complacency
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After Specters of Marx, spirituality recommends itself to critical
attention as a particularly direct and rich experience of other-
ness, alterity, etc. But ghosts fall short of fully manifesting
spirituality as what is not just other but also ultimately signifi-
cant and valuable. In Specters of Marx, Derrida finally develops
out of Hamlet a novel spirituality of the absolute difference that
never appears in history. This operates like a metaphysical
magnet, drawing humanity towards a different future. It’s as
if postmodernism had discovered its own repressed belief and
truth; so much for the end of ‘grand narratives’. And yet, in
the startling fifth act of Hamlet what is spiritually other and
ultimate is not beyond but immanent in events (such as ‘the fall
of a sparrow’ (5.2.157–8)) and action or ‘rashness’ (5.2.7).
Shakespeare’s most famous play ultimately dramatises a kind
of eschatological presentism that suggests that our present is
the place – the only and, therefore, the absolute place – of
agency and decision where all time may and perhaps must 
be consummated.
Greenblatt in Purgatory
As well as confessing that he ‘began with a desire to speak 
with the dead’, the Greenblatt of Shakespearean Negotiations wrote
that ‘literature professors are salaried middle-class shamans’
(Greenblatt 1988: 1). Though the spiritual colouring is less
exotic, Hamlet in Purgatory brings him full circle. Greenblatt is
frankly drawn to Hamlet, and the traditions of Purgatory, as a
way of saying kaddish for and laying to rest the ‘ghost’ of his
own father. Kaddish is a Jewish prayer of thanksgiving and
praise, part of the daily life of the Synagogue but specially
recited by orphaned mourners. Greenblatt observes that the
Jewish ritual ‘originated precisely at the time that Christianity
in the West formalized the practice of praying for the dead in
order to alleviate their sufferings in Purgatory’ and suspects it
was derived from the Christian tradition (Greenblatt 2001: 9).
It seems clear he identifies with Hamlet as the son of a dead
father, and even envies the tragic hero his chance of a super-
natural encounter with Old Hamlet’s spirit:
Anyone who has experienced the death of a close friend or











































loss but also the strange, irrational expectation of recovery.
The telephone rings, and you are suddenly certain that 
your dead friend is on the other end of the line; the ele-
vator door opens, and you expect your father to step out
into the hallway, brushing the snow from the shoulders 
of his coat.
(Greenblatt 2001: 102)
Greenblatt’s desire to contact the dead has become urgently
personal. The historical alterity of Shakespeare’s drama of
death is certainly not erased (much of the book offers an
extended cultural history of Purgatory) but it is charged with
Greenblatt’s particular, twenty-first-century, Jewish-American
experience. The father expected in the elevator has come in
from the battlements. The ‘cultural poetics’ of death of the late
medieval and early modern periods assuage the pains of death
in the present.7 Greenblatt’s bereavement, and the filial inten-
sities it evokes, probably carry over into his recent Shakespeare
biography. Will in the World ’s attempt to capture Shakespeare’s
ghost is largely staked on a new reading of Hamlet in terms 
of Shakespeare’s grief for his son, Hamnet, and anticipation of
his father’s death.8
The last chapter of Hamlet in Purgatory ends as follows:
With the doctrine of Purgatory and the elaborate practices
that grew up around it, the church had provided a powerful
method of negotiating with the dead, or, rather, with those
who were at once dead and yet, since they could still speak,
appeal, and appall, not completely dead. The Protestant
attack on ‘the middle state of souls’ and the middle place
those souls inhabited destroyed this method for most people
in England, but it did not destroy the longings and fears
that Catholic doctrine had exploited. Instead . . . the space
of Purgatory becomes the space of the stage where old
Hamlet’s ghost is doomed for a certain term to walk the
night. That term has now lasted some four hundred years
and it has brought with it a cult of the dead that I and
the readers of this book have been serving.
(Greenblatt 2001: 256–7)
Typically for Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory is a richly unsys-
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of feeling’ – ‘a powerful method of negotiating with the dead’
– is embodied in Purgatory and survives in the continuing 
life of Shakespeare’s play.9 Hamlet supplies an important spiri-
tual supplement, a secret ‘cult of the dead’, to mainstream
English Protestant culture and the later Western secular culture
of our own time.
In Marlowe’s most celebrated play, Faustus tells Mephisto-
pheles that Hell’s a fable. It’s a pretty silly thing to say to a
devil, and Mephistopheles responds, ‘Ay, think so still, till
experience change thy mind’ (Doctor Faustus (1616 text), Mar-
lowe 1999: 2.1.132). In respect of Purgatory, Greenblatt
manages to take up both Faustian and Mephistophelean posi-
tions at the same time. That is, the middle station of souls is
an invented place – as, by implication, are the upper and lower
chambers of the afterlife. And yet, to the extent that it shaped
the life and the selves of Christendom, Purgatory was very real
indeed. Greenblatt presents the disestablishment of Purgatory
as an historical trauma involving a massive deportation of 
spirits and a second bereavement for the living, as their dead
kin passed utterly beyond the scope of their indulgent love 
– as well as their more negative emotions of guilt and anger.
This evocation of exile is doubtless influenced by Greenblatt’s
earlier reflections on Jewish and postcolonial themes.10 Purg-
atory also provided an imagined buffer zone before the finality
of death for the living. But, most importantly for this bereaved
son, by institutionalising the felt proximity of the dear departed,
Purgatory met what is understood in Hamlet in Purgatory as a
transhistorical, fundamental human need to relate to and make
peace with them.11
Greenblatt’s new reading of Hamlet unfolds from a recog-
nition of the plain but routinely overlooked fact that the ghost
asks not so much to be revenged as remembered. The spirit of
Hamlet’s father is seen in relation to the old supplicating spirits
of Catholic England. Noting John Shakespeare’s supposed
recusancy, Greenblatt even imagines the Bard subjected to the
purgatorial pleadings of his deceased parent. This resonates
with his own felt duty to say kaddish. Greenblatt presents
Shakespeare’s tragedy as dramatising the progressive forgetting
of the father, thus particularising and allegorising the cultural
forgetting of Purgatory that he has narrated already and











































The spiritual content of Hamlet in Purgatory thus essentially
falls under the rubric of what Derrida (after Freud) calls ‘the
work of mourning’. The aim of such labour for Greenblatt is
‘organizing, articulating and making sense of a tangle of intense,
intimate feelings in the wake of a loved one’s death: longing,
regret, guilt, fear, anger, and grief ’ (Greenblatt 2001: 132). For
the mourner or mourners, this is more important than the
physical burial of the corpse, for only this will liberate them
from overwhelming grief and the chains of memory and restore
them to the living present. From such a perspective, speaking
to the dead must come to an end, which seems to admit the
limitations of historicism and our primary responsibility for
what is happening now. Greenblatt’s book shows how Purg-
atory provided institutional conventions and a cosmic station
for the work of mourning, a kind of waiting-room where the
dead are polite enough to linger until those they have bereaved
are ready to dispatch them and resume their own obstructed
lives. Greenblatt opposes ‘cold memory’ to ‘warm memory’ or
what Shakespeare calls ‘green’ memory. He writes of the ‘fading
of remembrance’ in Hamlet (Greenblatt 2001: 143, 218ff.). In
his account, Shakespeare’s play as much as Purgatory addresses
the process of bereavement. Both keep lines of communication
with the dead open for a certain time in order to allow for a
more complete leave-taking. At the same time, each takes 
the edge off the fear of death by making it more gradual, less
absolute.
Spirituality in Hamlet in Purgatory thus serves a remarkably
presentist function. It takes the specific form of an ancestor
cult: a common territory for mourners and historians that brings
together Greenblatt’s personal and professional concerns.
It serves a purpose in the ordinary world by enabling the living
to come to terms with the past and face their own deaths more
bravely. It is, in a word, therapeutic, more self-centred than
ethical or political. As the harbour of dead souls in the experi-
ence of the living, the spiritual experience that Greenblatt
evokes constitutes an experience of ultimacy but not of ulti-
mate values. It intimates a wider human community, but it
doesn’t really entail any vision of an alternative society such
as Christ expresses in the Gospel of John: ‘My kingdom is not
of this world’ ( John 18.36). Greenblatt is sensitive to the suffer-
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but Purgatory’s crucial position in the theatre of judgement
and salvation – to which Shakespeare’s ghost clearly and fright-
eningly testifies (1.5.9ff.) – is eclipsed by the main theme of
bereavement and remembrance.12
There is something insinuatingly unsatisfying about Green-
blatt’s title. Who is in Purgatory? Not Hamlet. Presumably
Greenblatt means to refer to Hamlet’s father, but it would 
be customary to call him Old Hamlet to distinguish him 
from the tragic hero. Another implication might be that Hamlet-
the-play is in Purgatory, but Greenblatt’s argument is more
that Purgatory’s in the play. In a sense, it is true to say that
Greenblatt’s in Purgatory. Suspended between this world and
the next, Purgatory facilitates but also defers final judge-
ment. In its comparable deferral of the ethics and politics of
spirituality, Hamlet in Purgatory affords a troubling image of our
own seminal Shakespeare critic himself languishing there.
Paradise postponed
Before Hamlet in Purgatory, and outside mainstream Shakespeare
studies, Jacques Derrida’s engagement with Shakespeare’s
tragedy had already conjured up a spiritual Shakespeare with
an urgent message on his lips. Specters of Marx (1994) is consid-
ered in Richard Kearney’s essay in this volume; its insights are
diffused throughout the book. My purpose with it is to show
how Derrida opens the ethical and political dimension of
spirituality in Hamlet that remains obscure in Greenblatt.13
I will then argue that both Greenblatt and Derrida neglect 
the last act of the play, with crucial critical and theoretical
consequences.
Derrida is more in tune with Shakespeare’s play than the
father of new historicism in one crucial respect. In his humane
responsiveness to his father’s spirit, Greenblatt is identifiable
with a more pragmatic Hamlet always aware of the necessity
of coming to terms with grief. By contrast, Derrida is like 
the Hamlet, who, according to Claudius’s worldly measure of
mourning (1.2.87ff.), exhibits an exorbitant responsiveness and
accountability. Derrida suggests:
It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost











































whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable
and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect
for others who are no longer or for those others who are
not yet there, presently living, whether they are already 
dead or not born.
(Derrida 1994: xix)
This puts intercourse with the dead at the centre of human
life and recalls, even more than Hamlet in Purgatory, the shamanic
Greenblatt of Shakespearean Negotiations. It’s tempting to say that
Specters of Marx provides a belated rationale for the new histori-
cist project in terms of responsibility for the absent historical
Other. To the extent that the Greenblatt in Hamlet in Purgatory
wants to speak with the dead to complete the work of mourn-
ing, he is moving through history in the direction of presen-
tism. But Derrida contends we cannot, should not lay our ghosts
to rest.
Shakespeare’s ghost is in being but also beyond. The purely
spiritual, Derrida implies, is that which is not at all present,
whereas the spectral hovers uncannily between presence and
absence as embodied spirit. Hamlet’s encounter with the ghost
is a primal scene of ethics: an experience of the irreducible
alterity of the other. As Derrida plainly puts it, ‘One does not
know what it is’ (Derrida 1994: 7). All others are ultimately
beyond knowledge. Moreover, because identities are deter-
mined by the free play of difference, nothing has more than
a flickering and passing presence: ‘the phenomenal form of the
world itself is spectral’, ‘the phenomenal ego (Me, You, and so
forth) is a specter’ (Derrida 1994: 135). It is a question not of
‘to be’ and ‘not to be’, then, but of being-in-between, as Hamlet
powerfully dramatises. In encountering the ghost, Derrida
suggests, Hamlet comes face to face with the ghastliness of his
own self, which affords one reason for what Greenblatt calls the
‘magical intensity’ of the tragedy and partly elucidates the
Prince’s strange and repeated utterance that draws Greenblatt’s
attention, ‘I am dead’ (Greenblatt 2001: 4, 229). The ghost is
an avatar of the Other that additionally reveals the fleeting-
ness and dependency of human being as such. In exemplifying
our own ‘lack-in-being’, mortality and difference, it encourages
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Reading Hamlet therefore opens up a spiritual horizon for
deconstruction in terms of the Prince of Denmark’s traumatic
reorientation towards otherness, but Derrida pushes beyond
the only partial absence and otherness of the ghost towards a
strange new notion of ‘the messianic’. Whereas the ghost arrives
and is recognised, Derrida’s Messiah is absolutely, unimagin-
ably other because it is always absent or ‘to come’. The ghost
summons Hamlet into specific engagement with itself, but 
the messianic is an opening towards unpredictable difference
– because we simply can’t know who or what the coming
Messiah will be. Openness to the unforeseeable difference of
this shadowy figure is openness to difference as such and 
it generates an openness to all particular differences: out of
Derrida’s novel spiritual conception a political vision of ‘a
universalizable culture of singularities’ unfurls (Derrida 2002:
57). Unlike Marx’s utopia, Derrida’s is not the communist
fruition of teleological history but the ‘messianic promise’ of a
perfect democracy, a state of perfect responsibility to all that
will never be realised.14 But, far from being hopeless, this un-
realisable dream – ‘life beyond life, life against life, but always
in life and for life’ – elevates human beings above mere biology,
supplying the ecstatic, aspirational energy of human history
(Derrida 2002: 289).
For Derrida, nothing is present in the present – not even
the present itself, which is defined by its difference from other
times. Derrida’s present is where we respond to difference. He
portrays a Hamlet who is dutifully responsive to the other that
is the ghost, but whose responsibility to others in general prevents
him from committing revenge. This Hamlet protests in the
name of (other-directed) responsibility against the (self-centred)
law of right, looking towards a day outside time when justice
would no longer be embroiled in the partisanship and fatality
of vengeance. His eyes are locked on an alien ‘messianic
extremity’, an ‘eskhaton’ of purified justice that ruptures histor-
ical complacency and ushers us towards a different future
(Derrida 1994: 37). It is an astonishing response to Shake-
speare’s tragedy. But at the end of Hamlet ‘divinity’ (5.2.10) 
is immanently present in the present, which is charged with 
‘a special providence’ (5.2.157–8). The Prince is called not 












































There are more things in heaven and earth 
than are dreamt of in your philosophy
Greenblatt and Derrida’s responses to Hamlet are in tune with
the Prince’s remark to Horatio. In the context of prevailingly
materialist criticism, Hamlet in Purgatory plugs back into the
power of Shakespeare’s tragedy to move and even heal us by
exploring themes that most post-Enlightenment thought has
completely neglected. Derrida, too, reads Shakespeare against
materialism, finding in the seemingly archaic and superstitious
figure of the ghost a revelation of the primal scene of ethics.
Moreover, the ghost provokes a new poststructuralist spiritu-
ality that is also ‘another concept of the political’ (Derrida 1994:
44). And yet, what Hamlet says to Horatio seems equally to
critique Greenblatt and Derrida, who both quickly tame the
sublime content they identify in Hamlet with interpretation. In
Shakespeare’s tragedy, the ghost speaks and, such is the magni-
ficent horror of his presence, Hamlet listens. For all their
disarming eagerness to relate, Greenblatt and Derrida don’t
listen to the ghost so much as place it at the centre of their
own respective systems of significance: for Greenblatt, the
historical loss of Purgatory itself as a way of experiencing and
coming to terms with death; for Derrida, his whole philosophy
of différance.15 The terrifying strangeness of the ghost is thus at
least partly dissipated. Remember it ‘harrows’ Horatio ‘with
fear and wonder’ (1.1.42), and poor Marcellus and Barnardo
it ‘distill[s]/Almost to jelly with the act of fear’ (1.2.204–5). It
is said to have been vomited up from the grave:
Making night hideous, and we fools of nature
So horridly to shake our disposition
With thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls . . .
(1.4.33–5)
Later it tells the Prince that it ‘could a tale unfold’ whose
‘lightest word’ would induce a number of startling physical
convulsions except that ‘this eternal blazon must not be/To
ears of flesh and blood’ (1.5.15–22).
Derrida has said something genuinely new about Hamlet,
ethics and spirituality, but Shakespeare has things to say back
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to do battle against ghosts’, that ‘formulation throws up barri-
cades, or digs trenches, surrounds itself with barriers, increases
the fortifications’ (Derrida 1994: 165). By making the ghost an
avatar of difference, he has allegorised it, crucially stripping 
it of the uncanny sameness that is a main source of its terrify-
ing power. Hamlet says of his father, ‘I shall not look upon
his like again’ (1.2.187): shockingly, he does. What ‘harrows’
Horatio is that the ghost is ‘most like’ Old Hamlet (1.1.42).
Barnardo sees it coming ‘[i]n the same figure like the king
that’s dead’ (1.1.39). With its strugglingly ponderous expres-
sion, this evokes a mind-bending prospect of death-defying
sameness. Marcellus asks, ‘Is it not like the king?’, to which
Horatio answers, ‘As thou art to thyself ’ (1.1.57–8), which at
once reduces difference to sameness and alienates self from self.
The following description perhaps best expresses the ghost’s
disruptive, questionable identity with the dead monarch: ‘These
hands are not more like’ (1.2.212).16
Of course, the ghost is crucially different from ordinary
mortals. But if encountering it reveals the primal scene of ethics,
then sameness should figure in that scenario too. The same-
ness of the other is what encroaches on and threatens the
autonomy of the self, particularly in the case of a father and
son both called simply ‘Hamlet’: Hamlet’s identity is disestab-
lished and imperilled by the unlooked for return of the other,
previous Hamlet. And Old Hamlet has come to claim, indeed
to possess his son because his identity, throne and queen have
been usurped by the next male family member, his brother
Claudius. But if the sameness of the other provokes unethical
self-assertion and revenge, identification and solidarity enables
Hamlet’s responsibility towards his father. A natural, familial
ethics of sameness is generalised in his experience of the
undoing of differences in death in the graveyard scene. That
difference is the essence of ethics, as Emmanuel Levinas as
much as Derrida suggests, isn’t beyond dispute:17 indeed, Alain
Badiou has scandalously announced, ‘the whole ethical predi-
cation based on recognition of the Other should be purely and
simply abandoned’ (Badiou 2001: 25). This is because,
according to Badiou, the status quo is defined by differences
– of race, gender and class, etc. What would really change












































But the chief limitation of Greenblatt and Derrida on the
spirituality of Hamlet is not so much that they idealise the ghost
as that they each begin and end with it. Greenblatt recognises
that the trajectory of the play describes the Prince’s gradual
forgetting of the ghost, but it does so as he proceeds towards
an apprehension in the fifth act of ‘a divinity that shapes our
ends’ (5.2.10) and ‘a special providence in the fall of a sparrow’
(5.2.157–8). Kearney (this volume) and Girard (1991; discussed
by Kearney) also pass over this, although they remark on the
transcendence of mourning. The relevant speeches occur in the
graveyard scene. In the first case, Hamlet is telling Horatio that,
when his ship for England was assailed by pirates, he replaced
Claudius’s warrant for his death with a similar warrant for
Rozencrantz and Guildenstern. ‘[L]et us know’, he goes on,
Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
When our deep plots do pall, and that should teach us
There’s a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough hew them how we will –
(5.2.7–12)
It’s an aside but its very offhand casualness serves only to
heighten the shocking access of metaphysical confidence and
security in this erstwhile prince of doubters: ‘let us know’, ‘and
that should teach us’. Hamlet declares that ‘divinity’ perfects
spontaneous, awkward human action. He locates this divine
force specifically in the killing of his erstwhile friends; he
perceives ‘heaven’s ordinance’ in having to hand his father’s
royal signet ring with which to seal their deaths (5.2.49). We
should put this together with his retroactively casting himself
as heaven’s ‘scourge and minister’ after slaying Polonius
(3.4.159). ‘[P]raised be rashness for it’ (5.2.7): within the
famously overwhelming atmosphere of mortality in the grave-
yard scene as a whole, Hamlet invokes a god of ‘casual
slaughter’ (see 5.2.326).
He subsequently associates ‘a special providence’ with a
dubious prospect. Osric has brought him the King’s challenge
to duel with Laertes. Hamlet accepts this, despite being invaded
with a malaise evidently intended as a premonition of his own
death. A troubled Horatio says he will catch up with Osric
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Not a whit. We defy augury. There’s a special providence
in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, ’tis not to come. If
it be not to come, it will be now. If it be not now, yet it
will come. The readiness is all. Since no man knows aught
of what he leaves, what is’t to leave betimes? Let be.
(5.2.157–61)18
Again, in what is said, as well as in the short, declarative
sentences in which Hamlet says it, there is the same surprising
note of absolute assurance. But it is matched here by the 
sheer inscrutability of the statement. The fall of a sparrow?
Does this imply Hamlet’s own death? Or, since sparrows were
associated with lechery, Claudius’s? What will be now or to
come or not? And what would it mean to be ready for it? By
the penultimate sentence, Hamlet seems to be contemplating
death as valediction. To what ‘Let be’ refers is less clear. The
central focus of the speech brings together the humble, random
specificity of a tumbling sparrow with the entire generality of
‘it’. Both are vehicles for ‘a special providence’, suggesting each
and every event is inhabited by some kind of divine excess and
that history is ultimately beyond human ken. Hamlet submits
to history and the coming event in a strange spirit of passive
readiness. As Roger Starling suggests, it is as if he is opening
up to the Derridean ‘messianic’ (Starling 1997/8: 207–8). But
what is to come in Hamlet makes way for an actual tragic climax
now, which encompasses a number of deaths, including
Hamlet’s own.
Hamlet’s god of ‘rashness’ is certainly more ‘other’ than
Shakespeare’s patriarchal ghost which, for all its uncanniness,
is very much an emanation of the social status quo – indeed,
responsibility to such a ghostly father could as easily be cast
in terms of conservative ideology as progressive politics. At 
this juncture in the play, A. C. Bradley, still one of the most
subtly responsive critics of the spirituality of Hamlet, identifies
an intense ‘feeling of a supreme power or destiny’ and ‘a partic-
ular tone which may be called, in a sense, religious’. But Bradley
admits ‘I cannot make my meaning clear without using
language too definite to describe truly the imaginative impres-
sion produced’ (Bradley 1971: 140). The irreducible opacity 
of Hamlet’s god suggests its inexpressible otherness: for Søren











































language but ‘in tongues’.19 Yet, as Bradley recognises, Hamlet
says enough to distinguish his ‘divinity’ from the Christian God.
Where St Paul is visited by a suffering Jesus (Acts 9.4), Hamlet
bears witness to a divine force more active and less personal.
As a god not of being and the beyond but of becoming and
history, Hamlet’s ‘divinity’ evokes the theology of the incar-
nation.20 As a ‘special providence’, it recalls the specifically
Calvinist theology of ‘predestination’: Alan Sinfield points to
parallels between Hamlet’s phrasing here and Calvin’s in the
Institutes (Sinfield 1992: 226).21 According to Sinfield, Hamlet’s
indifference to his ‘special providence’ fatally undermines and
weakens it: I will return to indifference later.
In fact, much more subversive of Christian orthodoxy is the
pure violence of a ‘divinity’ that Hamlet speaks of only in
contexts of hoisting friends with their own petard and agreeing
to take part in a suspicious sword-fight that turns into some-
thing like an orgy of death. The violence of ‘rashness’ is the
Kierkegaardian violence of seemingly unwarranted action, of
spontaneous, reckless choice, of pure historical agency – ‘I just
did it’ – which bursts beyond custom and expectation into an
incalculable future. Hamlet ‘defies augury’: knowing he is likely
to lose, intuiting that – like the sparrow – he will die, he goes
ahead anyway. His sudden metaphysics of rashness goes further
(or madder) than Kierkegaard, who proposed that ‘rashness’
might in special cases be justified by a ‘special providence’
beyond ordinary ethics, by finding ‘divinity’ solely in ‘rashness’22.
‘[P]raised be rashness’: in that shocking utterance, rashness
seems to be the very name of Hamlet’s god.
Greenblatt is convinced that ‘nothing comes of nothing, even
in Shakespeare’ (Greenblatt 2001: 4) but no context – certainly
not Purgatory’s cultural history – is totally adequate to Hamlet’s
last act. Kierkegaard is right that Hamlet is not a religious play
in any conventional sense (see Kearney, this volume). Hamlet’s
faith in a ‘divinity’ or ‘providence’ that expresses itself through
worldly events and actions in time is suggestive, to a certain
extent, of ‘the hour’ in which time is divinely fulfilled in the
Gospel of John: ‘The hour is come that the Son of Man should
be glorified’ (12:23); ‘for this cause came I unto this hour’
(12:27); ‘his hour was come that he should depart out of this
world unto the father’ (13:1), etc. But, strange though it is to
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more powerfully with the Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita. In the
Gita, Arjuna is hesitating to fight in an agony of compassion
when the god Krishna addresses him as follows:
Simply because it ought to be done, when action
That is religiously required is performed, Arjuna,
Abandoning attachment and fruit,
That abandonment is held to be of goodness.
He loathes not disagreeable action,
Nor does he cling to agreeable (action),
The man of abandonment who is filled with goodness,
Wise, whose doubts are destroyed.
(Bhagavad Gita 1944: 2.47, 18.9–10)
Arjuna responds, ‘I stand firm, with doubts dispersed;/I shall
do thy word’ (ibid.: 73); and he joins the fray. Against the run
of the play, Hamlet shares Arjuna’s enabling assurance. A
breath of metaphysical irony returns via the biblical resonances
of ‘a fall of a sparrow’ in Matthew 10:28–32 and Luke 12:4–7.
These parallel texts are disturbingly ambiguous. They cultivate
religious comfort. Matthew’s version reads:
Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them
shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the
very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not
therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows.
(Matt. 10:30–2)
But at the same time they provoke anxiety. Matthew again:
[F]ear not them which kill the body, but are not able to
kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy
both soul and body in hell.
(Matt. 10:28)
The prospect of Hell is a reminder that rashness may be demon-
ically inspired, as Hamlet feared in relation to the promptings
of the ghost from the first (‘Be thou a spirit of health or goblin
damned . . .’ (1.4.21)). For Kierkegaard, nothing – nothing











































rashnessis a terrible wager.23 But, apart from the unsettling
biblical reverberation, irony and anxiety do not undermine
Hamlet’s rashness, not so much because he has dispersed his
doubts, like Krishna disperses Arjuna’s, as because he has
engrossed them into himself and his deed in advance – by means
of his ‘antic disposition’ (2.1.173) and his obsessive mental
rehearsal of action. As a result of this anticipation of irony,
Hamlet’s rashness is actually more convincing than that of
confirmed Shakespearean action-men like Pyrrhus, Laertes and
Fortinbras, even Coriolanus.24
Where does this leave us in relation to Derrida on Hamlet?
Too often criticism is theory’s latecomer and parasite when,
as a less systematic, more phenomenological and responsive
form of thinking, it is in a position to make a creative contrib-
ution to theory. Richard Halpern has provided an engaging
materialist critique of Derrida’s reading of Hamlet already,
pitting the gravedigger and Yorick’s skull against Derridean
‘spectropoetics’. He concludes, ‘If Derrida really wants to play
the Gravedigger in Hamlet, as he claims, it is necessary to put
off his princely fastidiousness, curtail his project of endless
“filtering” and purgation, and delve in the sometimes
unpleasant muck of real history’ (Halpern 2001: 51). By contrast
with Halpern, I develop in what follows a materialist critique
of Derrida paradoxically grounded in the novel spirituality of
immanence that Hamlet develops in its last act. Such spiritu-
ality is not only compatible with the graveyard where it is
revealed, it is a spirituality of the graveyard – of time, mortality
and the event. I propose that the graveyard scene, and the
confrontation with human finitude it represents, snuffs out the
ghost, but that at the same time spirituality is transfused into
material life, being absorbed into becoming.
Hamlet’s god of ‘rashness’ challenges Derrida in at least
three ways. First, the manifestation to the Prince of a ‘divinity’
immanently involved in experience and action contravenes
Derrida’s structure of messianic deferral. Slavoj Žižek has
written that the
fundamental lesson of postmodernist politics is that there is
no Event, that ‘nothing really happens’, that the Truth-Event
is a passing, illusory short-circuit, a false identification to
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or, at best, the fleeting promise of the Redemption-to-come,
towards which we have to maintain a proper distance in
order to avoid the catastrophic ‘totalitarian’ consequences.
(Žižek 2000a: 135)
But Žižek opposes this ‘structural scepticism’, insisting, after
Jacques Lacan and Badiou, that ‘miracles do happen’ (Žižek 2000a:
135). According to Hamlet, they happen through the very
meanness and contingency of life – criminal confusion at sea,
a dodgy sword-fight, and so on. This manifestation of the
absolute through dubious means precipitates, within the play,
the overthrow of a corrupt regime. To this extent, in place of
Derrida’s Marx of messianic expectation, Hamlet seems to give
us back the Marx of material intervention. In an exact reversal
of what we might expect, Hamlet’s mystical experience turns
him from a kind of conscientious objector into an activist who
says, ‘The readiness is all’ (5.2.169). Joyce saw this when he
wrote, ‘Khaki Hamlets don’t hesitate to shoot’ ( Joyce 1992:
239–40). What Hamlet achieves is what Michael Witmore calls
‘a form of quasi-agency’, ‘a cooperation with divine providence
which, paradoxically, allows him to fulfil the ghost’s charge for
revenge’ (Witmore 2001: 109). And yet, I would add, because
Hamlet’s act is inspired by the absolute rather than his affronted
father, it transcends revenge in the direction of justice.
The existential dimension of this immersion of divinity in
the messy human element entails a more substantial human
spirituality than either Greenblatt or Derrida describe. Hamlet
has been pained by the degrading contradiction between the
transcendent qualities of human being and what Greenblatt
calls ‘the material leftover’ (Greenblatt 2001: 242): ‘What a
piece of work is a man! how noble in reason, how infinite in
faculty. . . . And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust’
(2.2.293–8).25 But, as Greenblatt does not recognise, Hamlet’s
recognition that ‘there’s a divinity that shapes our ends’ now
teaches him that mere physical life is already caught up into
divine life. This, as it were, reverses Hamlet’s earlier thought:
‘What a quintessence of dust is a man. . . . And yet, to me,
how noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, etc.’ As Žižek
writes, ‘[h]uman life is never just life, it is always sustained by
an excess of life’ (Žižek 2001: 104–5). For Derrida and his











































defers and displaces life into the future. Hamlet’s revelation
and theology suggests instead that ‘divinity’ irradiates and oper-
ates through the very imperfections of existence. This enables
him to act in favour of the absolute even as a compromised
agent in a compromised world.
If Hamlet’s avowal of a politically enabling ‘immanentiza-
tion of spirit’ (see Badiou 2003: 69) defies Derrida’s messianic
structure of expectation and possibility, then his commitment
to his god of ‘rashness’ also contravenes Derrida’s ethical spiritu-
ality of a universal responsiveness to difference. Perhaps partly
because of his thesis that ‘[t]he tragic hero remains within the
ethical’, partly because he was suffering from Bloomian ‘anxiety
of influence’, Kierkegaard explicitly missed the Shakespearean
transcendence of ethics in Hamlet. He writes in suspiciously
bardolatrous tones, ‘Thanks be to thee, great Shakespeare, who
art able to express everything, absolutely everything, precisely
as it is – and yet why didst thou never pronounce this pang?’
(Kierkegaard 1955: 69, 72). But, in his religiously inspired
violence, Hamlet achieves the very ‘teleological suspension of
the ethical’ that Kierkegaard discovered in the biblical story of
the sacrifice of Isaac. In his consideration of Kierkegaard’s Fear
and Trembling, Derrida observes, ‘Abraham is faithful to God
only in his absolute treachery, in the betrayal of his own and
the uniqueness of each one of them, exemplified in his beloved
son’. This means in general terms: ‘I cannot respond to the
call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another
without sacrificing the other other, the other others’ (Derrida
1995b: 68). In Specters of Marx, Derrida had already written in
relation to Shakespeare:
How to distinguish between two disadjustments, between
the disjuncture of the unjust [i.e. the betrayal of others in
favour of some one] and the [disjuncture] that opens up
the infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other [i.e. of
ultimate responsibility to the one in spite of everything and
all others]. Whether one knows it or not, Hamlet is speaking
in the space opened up by this question.
(Derrida 1994: 22)
But, like much literary criticism, Specters of Marx is stuck 
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from committing revenge. Once Hamlet has committed himself
to ‘divinity’ rather than the furious spirit of a murdered father,
the play dramatises the enabling power of a complete commit-
ment. After his mystical experience, Hamlet, like Abraham, is
willing to do whatever is required, and without Abraham’s
‘pang’ – which suggests Shakespeare went further than Kierke-
gaard beyond ordinary good and evil.26 As if to stress the
historical potential of spirituality, Hamlet’s mystical commit-
ment to a ‘special providence’ is inseparable from a com-
mitment to intervening in time. His god of ‘rashness’ plunges
ethical idealism into the flux and chance of history, abolishing
a separate sphere of ethics.
Only a pledge to the absolute can combine the violence of
a specific commitment with the assurance of doing right. The
other side of Hamlet’s unconditional engagement is his achieve-
ment of what seems to be a kind of inspired, militant
indifference. This too challenges Derrida’s ethics of difference
and is the third count in which the play offers grounds for
critiquing poststructuralism. In Hamlet, justice is not achieved
by exposure to difference as in Derrida’s prescription for it.
Hamlet is devoted to difference before Act Five: he wants to
be different from the world; he wants ‘man’ to be different
from ‘woman’ and his own mortality; he desperately asserts
the distinction of his father. But this just gets him more stuck
in the system of differences (of individuality, of gender, of class)
that constitutes social life. It is Hamlet’s engagement with the
absolute that decidedly lifts him out of this system of differ-
ences and enables him to see and, more crucially, to act
disinterestedly.
No one to my knowledge has placed Hamlet’s crucial tran-
sition from ‘To be, or not to be’ (3.1.58) to ‘Let be’ in the
context of the rich history of indifference and letting-be in the
history of ideas in the Western tradition. The medieval German
mystic Meister Eckhardt (1270–1327) characterised true reli-
gion as the relinquishing of self-centred being in order to let
God be.27 As Hans Urs von Balthasar points out, the Thomist
tradition in theology explains the spiritual worth of indiffer-
ence by saying that the ‘part’ should love the ‘whole’ more
than itself, while Augustinian, Anselmian and Franciscan
thoughts hold that the right should be desired for its rightness











































of a ‘new and deeper’ virtue of ‘indifference’ able to let the
Good be without trying to acquire it (Balthasar 1988: 212–13).
In philosophy, the later Heidegger appropriated this theolog-
ical tradition in his own crucial notion of Gelassenheit (Heidegger
1966). This is thinking as the renouncing of willing, especially
of that utilitarian instrumentality which drives the advance of
technology; it is pure contemplation, free from desire to master
the world. All these accounts present indifference as the subjec-
tive path to ethical truth. Most recently, Badiou has approached
the matter from the other side, stressing that truth is indifferent
to subjective differences (Badiou 2001). Indifference, letting-be,
Gelassenheit: all these correspond to the ‘mysterious and beau-
tiful disinterestedness’ Harold Bloom attributes to the fifth-act
Hamlet (Bloom 1989: 57).
Hamlet cannot do justice in his own behalf, especially as he
is the son of the victim. As Kant saw, justice must be performed
in the name of transcendental objectivity.28 ‘If it be now, ’tis
not to come. If it be not to come it will be now’ is illuminated
by unselfish indifference: whether ‘it’ is Hamlet’s or Claudius’s
death or any other event, it’s all one to Hamlet. In this context,
the confusing generality of the Prince’s ‘Let be’ begins to look
more like gracious largesse. It suggests resignation to ‘a special
providence’ and acceptance of his own imperfection. It seems
to make peace with the world, bearing fruit in courtesy to
Gertrude, solidarity with Laertes and communion in death 
with both – and even with Claudius, whom Hamlet forces 
to drink from the poisoned cup with the strange words sug-
gestive of the Eucharist, ‘Is thy union here?’ (5.2.268). But far
from preventing him from passing violent judgement on the
world, such peaceful resignation enables Hamlet to channel 
‘a special providence’ purely and knowingly, with a self-
transcending, missionary conviction that he is acting in favour
of the absolute. As it turns out, this involves not just killing
but suicidally surrendering himself to the judgement he recog-
nises in chance and death as well. Such is his defiance of
‘augury’ and his own best interests. It might still be hard 
to see how Hamlet’s distant and strange serenity facilitates
decisive action but, in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, Žižek
quotes G. K. Chesterton to bring out the militant potential 
of indifference: ‘A soldier surrounded by enemies, if he is to
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indifference to it; he must desire life like water and yet drink
death like wine’ (Chesterton 1995: 9; quoted in Žižek 2002:
89–90). As any athlete or actor knows, you’ve got to be suffi-
ciently relaxed to spring powerfully into action.
From his sudden indifference to life, Hamlet gets life back:
‘He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life
in this world shall keep it unto life eternal’ ( John 12.25). He
receives the power to act not from his father but from else-
where. And yet his sudden faith that ‘divinity’ is absorbed in
the mess and chance of history enables him to live and die
confidently and unanxiously. His indifference and belated
enactment of his heroic role are intimately related.
Indifference in Hamlet involves what Žižek describes as
‘unplugging’ from the symbolic order (Žižek 2000b: 123ff.).
Hamlet’s ‘unplugging’ extends to his removal from the Danish
succession. Hamlet doesn’t succeed Hamlet, and never looks
like doing so: he certainly doesn’t kill Claudius in order to gain
the Danish throne. Hamlet is also removed from marriage and
even sexual relations. Is he a virgin? It would intensify the pity
and fear. That the thought is somehow unbearable is suggested
by Kenneth Branagh’s flashback in his 1996 film of the 
play placing Hamlet in Ophelia’s bed. Manly Old Hamlet is
more appropriately succeeded by the straightforwardly potent
Fortinbras. Lapsed as a lover, passed over for Fortinbras, Hamlet
is effectively emasculated by the play. More positively, he seems
to move beyond cultural conditioning and more or less arrive
on the other side of social and sexual difference, thereby furnishing
an important counter-example to criticism that sees character
as wholly culturally determined.
Perhaps most importantly in the context of current criticism,
Hamlet’s deed suggests the possibility of an authentic act not
determined by prevailing conventions, in this case of revenge.
The deterministic historicism of contemporary intellectual life
has weakened the credit and perhaps even the scope for indi-
vidual agency and resistance.29 But Hamlet’s divinely inspired
act breaks the deadlock of the prevailing situation. Through it,
in the most unlikely circumstances, an extraneous justice takes
the place of partisan revenge, not in the name of Hamlet’s father
but as it is disposed by ‘divinity’ and a ‘special providence’.
But what sort of justice is achieved at the end of Hamlet?











































dead. As is his (previously the murder victim’s) queen. The
degree of Gertrude’s guilt is disputed.30 She recognises some
(3.4.78–81) and is surely involved in Claudius’s, but does she
deserve to die? Laertes, who has conspired with Claudius to
kill Hamlet, is dead. Polonius is dead already: he schemed with
the wrongful king and (to the detriment of especially his
daughter) was superficial and a tedious talker. Hamlet, who
killed Polonius, is dead. By his own morally strenuous account,
he is guilty of more offences than we have words to put them
in (3.1.125ff.) – among them must be numbered vacillating
with bloody consequences, as well as mistreating Ophelia 
and killing her father, which causes her death. And Hamlet
was supposedly the best person in the play: ‘O what a noble
mind is here o’erthrown!/The courtier’s, soldier’s, scholar’s 
eye, tongue, sword’ etc. (3.1.149ff.). According to the Prince,
all are guilty – all of the above, and all others as well – which
would validate universal punishment.
The justice of the last act remains finally undecidable.
Hamlet, as Sinfield writes, ‘plays with Osric (this scene seems
purposefully desultory), competes recklessly with Laertes, makes
no plan against the king. The final killing occurs in a burst of
passionate inspiration’ (Sinfield 1992: 228). And yet, Hamlet
has prepared us for rough justice beyond human scope by
testifying that ‘a special providence’ operates through exactly
such ‘rashness’ and seemingly random contingency. Bradley
suggests that
in all that happens or is done we seem to apprehend some
vaster power. We do not define it, or even name it, or
perhaps even say to ourselves that it is there; but our
imagination is haunted by the sense of it, as it works its
way through the deeds or the delays of men to its inevit-
able end.
(Bradley 1971: 139)
I have said that Hamlet engrosses irony into his long-awaited
action to the effect that, when finally he performs it, it is less
susceptible to deconstruction. But so obscure is the last act 
of the play, so wide is the gap between its ‘accidental judge-
ments’ and ‘casual slaughters’ (5.2.326) and the significance
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true to say that interpretation cannot be definitive. As in
Kierkegaard, we ultimately don’t know. Hamlet proclaims we
must act without knowing. Of course, it is possible that his indif-
ference is a screen for his interest. Perhaps Hamlet exposes action
as a form of passivity, and we should take the equation between
action and letting-be at face value? Perhaps Hamlet really
achieves agency in the refusal to act that he sadly relinquishes
at the end? Again, Bradley seems most apt because he is 
most sensitive to the ambiguities. He writes, ‘the Hamlet of the
Fifth Act shows a kind of sad or indifferent self-abandonment,
as if he secretly despaired of forcing himself to action, and 
were ready to leave his duty to some other power than his 
own’. But Bradley immediately havers in this interpretation,
confessing there is ‘[s]omething noble in [Hamlet’s] careless-
ness’, and then reverting to bemused wonder at the strange
power he insists is moving through the action (Bradley 1971:
116–17, 141).
I maintain that the spirituality of rashness discussed earlier
is a major, intellectually and politically provocative implica-
tion of the immanent operation of the ultimate in the play. 
It is inherent in the structure of Hamlet and of drama itself. 
A theatrical pun is at work in that Hamlet’s act ends the last
act of the play, and with the specific act expected with
increasing intensity from the beginning. Hamlet’s act is a last
or ultimate, an eschatological act, because it’s performed in
the name of the absolute, because it’s the last thing he does
and because it entails his own death. Action is the distinguishing
feature of dramatic art. Rashness is action denuded of reason,
action that surges ahead of words and thinking in a shameless
overstepping of ‘the modesty of nature’ (3.2.17–18) – in other
words, pure action: action itself. Hamlet’s god of rashness is
therefore the god of drama even more than it’s a god of history,
and it enables a simultaneously aesthetic and spiritual resolu-
tion. Witmore suggests that Hamlet is a ‘trial’ challenging its
audience to recognise theatre’s ‘reigning provisional deity’
(Witmore 2001: 109). After all the Prince’s sustained recoil
from action and, as a result, from the very medium of theatre
in which he finds himself stranded, Shakespeare’s play impro-
vises a new ontology of being-in-action, an ontology that doesn’t
so much drag the present into the artifice of eternity as it drags











































What are we to make of this in our present? At Riverside
Studios in London 2004, Sulayman Al-bassam’s award-winning
The Al-Hamlet Summit (2004) cast Hamlet as a diffident, Euro-
peanised Arabic playboy. Its most stunning moment was the
Prince’s reappearance in the robes of Islamic fundamentalism.31
Perhaps we should recall here that in our contemporary world,
after the collapse of Soviet communism, the dominant and repre-
sentative form of political resistance to Western capitalism is
religious. As the subject of an ambiguous otherworldly act,
Hamlet seems disturbingly like a contemporary terrorist. Does
Shakespeare’s play propose that invoking the absolute in order
to act might facilitate good as well as evil? The unfocused ‘War
on Terror’ sometimes seems like a neurotic, itself terroristically
pre-emptive clampdown on any resistance to conventional
Anglo-American culture. Can we imagine a peaceful revolu-
tion? With Fortinbras waiting in the wings, few commentators
would be optimistic about the political future suggested by
Shakespeare’s tragedy. But, in the vivid present of its own event,
Shakespeare’s play epitomises a metaphysics of rashness – an
absolute now – wherein everything is gathered and staked upon
a deed.
Notes
1 Presentism’s most important exponents are Hugh Grady and Terence
Hawkes. See especially Grady 1991, 1996 and 2002 and Hawkes
2002.
2 See Kastan 1999: 17.
3 This, for example, was the basis of Margreta de Grazia’s critique of
presentism in a 2004 Shakespeare Association of America session in
New Orleans titled ‘Missing Links: Historicism, Presentism, and the
Limits of the Modern’. Kastan writes against presentism in similar
terms (Kastan 1999: 17). For a more detailed critique, see Wells 2000a
and 2000b. See also Pechter 2003, especially pp. 521–2. For a more
positive account, see Fernie 2005. For overviews, see Moore 2003 and
Brown 2004.
4 See Fernie 2005.
5 According to a review article by David Schalkwyk, Hamlet in Purg-
atory ‘strikes at the heart of the most fundamental of Materialist
dogmas’ – ‘the primacy of the material’ – by showing how an
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6 See Hawkes 2002: 4.
7 For a sophisticated and illuminating discussion of how new historicism,
and especially Hamlet in Purgatory, meet ‘present needs and interests’,
see Schalkwyk 2004.
8 See Greenblatt 2004.
9 Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000 assert that the unsystematic empiri-
cism of new historicist thought is a distinct advantage.
10 Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000 includes reflections on Jewishness.
Greenblatt 2000 addresses the subject autobiographically. On post-
colonial themes, see especially Greenblatt 1992.
11 It may be that Greenblatt’s concern with death and bereavement is
focused and sharpened by the thought of the Holocaust. In the
prologue to Hamlet in Purgatory, Greenblatt recalls that the book was
partly written at Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin and that ‘the fact that
Berlin is haunted by ghosts was itself a powerful inducement to reflect
on the claims of the dead and the obligations of the living’ (Greenblatt
2001: xi). Greenblatt 2000 evokes a visit with his younger son to his
ancestral homeland where he contemplated the massacre of the Vilna
Jews.
12 For an astute historical and theological perspective on the narrow-
ness of Greenblatt’s treatments of Purgatory and Hamlet, see Sarah
Beckwith 2003. Beckwith details Greenblatt’s exclusion of ‘justice,
judgement and reconciliation’ and ‘the incarnation of performance’
in terms of his failure to consider the medieval sacrament of penance.
In the same volume, David Aers critiques Greenblatt’s handling of
the Eucharist in Practicing New Historicism (Aers 2003).
13 For a positive account of Derrida’s reading of Shakespeare’s play,
see Starling 1997/8. For a more sceptical treatment, see Halpern
2001.
14 See Derrida 1997 for much discussion of the place of this notion in
Derrida’s thought.
15 The verbal clue here is that Greenblatt desires to speak to the dead;
and although Derrida says it is needful to speak to, of and with the
ghost and ghosts, that still isn’t exactly listening.
16 Greenblatt can productively be read against Derrida here. He too
reflects on the uncanny likeness that the text stresses (Greenblatt
2001: 210ff.).
17 For an introduction to Levinas’s thought, see Levinas 1985 and 1989.
18 I follow the Oxford editor (and most others) here in including ‘Let
be’ which is not in the Folio text. See Shakespeare 1987.
19 See Kierkegaard 1955.
20 See Swinburne 1994 for a recent consideration of the doctrine of
incarnation.
21 For a more subtle treatment of Hamlet in terms of Protestant provi-
dentialism and theatrical aesthetics, see Witmore 2001. My argument











































mind, Witmore underplays the extent to which Hamlet’s theology 
of ‘accident’ is also a theology of ‘rashness’. Witmore’s emphasis 
is metatheatrical. He suggests that through Hamlet’s avowals of
‘providence’ Shakespeare is prompting recognition of his own author-
ship. I focus instead on the existential and metaphysical implications
of a spirituality of accident and rashness for Hamlet himself and for
agency in general.
22 See Kierkegaard 1955.
23 Ibid.
24 In Shakespeare’s play, this more resolute and heroic Hamlet force-
fully supplants the wan and fainting figure of critical tradition from
Goethe onwards (Goethe 1989: 146).
25 See also Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000: 141.
26 For more on Kierkegaard and Hamlet, see Kearney’s essay, this
volume.
27 See Eckhardt 1941: 127.
28 Kant writes, ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could
also will that my maxim should become a universal law’ (Kant 1997:
402).
29 Greenblatt’s avowal that subversion is always contained is the locus
classicus of such hopelessness (Greenblatt 1988: 65). The history of
politically ambitious cultural materialism can be cast in terms of a
struggle with the pessimistic determinism suggested by its own name.
As Claire Colebrook observes, ‘Because of the problematisation of
the humanist subject and the Marxist economic base, post-Marxist
criticism has struggled to find a legitimating ground from which its
political critique can be launched’ (Colebrook 1997: 194).
30 See, for instance, Ouditt 1996 and Smith 1980.
31 This reworking of Hamlet produced by Zaoum Theatre from an Arabic
viewpoint and in a non-specific Arabic setting won a Fringe First
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Afterword
Jonathan Dollimore
There is, of course, feel-good spirituality, as in the advice once
given me by a Californian new-ager: ‘choose the kind of spir-
ituality you feel most comfortable with’. And then there is its
opposite, spirituality of the anguished kind wherein conscious-
ness is tormented by loss, lack, guilt, conflict and finitude, and
always and restlessly searching for something other.
It is to their credit that the contributors to this volume eschew
feel-good spirituality while at the same time avoiding the histri-
onic gestures of its agonised opposite. Readers will find here an
engagement with both Shakespeare and spirituality that is intel-
ligent, original, and challengingly optimistic, one that surely
succeeds in its wish to ‘reinvigorate and strengthen politically
progressive materialist criticism’ (Introduction: 3). Haunting is
just one of its intriguing themes, and I want to suggest that a
collection such as this, precisely because of its intelligence and
commitment, must be haunted by that darker, agonised spiritu-
ality that was a driving force of early modern culture, and
indeed of Western culture more generally, right up to and
including the present.
Tragedy, and especially Renaissance tragedy, presupposes










































The famous Chorus Sacerdotum from Fulke Greville’s Mustapha
suggests how the agonised spirituality of the West is potentially
also politically dangerous:
Oh wearisome condition of humanity!
Born under one law, to another bound:
Vainly begot yet forbidden vanity,
Created sick, commanded to be sound:
What meaneth nature by these diverse laws?
Passion and reason self-division cause:
Is it the mark or majesty of power
To make offences that it may forgive?1
Shakespeare’s sonnet (129) ‘The expense of spirit in a waste
of shame’ is perhaps the most famous dramatisation of the ‘self-
division’ consequent on the conflict between ‘passion and
reason’, but there are many more from this period. And the
fact that ‘spirit’ here links semen and soul via the notion of
vital energy is a reminder of how inclusive the early modern
spiritual sensibility could be.
The editor of this volume is surely right in saying that histor-
ical/materialist approaches to Shakespearean drama have been
unable to handle its spiritual dimensions. Consider something
obsessively central to both spirituality and tragedy, namely
death. The historical approach to death insists that it is not
some essential thing, but a socio-historical construct; it tells us
that to look for the transhistorical continuities in the human
experience of death is fundamentally misguided; on the con-
trary, we must understand death as something that changes
across time within any one culture and that fundamentally
differs between cultures (and religions). So, in the latter case
there will be, e.g. a Buddhist conception of death, and a Chris-
tian one; in the former, there will be a medieval way of dying
and a Victorian one, and so on. Difference is all.
This is true, as far as it goes. But as is often the case, the
agreeable truth (diversity and difference) is used to evade the
less agreeable (the anguish of mortality). Historicism performs
this evasion not just with respect to specific topics such as 
death, but in its very methodology, and especially in its assump-
tion that anything in the past can be explained if its full his-











































history is rarely if ever retrievable, but the assumption that all
would be revealed if it were, is the ideal to which the histor-
ian aspires. In other words, nothing of itself, and in relation
to us, is inexplicable in principle, only in practice. Nothing
more than inadequate historical data stands between us and 
a full understanding of the past. To the extent that this assump-
tion pervades historicism of all kinds, it entails a certain irony:
this most empirical of procedures has at its methodological
heart something of the a priori. By contrast, a spiritual pers-
pective might (for example) accept in principle that the object
of its understanding may be ultimately incomprehensible, or
comprehended fully only at the cost of undermining what
currently counts as understanding.
Not surprisingly, then, the contemporary encounter with
spirituality proceeds via deconstruction and postmodernism. To
the extent that this entails finding spirituality where it might
least be expected, it is encouraging: the most interesting forms
of the spirit are always the unexpected ones. But the urbane
complexities that characterise both deconstruction and post-
modernism, at least in their academic forms, are as likely as
historicism to obscure the less palatable truth with the more
agreeable one.
Why are the most interesting forms of spirit the unexpected
ones? Partly because spirituality survives most interestingly via
a kind of radical continuity – that is, a continuity arising from
negation. Something is negated but survives by mutating into
the form of its opposite; so, for example, spirituality survives
in and as unbelief (only the sacrilegious truly understand the
sacred).
Thus Freud, who professed himself the unbelieving scientist,
redramatised human interiority – the very space of spirituality
– by enlarging its domain, elaborating its complexity and
intensifying its conflicts. Psychoanalysis became a new religion,
or at least was embraced by those who might otherwise have
been religious, or for whom unbelief made religion proper
untenable. Not for nothing does Anthony Burgess in Earthly
Powers have a prospective Pope remark in 1938 that Freud
could still be a good Jewish theologian if only he would stop
inventing words like ‘id’ (Burgess 1981: 394).
But it is Nietzsche who is most significant here. He who











































modernists, and never more so than when he is castigating all
religion and especially Christianity; his anguished conscious-
ness, his desperate quest for intellectual truth and an authen-
ticity of self, his sense of supreme effort (will to power) born
of lack, and, above all, his acute sense of conflict as the 
very condition of being, make him the heir of Western spir-
ituality. And like Renaissance writers before him, Nietzsche
realised that tragedy at its most challenging derives from spiri-
tual dissatisfaction – specifically the convergence of forbidden
knowledge and dissident desire.
Milton’s Adam and Eve are told: ‘know to know no more’
(Paradise Lost 4. 775).2 They disobey, and their transgressive
desire for forbidden knowledge brings death into the world,
into desire. In other words, transgressive desire is inseparable
from forbidden knowledge and together they kick-start history
and become the stuff of tragedy.
For those like Milton this produces a state of spiritual alien-
ation as terrible as it is deplorable. But for Nietzsche we are
most ourselves when in this destructive and suffering state of
knowing and desiring more than we should. This is one aspect
of his transvaluation of values (continuity through negation),
the upshot of which is a survival in him of a specifically Chris-
tian sense of free will: we retain the capacity to violate the
restraints of the history that has produced us, even if at a
terrible cost. This was also a view that Nietzsche attributed to
Shakespeare. The rationalist typically regards the accumula-
tion of knowledge as a progressive and irreversible consolidation
of civilisation. But Nietzsche affirms another kind of know-
ledge, one that does not consolidate civilisation, but threatens
it. It is the knowledge that civilisation itself is at heart illusory.
‘Illusory’ here refers not to some residual superstitions, soon to
be swept away by the march of rational progress, but to the
very structure of ‘rational’ civilisation; anticipating Freud,
Nietzsche believes that human civilisation requires illusion in
order to be what it is. (Later Freud would elaborate this idea
in terms of repression, disavowal and sublimation.) To know
that this is so makes one a spiritual outcast from society, under-
standing too much from a spiritual position ‘beyond good 
and evil’.
This is Nietzsche’s reading of Hamlet – he has ‘seen through’











































derives not from confusion and doubt, but from too much
knowledge. Likewise with Macbeth, but with him it is also
about affirming what has been repressed – of desublimating
the life force itself, turning it against civilised morality, and
celebrating its destructive power. So it’s a mistake, says
Nietzsche, to think that Shakespeare’s theatre was aiming for
a moral effect. In this regard Macbeth does not warn against
hubris and ambition; on the contrary it affirms their attrac-
tion. And the fact that Macbeth ‘perishes by his passions’ is
part of his ‘daemonic attraction’. By ‘daemonic’ (dämonisch)
Nietzsche means ‘in defiance against life and advantage for the
sake of a drive and idea’ (Gedankens und Triebes). He adds:
Do you suppose that Tristan and Isolde are preaching
against adultery when they both perish by it? This would
be to stand the poets on their head: they, and especially
Shakespeare, are enamoured of the passions as such and
not least of their death-welcoming moods.
Shakespeare, like other tragic poets, ‘speaks . . . out of a rest-
less, vigorous age which is half-drunk and stupefied by its excess
of blood and energy – out of a wickeder age than ours is’. But
the guardians of high culture in our own day disavow this:
they seek to ‘adjust and justify the goal of a Shakespearean
drama’ precisely in order that they (and we) ‘not understand
it’ (Nietzsche 1982: 140–1).
Thus Shakespeare and his guardians fall on opposite sides of
Nietzsche’s great divide between, on the one hand, those who
affirm the life force, and on the other those who turn away 
from it – between, in other words, the daemonic and the
humanitarian. In The Gay Science this distinction is expressed in
terms of two distinct kinds of sufferer – those who suffer from
a superabundance of life and those who suffer from an impov-
erishment of life. The former live with a spiritual intensity,
wanting ‘a Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and insight
into life’, and willingly confront ‘the terrible and questionable
. . . every luxury of destruction, decomposition, negation’; while
the latter avoid that same intensity, choosing instead ‘mild-
ness, peacefulness, goodness in thought and in deed . . . a
certain warm, fear-averting confinement and enclosure within











































All this is to the point, although Nietzsche wilfully miscon-
strues Macbeth. This play is indeed a profound exploration of
the daemonic, but its tragedy is the recalcitrant conflict between
the daemonic and the humane, between the Macbeths’ ‘black
and deep desires’ and the ‘milk of human kindness’ (1.4.51,
1.5.15). And if this type of conflict is the focus of many of the
most memorable tragedies, it is also embedded in the history
of human civilisation, and one reason why tragedy is widely
regarded as the most profound of all literary genres. But
Nietzsche’s view of the artist and philosopher as knowing too
much, of seeing through, demystifying and maybe undermining
the ideological, religious and cultural ‘fictions’ of society, and
thereby ‘de-repressing’ subversive desires – all this is clearly
relevant to Shakespeare, whose own heroes, anti-heroes, lovers
and malcontents are already doing something similar. Similar
but perhaps with even darker implications: if Nietzsche revels
in the idea that Macbeth ‘perishes by his passions’, these plays
dramatise the agony, the violence and the psychological conflict
generated by the destructive and illicit desires that the Macbeths
entertain. On the one side is the world of humane values,
expressed most vividly in the imagery of nurturing the depen-
dent infant, and whose condition is repression, suppression,
exclusion and disavowal, these being the preconditions for civil-
isation itself. On the other, the dangerous knowledge that
understands the price being paid for the humane, and the trans-
gressive desire that knowledge permits and incites, and that
will not pay the price even if the consequence is a terrible
inhumanity: courage screwed to the sticking place in a will to
power (spirit as ‘undaunted mettle’ (1.1.73)) that would will-
ingly dash out the brains of the sucking infant rather than fail.
Black and deep desires can only be free of the humane in and
through its deepest violation, which means of course that they
can never be free. Macbeth shows how the threat of the daemonic
derives not from a pure, pre-social nature or instinct, clearly
distinct from the culture it threatens, but from the return of
repressed desire so inextricably bound up with culture it is
impossible anymore to distinguish between the two. This is
why only the highly civilised can become truly daemonic. Early
modern writers knew well that ‘corrupted’ reason was capable
of an intensity of evil unknown to the non- or irrational; lilies











































repressed has a virulence that is not the opposite of civilisa-
tion but its inversion; not unfettered pre-social libido indifferent
to the civilising restraint it has escaped, but, on the contrary,
desire returning via the ‘civilising’ mechanisms of its repres-
sion, mechanisms it is still inseparable from, even as it violates
them. Thus Lady Macbeth’s image of herself dashing out the
brains of her own child.
Is Nietzsche right about the ‘death-welcoming’ moods of
artists such as Shakespeare? His was a religious culture whose
more extreme forms were death-obsessed; thus Richard
Crashaw, writing in the seventeenth century about St Teresa
and martyrdom: ‘Such thirsts to die, as dares drink up/A thou-
sand cold deaths in one cup’ (‘A Hymn to the Name and
Honor of the Admirable Sainte Teresa’, 37–8).3 Truly, a thirst
for annihilation. And Shakespeare’s is a theatre in which those
who desire most illicitly not only die, but also seem to embrace
death. One reason is to be found in that early modern (spiritual)
sensibility for which death was at once the enemy of desire (it
destroys what we love) but also that which guarantees the end
of desire; both cause of and release from pain. A diligent
researcher (ungraciously I have forgotten who – such diligence
deserves better) once counted more than two hundred suicides
in around one hundred plays between 1580 and 1640; appar-
ently Shakespeare has no less than fifty-two – remarkable
indeed for a society in which suicide was severely demonised.
If in real life suicide is most often a desperate escape from
wretched suffering, in literature it is most often a profoundly
spiritual expression of the suffering born of dangerous know-
ledge and/or dissident desire.
Nietzsche paid with his sanity for trying to live just such a
spirituality, at once austerely severe and romantically exces-
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Žižek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso.
–––– (2000a) The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology,
London and New York: Verso.
–––– (2000b) The Fragile Absolute – Or, Why Is The Christian Legacy Worth
Fighting For?, London: Verso.
–––– (2001) On Belief, London and New York: Routledge.
–––– (2002) Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11
and Related Dates, London and New York: Verso.
–––– (2003) The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity,












































absolute xvii, 7, 15, 18, 202–4,
208
Adam 101
Adorno, Theodor, W. Aesthetic
Theory 136–8
Aers, David 210 n.12
aesthetics 136–8, 147–51, 157;
and religion 166–73, 178–80
Ali, Tariq 11
All’s Well That Ends Well 18, 19,
28–49
Amirthanayagam, David P. 71 n.2
anthropology 74–6
Antony and Cleopatra 2, 3, 5, 8, 124
apparition and artworks 135–8,
140–51; and messianic
commitment or summons 176;
and otherness 132–3; of spectre
175–6; (see also ghost/phantom;
spectre/s); and visor effect 175
Aristotle 168, 170
Arminianism 106
Armstrong, Isobel 137, 153
Artaud, Antonin 148
As You Like It 15, 16, 18, 26 n.17
Attridge, Derek 155 n.2
Augustine 127 n.9, 127 n.10
Bacon, Francis 97
Badiou, Alain Ethics: An Essay on
the Understanding of Evil 16, 25
n.2, 26 n.18, 79, 155 n.2, 196,
205; Saint Paul: The Foundation of
Universalism 12, 25 n.2, 26 n.18,
80, 81, 92 n.11, 93 n.19, 211
n.2




Beckett, Samuel 148; Endgame 138
Beckwith, Sarah 210 n.12
Benjamin, Andrew 97
Benjamin, Walter 140
Berger, John 127 n.14
Bernstein, Jay M. 156 n.7




Bishop, T.G. 16, 25 n.8
Blair, Tony 12, 154, 156 n.13
Bloch, Ernst 27 n.25
Bloom, Harold 71 n.2, 205
Bowers, Fredson 52, 59
Bowie, Andrew 136
Bradley, A.C. 71 n.2, 198–9,
207–8
Brecht, Bertolt 148
Brook, Peter xvii, 20, 134–8, 149,
155 n.4
Brown, Marshall 209 n.3
Bruns, Gerald 150












































Buber, Martin 19, 50, 72 n.9, 72




Bush, George 11–12, 154
Callaghan, Dympna 26 n.13
Calvinism 100, 108 n.3, 105, 110,
199; (see also Reformation)
Caputo, John D. xvii–xix, 25 
n.2, 25 n.6, 56, 72 n.8, 77–8,
92 n.6, 185 n.4
Catholicism xvii, 2, 25 n.3, 71
n.1, 100, 105, 110, 190;
Medieval 168; Roman 126 n.1
Cavell, Stanley 138–9
Chapman, George 104
Cheney, Patrick 26 n.21
Chesterton, Gilbert K. 205
Christ 5, 27 n.28, 81–2, 84,
100–1, 191; (see also
Christianity; God; Jesus)
Christianity 2, 6, 12, 15, 16, 27
n.23, 27 n.28, 31–2, 34, 37–8,
41–2, 55, 74, 77, 85–9, 93 n.16,
127 n.10, 154, 166, 168, 178,
182, 188, 215; (see also Christ
and iconoclasm 126 n.1; Jesus);
and orthodoxy 199
Coakley, Sarah 92 n.10, 93 n.17
Cohen, Walter 83
Colebrook, Claire 211 n.31
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 44
communism 15
Coriolanus 201
Coyle, Martin 84, 89
Cranmer, Thomas 106





death/the dead 184, 188–90, 191,
193, 195, 196, 205–7, 
210 n.15, 213–18;
acknowledgement of 182;
in All’s Well That Ends Well
29–31, 34–6; of Christ 12; 
(see also Derrida, Jacques); and
difference and sameness 196;
gift of 131–2 ; of God xvii, 92
n.10; and the Holocaust 191,
210 n.11; and life 152, 192–3;
(see also spirituality; and
mourning); and Nietzsche
214–18; of Old Hamlet 131–2,
188–9; of Richard II 66–7; and
social subjection 40; and
tragedy 213
deconstruction 14–15, 21, 158,
173–180, 214
de Grazia, Margreta 98–9, 126 
n.2, 126 n.3, 209 n.3
Derrida, Jacques xix, 11, 16–17,
27 n.25, 210 n.13, 210 n.15;
Acts of Religion 14, 25 n.2, 194;
Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A
Conversation with Jacques Derrida
210 n.14; The Gift of Death 3, 92
n.5, 92 n.6, 141, 143, 146–9,
152, 156 n.9, 156 n.14; Given
Time: 1. Counterfeit Money 77;
Monolingualism of the Other; or, 
the Prosthesis of Origin 155 n.5;
On the Name 92 n.11; Positions
xvii; Specters of Marx 11–15,
17–19, 21, 23, 56, 99, 132,
173–80, 187, 192–7, 201–4,
210 n.16
Descartes, René 97
de Vries, Hent 25 n.2
Diehl, Huston 24 n.1
Docherty, Thomas 136
Dolan, Frances E. 25 n.3
Duffy, Eamon 106
Durling, Robert 112, 127 n.8
Dutton, Richard 25 n.3
Eagleton, Terry 17, 27 n.27


















































essentialism xix, 3, 8
Eucharist 92 n.10, 93 n.5, 93




feminism 116, 27 n.28; (see also
gender)
Fernie, Ewan 24 n.2, 209 n.3, 209
n.4, 186–211
fetishism 109–29; and the dish of
doves (The Merchant of Venice)
87–91; and kenosis (The
Merchant of Venice) 82–7; and
metonymy 117; negative
discourse of 111; and objects of
lure and illusion 162; and
original sexual object 117–18;
and otherness 110–11; and
Petrarch 112–17; and the
phallus 162–3; pre-modern
discourse of idolatry and
modern discourse of 116; and
Reformation iconoclasm, and
idolatry 20, 112; as religious
relic 117; and secularization
and a demonized Other 111;
and the Sonnets 122–5
Feuerbach, Ludwig xvii
Finlayson, Michael 25 n.3
Foakes, R. A. 152
Foucault, Michel 96, 108 n.2
Frascati-Lochhead, Marta 93 
n.13
Freccero, John 112, 127 n.8, 127
n.9
Freinkel, Lisa 24 n.2, 20, 109–29,
128 n.20
Freud, Sigmund 20, 117–19, 
122, 128 n.19, 214, 215; and
fetishism 111, 118, 119, 120,
121, 127 n.13; Interpretation of
Dreams 161; Libidostauung 128
n.18; Penisersatz 120–2, 124;
Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality 117, 118, 119;
Verleugnen 111, 118; (see also
fetishism)
Friedman, Maurice S. 72 
n.9
Fukuyama, Francis 11
fundamentalism 27 n.23; 
(see also Islam)
Gallagher, Lowell 24 n.2, 19,
73–93, 127 n.9, 210 n.9, 210
n.10
gender 7, 8, 22–3, 38–40, 45–7,
101, 105–8, 115–16, 119–20,
206; (see also feminism)
ghost/phantom 157–85, 186–211;
and awareness-unawareness
163; as conscience 158; (see
also dead/death); demonic 182;
and the divine 165; and
doubling 165; -as-erasure 158; 
-as failure 157; and healing 
165; heterogeneity of 180;
holy/unholy 157, 175, 182; 
in Marx’s Communist Manifesto
174–5; and memory 165–6,
190; and mourning 21, 
161–2, 183–4, 176–7; (see
also spirituality: and mourning);
and narrative catharsis 184; 
and other/difference 13, 163–4,
176, 193, 196; (see also
spirituality: and otherness/
difference/alterity/the beyond);
and phantom effect 164; as-
unconscious 157; and the 
self 193
Girard, René 21, 24 n.2, 157,











































God xvii, xviii, 42, 52, 66–7, 82,
87, 100–1, 113, 134, 140, 
145, 154, 171–2, 177, 199, 
200, 214
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von
171, 173, 211 n.25
Grady, Hugh 24 n.2, 51, 72 n.12
Green, André 164, 185 n.2
Greenblatt, Stephen 26 n.19, 210
n.9, 210 n.10, 211 n.26; Hamlet
in Purgatory 11, 20–1, 26 n.22,
131–2, 187–93, 199, 202, 210
n.7, 210 n.11, 210 n.12, 210
n.16; The Inevitable Pit: On
Becoming American 210 n.11;
Shakespearean Negotiations 10, 188,
193, 206 n.31; Will in the World
189, 189 n.8
Gregerson, Linda 93 n.15




Halpern, Richard 127 n.13, 
201
Hamilton, Gary 71 n.1
Hamlet xvii, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 21,
66, 157–85, 186–211, 211 
n.22; (see also Greenblatt,
Stephen; Hamlet in Purgatory)
Hammer, Espen 139
Hampson, Daphne 93 n.13
Hand, Sean 72 n.16
Harvey, Gabriel 97, 104
Hawkes, Terence 186, 206 n.6,
209 n.1
Hazlitt, William 44–5
Heelas, Paul 26 n.12, 27 n.24
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
10, 12, 27 n.28, 92 n.10
Heidegger, Martin 25 n.6, 92 n.3,
96–7, 205; (see also
phenomenology)
1 Henry IV 57, 58, 63–6, 105
2 Henry IV 57, 61–3, 70–1
1 Henry VI 3, 5
2 Henry VI 3
Henry V 8, 51, 62, 63, 65, 67–8,
70
Henry VIII 9
historicism 187, 191, 206, 209
n.3, 213–14; new historicism 
24 n.1, 27 n.27, 37, 210 n.7,
210 n.9
Hoeniger, David F. 108 n.7
Horner, Robyn 92 n.2, 92 n.3, 92
n.7
humanism 93 n.20, 211 n.31;
liberal 87
Hunt, Maurice 71 n.1
Husserl, Edmund 92 n.3
ideology 7–8, 12, 23, 198, 217; (see
also spirituality: and ideology)
Irigaray, Luce 25 n.2, 27 n.28
Islam 3, 16, 26 n.15;
fundamentalism xviii, 11, 209;
and terror 12–13
Jackson, Ken 24 n.1, 26 n.16, 56,
72 n.8, 77 n.5
Jameson, Frederic 25 n.5, 25 n.11
Janicaud, Dominique 92 n.7
Janik, Allan A. xvii
Janowitz, H.D. 72 n.14
Jesus 32, 81, 87, 161, 199; 
(see also Christ; Christianity;
God)
Jews/Jewishness/Judaism 5, 74,
77, 80, 84–8, 93 n.16, 110, 113,
188–90
John, Gospel of/ Saint 93 n.20,
93 n.21, 199, 206
Johnson, Samuel 45–6
Jones, Ann Rosalind 109–12, 126
n.3
Joughin, John J. 20, 130–56, 155
n.6, 156 n.7
Joy, Morny 25 n.2, 27 n.28














































Kant, Immanuel 205, 211 n.30
Kastan, David Scott 186, 209 n.2,
209 n.3
Kearney, James 126 n.1, 126 n.3
Kearney, Richard 21, 79, 157–85,
185 n.3, 197, 199
Keats, John 147
Kerrigan, John 108 n.5,
Kierkegaard, Søren 16, 21, 134–5,
141, 153, 157, 177, 178; On
Authority and Revelation 172; Fear
and Trembling 145, 151–3,
175–6, 180, 198–201, 203, 208,
210 n.19, 211 n.23, 211 n.24;
Stages on Life’s Way 166–73
King Lear 2, 6, 16–17, 63, 70, 82,
152–3
Kittredge, G. L. 52
Knapp, Jeffrey 24 n.1, 25 n.9, 55
Kohanski, Alexander S. 72 n.9
Krips, Henry 127 n.13
Lacan, Jacques 15, 21, 127 n.13,
157, 161–2, 165, 182, 185 n.1,
202
Laclau, Ernesto 11
Lake, Peter 25 n.1, 25 n.3
Lenin, Vladimir 16
Levin, Harry 72 n.7
Levinas, Emmanuel 14, 19, 50, 72
n.16, 74, 79, 83, 90, 176; Entre
nous: Thinking-of-the Other 92
n.11, 93 n.13; Ethics and Infinity:
Conversations with Phillippe Nemo
68–9, 210 n.17; Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence 51; In the
Time of the Nations 92 n.11;




Loomis, Roger Sherman 93 n.14
Love’s Labour’s Lost 16, 71 n.4,
94–108
Luke, Gospel of/St 93 n.20, 
200
Lupton, Julia Reinhard 24 n.2, 24
n.3, 26 n.16, 72 n.17
Luther, Martin 20, 112, 127 n.7
Lyotard, Jean-François 12
Macbeth 5–7, 25 n.7, 70, 216–18
McCoy, Richard 24 n.1
McGee, C. E. 71 n.2
Machiavelli, Niccolò 51
McLaverty, James 52
MacLean, Hugh 72 n.14
Malinowski, Bronislaw 75
Malone, Edmund 123 n.22
Manonni, O. 126 n.5
Marion, Jean-Luc 74, 78, 83, 88,
90, 92 n.11
Mark, Gospel of/St 93 n.20, 93
n.21
Marlowe, Christopher 190
Marotti, Arthur F. 24 n.1, 24 n.2,
25 n.3
Marsh D. R. C. 72 n.14
Marshall, David 148, 150–1, 156
n.10
Marx, Karl xvii, 13, 56, 75,
173–5, 194, 202
Marxism 10–12, 26 n.13, 175
materialism xviii, 2, 3, 5, 10, 19,
21 n.1, 74, 76, 89, 95, 195,
201, 209 n.5, 212; cultural 10,
24 n.1; dialectical 10, 12;
Marxist 10; the new
materialism 110, 126 n.2; of
objects 98; secular xix
Matthew, Gospel of/St 43, 87,
200
Mauss, Marcel 56, 75–6
Mazzotta, Giuseppe 112, 127 
n.8
Measure for Measure 7, 9
The Merchant of Venice 1–2, 5–6, 19,
73–93, 92 n.4, 93 n.16, 93
n.18, 93 n.20











































messianic 14–15, 27 n.25, 79,
133, 140, 154, 168, 175, 178,
194, 198, 201–2
metaphysics 96, 143
Metzger, Bruce M. 92 n.8
A Midsummer Night’s Dream 1,
3–4, 5, 7, 16, 18, 20, 25 n.6,
33, 39, 130–56, 133, 134,
139–40, 144, 147, 156 n.10,
151
Milbank, John 93 n.16
Milton, John 7, 215, 218 n.2
modernism 215
Moore, Helen 186, 209 n.3
Morales, Alberto 72 n.9
Moses 32
Mouffe, Chantal 11–2
Much Ado About Nothing 64
Mullaney, Steven 72 n.6
Mulvey, Laura 116, 127 n.14
Murphy, John W. 72 n.9
Murphy, Roland E. 92 n.8
Nashe, Thomas 97, 104
Newell, Philip 25 n.4
Nietzsche, Friedrich xviii, 214–18
Newman, Franklin B. 71 n.2
Newman, Karen 75
Othello 2–3, 5, 12
Otto, Rudolf 157
Ouditt, Sharon 211 n.32
Ovid: Metamorphoses 72 n.11
pagan 31–2, 37
Parker, John 126 n.3
Parker, Patricia 94–5
Pascal, Blaise 97
Patocka, Jan 92 n.5
Paul, Gospel of/St 15, 80–3,
86–8, 100, 134–5, 140, 199
Pechter, Edward 209 n.3
Petrarch 109, 112–13, 128 n.16,
118, 122–3, 127 n.8, 127 n.13,
128 n.16
Phan, Chantal 108 n.9
phenomenology 74, 76, 77, 89, 92
n.3, 92n.7, 93 n.18, 95–6, 201;
(see also Heidegger, Martin)
philosophy xvii, xix, 21, 74, 97,
131, 157, 173
‘The Phoenix and Turtle’ 16
Pietz, William 110–11, 116, 127
n.15
Platonism 127 n.9
poetry 4, 6; (see also spirituality:
and poetry)
Poole, Kristen 71 n.1
Porter, Joseph 52
postcolonialism 190, 210 n.10
post-Enlightenment 195
post-Marxism 11–2, 211 n.31
postmodernism xvii, xviii, 8, 18,
24 n.2, 25 n.2, 95, 131, 165,
180, 188, 201
poststructuralism 15, 16, 37, 204
Potter, Lois 52
pre-Copernicus xviii
presentism 24 n.2, 186, 186 n.3,
208
Protestantism 2, 27 n.23, 71 n.1,
100, 109, 126 n.1,189–90, 210
n.22; (see also Reformation)
psychoanalysis 21, 109, 115–16,
157, 161–4, 180, 214
Puritans 41
Puttenham, George 121–2
Quilligan, Maureen 98–9, 162 n.2
realism xix
Reformation 50 n.1, 84 n.16; (see
also Calvinism; Protestantism)
religion 2, 8, 11–12, 19, 43, 71
n.1, 74, 78, 80, 84, 109, 117,
157, 166–80, 198, 200, 212,




Renaissance 76, 98, 109, 212, 215











































Richard III 1, 3, 5, 6
Rockas, Leo 87
Romanticism 147–8
Romeo and Juliet 148
Rorty, Richard 25 n.6
Rose, Gillian 131, 135, 150, 156
n.12
Rubinstein, Frankie 108 n.8
Ruiter, David 19, 50–72
Rushdie, Salman 25 n.6
Ryan, Kiernan 18–19, 26 n.17, 27
n.25, 28–49, 155 n.1
Sardar, Ziauddin 26 n.15
Scanlon, Michael J. 77–8, 92 n.6
Schalkwyk, David 209 n.5, 210
n.7
Schlegel, August Wilhelm von
147–8
Sheldrake, Philip 25 n.10
Shell, Alison 24 n.1, 25 n.3
Shuchter, J.D. 52
Shuger, Deborah 24 n.1
Silberstein, Laurence J. 72 n.9
Sinfield, Alan 10, 199, 207
Smith, Rebecca 211 n.32
sociology 74
The Sonnets 20, 109, 122–5, 126
n.5, 128 n.21
spectre/s (see also apparition); of
communism 174; and a crisis 
of narrative memory 159–61;
and difference/otherness 163,
176, 181; (see also ghost/
phantom); of Hamlet 157–85;
and phenomenal ego 193; 
and phenomenal form of the
world 193; and spirituality 
180 (see also spirituality: and
spectre/s); and theatrical
culture 181; and visor effect
175
Spenser, Edmund 104 The Faerie
Queene 93 n.15
spirituality 1, 19, 25 n.10; and
aesthetics/artworks/drama/
theatre 2–8, 16, 18, 20–1, 24,
25 n.9, 132, 136–8, 140, 150,
181–182, 187; (see also
spirituality: and ‘Holy
Theatre’); and alienation 215;




beyond good and evil 215; and
bodily life 10, 23, 43, 102, 105,
139, 200; and contemporary
debates 2, 9, 12, 19, 21, 27
n.23, 209, 212; and continuity
arising from negation 214–15;
and crisis/tension/struggle 6, 7,
18; and death 106–7; (see also
death); of deconstruction 14–15;
deferral of ethics and politics in
Hamlet in Purgatory 192;
definition of 8, 21, 25 n.10; and
Derrida 11, 13–14; (see also
Derrida, Jacques: Specters of
Marx); and dispossession 17;
and dissatisfaction 215; and
doubling 182; and the early
modern 213; and experience 7,
24 n.2; feel good 212; of female
generativity 7; French feminist
theoreticians of 27 n.28; (see also
feminism; gender); and fetishism
109–27; (see also fetish); and
gift/gift exchange 56–7, 73–93,
77–8, 81, 85; and God or the
divine 82–3, 113, 134, 165,
177, 182, 198–200, 202; (see also
God; spirituality: and
transcendence); and grace 19,
80–1, 85, 87–8, 95, 99–101,
105–8, 145; of the graveyard
201; and Hamlet and ethics 195;
historical potential of 204; holy
or unholy 165; and ‘Holy
Theatre’ 20, 135–6, 149–50;
and humanism 27 n.23; and











































and indifference 204; of
immanence 188, 201; and
intensity 216; and literature 25
n.6; (see also poetry; spirituality:
and poetry); and materialism 3,
9–10, 20, 74, 187 n.5; (see also
materialism); militant 12–13;
and miracle or resurrection 19,
27 n.23, 32–3, 36, 38, 41–4; as
mode of opposition 9–10; and
mourning 21, 145, 153, 161,
176–7, 182–4, 188; (see also
dead/death; ghost/phantom);
and ‘new age’ religion 10, 18,
23; Nietzschean 214–15; (see also
Nietzsche); as open structure
8–10; and ordinary life/
everydayworld 20, 50–72,
59–61, 60, 71, 134, 137, 142–3,
150; otherness/difference/
alterity/the beyond xvii, xix,
3–5, 6, 8, 13, 20, 26 n.19,
28–9, 33, 78–9, 90–1, 95, 111,
132, 133–6, 138, 140, 146, 150,
154–5, 163–4, 175–8, 181,
187–8, 191, 193–6, 198, 199,
203–6, 212; and poetry 4, 16;
(see also spirituality: and
literature; poetry); and political
history 61; and power 9; of
rashness 21, 188, 194, 198–201,
199 n.22, 204; and relationship
60, 61, 63–4, 70; and religion
2, 9–10, 16–17, 30–2, 37, 38,
42–3, 45, 65–7, 80, 82–4, 87–8,
198; (see also religion); and
revelation 134; and sacrality 95;
and salvation 101–8, 165;
sexual 7; and the spectral 193;
(see also apparition; ghost/
phantom; spectre/s); and
subjectivity 3, 19, 214; (see also
subjectivity); and suicide 218;
and theology 2; and theory 2;
and things 96–9, 108, 113,
119–21, 132, 175,177; and
tragedy 212–3; and
transcendence 43–4, 46–7,
49–51, 54, 64, 69–71, 78–81,
85–6, 90–1, 111, 136, 191, 197,
202–3, 205; (see also spirituality:
and God or the divine); and
truth 6, 7, 9; (see also truth); as
ultimate 18, 24, 26 n.22, 188,
191; and urgency 5; version 
of legality 99; and worldly
shame 17
Stallybrass, Peter 26 n.13, 98–9,
109–10, 126 n.1, 126 n.2, 126
n.3, 128 n.17, 128 n.22
Starling, Roger 198, 210 n.13
Steevens, George 128 n.22
Subjectivity 3, 7, 15–16, 68–70,
81–2, 85–6, 95, 97–8, 101, 110,
126 n.2, 168, 196, 205, 214
Swinburne, Richard 210 n.21
The Taming of the Shrew 39
Taylor, Gary 24 n.2
Taylor, Mark C. xviii
The Tempest 14, 22–3, 27 n.28, 33
terror 9, 12, 16, 19, 21, 43–4, 76,
154; (see also Islam: and terror)
theology 2, 77, 84, 92 n.10, 93
n.18, 93 n.20, 107, 115, 157–8,
178, 180–4, 199, 203
Thomas, Gospel of/St 27 n.28
Timon of Athens 8, 56, 92
Trinitarian 93 n.20
truth xviii, 9, 97, 136, 164, 196,
201, 205, 213, 214; (see also
spirituality: and truth)
Tyacke, Nicholas 108 n.11
Vickers, Nancy 109, 112, 115,
116, 118, 123, 127 n.14
Ward, Graham 92 n.10, 92 n.20
Wells, Robin Headlam 209 n.3
Wernick, Andrew 25 n.2













































Wilson, Richard 24 n.2, 25 n.3,
26 n.23
The Winter’s Tale 2–5, 7, 21, 24,
141–6 152
Witmore, Michael 202, 211 n.22
Wright, Eugene 52, 72 n.7
Yan, Yunxiang 75
Young, David 148
˛i≈ek, Slavoj 14–18, 23, 26 n.19,
26 n.20, 205–6; On Belief 25
n.2, 26 n.18, 202; The Fragile
Absolute – Or, Why Is The
Christian Legacy Worth Fighting
For? 25 n.2, 26 n.18, 93 n.22,
206; The Puppet and the Dwarf:
The Perverse Core of Christianity
12–14, 17, 25 n.2, 26 n.18, 27
n.28; The Sublime Object of
Ideology 126 n.5; The Ticklish
Subject: The Absent Centre of
Political Ontology 15, 25 n.2, 26
n.18, 201–2; Welcome to the Desert
of the Real!: Five Essays on
September 11 and Related Dates
12–14, 25 n.2, 26 n.18, 206
1111
2
3
4
5111
6
7111
8
9
1011
1
2
3111
4
5
6
7
8
9
20111
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
30111
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
40111
4111
Index 241



